CHAPTER 3.
THE NEGOTIATIONS.
The British Government and the British people do not desire any
direct authority in South Africa. Their one supreme interest is
that the various States there should live in concord and
prosperity, and that there should be no need for the presence of a
British redcoat within the whole great peninsula. Our foreign
critics, with their misapprehension of the British colonial system,
can never realise that whether the four-coloured flag of the
Transvaal or the Union Jack of a self-governing colony waved over
the gold mines would not make the difference of one shilling to the
revenue of Great Britain. The Transvaal as a British province would
have its own legislature, its own revenue, its own expenditure, and
its own tariff against the mother country, as well as against the
rest of the world, and England be none the richer for the change.
This is so obvious to a Briton that he has ceased to insist upon
it, and it is for that reason perhaps that it is so universally
misunderstood abroad. On the other hand, while she is no gainer by
the change, most of the expense of it in blood and in money falls
upon the home country. On the face of it, therefore, Great Britain
had every reason to avoid so formidable a task as the conquest of
the South African Republic. At the best she had nothing to gain,
and at the worst she had an immense deal to lose. There was no room
for ambition or aggression. It was a case of shirking or fulfilling
a most arduous duty.
There could be no question of a plot for the annexation of the
Transvaal. In a free country the Government cannot move in advance
of public opinion, and public opinion is influenced by and
reflected in the newspapers. One may examine the files of the press
during all the months of negotiations and never find one reputable
opinion in favour of such a course, nor did one in society ever
meet an advocate of such a measure. But a great wrong was being
done, and all that was asked was the minimum change which would set
it right, and restore equality between the white races in Africa.
'Let Kruger only be liberal in the extension of the franchise,'
said the paper which is most representative of the sanest British
opinion, 'and he will find that the power of the republic will
become not weaker, but infinitely more secure. Let him once give
the majority of the resident males of full age the full vote, and
he will have given the republic a stability and power which nothing
else can. If he rejects all pleas of this kind, and persists in his
present policy, he may possibly stave off the evil day, and
preserve his cherished oligarchy for another few years; but the end
will be the same.' The extract reflects the tone of all of the
British press, with the exception of one or two papers which
considered that even the persistent ill usage of our people, and
the fact that we were peculiarly responsible for them in this
State, did not justify us in interfering in the internal affairs of
the republic. It cannot be denied that the Jameson raid and the
incomplete manner in which the circumstances connected with it had
been investigated had weakened the force of those who wished to
interfere energetically on behalf of British subjects. There was a
vague but widespread feeling that perhaps the capitalists were
engineering the situation for their own ends. It is difficult to
imagine how a state of unrest and insecurity, to say nothing of a
state of war, can ever be to the advantage of capital, and surely
it is obvious that if some arch-schemer were using the grievances
of the Uitlanders for his own ends the best way to checkmate him
would be to remove those grievances. The suspicion, however, did
exist among those who like to ignore the obvious and magnify the
remote, and throughout the negotiations the hand of Great Britain
was weakened, as her adversary had doubtless calculated that it
would be, by an earnest but fussy and faddy minority. Idealism and
a morbid, restless conscientiousness are two of the most dangerous
evils from which a modern progressive State has to suffer.
It was in April 1899 that the British Uitlanders sent their
petition praying for protection to their native country. Since the
April previous a correspondence had been going on between Dr.
Leyds, Secretary of State for the South African Republic, and Mr.
Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, upon the existence or
non-existence of the suzerainty. On the one hand, it was contended
that the substitution of a second convention had entirely annulled
the first; on the other, that the preamble of the first applied
also to the second. If the Transvaal contention were correct it is
clear that Great Britain had been tricked and jockeyed into such a
position, since she had received no quid pro quo in the second
convention, and even the most careless of Colonial Secretaries
could hardly have been expected to give away a very substantial
something for nothing. But the contention throws us back upon the
academic question of what a suzerainty is. The Transvaal admitted a
power of veto over their foreign policy, and this admission in
itself, unless they openly tore up the convention, must deprive
them of the position of a sovereign State. On the whole, the
question must be acknowledged to have been one which might very
well have been referred to trustworthy arbitration.
But now to this debate, which had so little of urgency in it that
seven months intervened between statement and reply, there came the
bitterly vital question of the wrongs and appeal of the Uitlanders.
Sir Alfred Milner, the British Commissioner in South Africa, a man
of liberal views who had been appointed by a Conservative
Government, commanded the respect and confidence of all parties.
His record was that of an able, clear-headed man, too just to be
either guilty of or tolerant of injustice. To him the matter was
referred, and a conference was arranged between President Kruger
and him at Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State. They
met on May 30th. Kruger had declared that all questions might be
discussed except the independence of the Transvaal. 'All, all, all!
' he cried emphatically. But in practice it was found that the
parties could not agree as to what did or what did not threaten
this independence. What was essential to one was inadmissible to
the other. Milner contended for a five years' retroactive
franchise, with provisions to secure adequate representation for
the mining districts. Kruger offered a seven years' franchise,
coupled with numerous conditions which whittled down its value very
much, promised five members out of thirty-one to represent a
majority of the male population, and added a provision that all
differences should be subject to arbitration by foreign powers, a
condition which is incompatible with any claim to suzerainty. The
proposals of each were impossible to the other, and early in June
Sir Alfred Milner was back in Cape Town and President Kruger in
Pretoria, with nothing settled except the extreme difficulty of a
settlement. The current was running swift, and the roar of the fall
was already sounding louder in the ear.
On June 12th Sir Alfred Milner received a deputation at Cape Town
and reviewed the situation. 'The principle of equality of races
was,' he said, essential for South Africa. The one State where
inequality existed kept all the others in a fever. Our policy was
one not of aggression, but of singular patience, which could not,
however, lapse into indifference.' Two days later Kruger addressed
the Raad. 'The other side had not conceded one tittle, and I could
not give more. God has always stood by us. I do not want war, but I
will not give more away. Although our independence has once been
taken away, God has restored it.' He spoke with sincerity no doubt,
but it is hard to hear God invoked with such confidence for the
system which encouraged the liquor traffic to the natives, and bred
the most corrupt set of officials that the modern world has seen.
A dispatch from Sir Alfred Milner, giving his views upon the
situation, made the British public recognise, as nothing else had
done, how serious the position was, and how essential it was that
an earnest national effort should be made to set it right. In it he
said:
'The case for intervention is overwhelming. The only attempted
answer is that things will right themselves if left alone. But, in
fact, the policy of leaving things alone has been tried for years,
and it has led to their going from bad to worse. It is not true
that this is owing to the raid. They were going from bad to worse
before the raid. We were on the verge of war before the raid, and
the Transvaal was on the verge of revolution. The effect of the
raid has been to give the policy of leaving things alone a new
lease of life, and with the old consequences.
'The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently in
the position of helots, constantly chafing under undoubted
grievances, and calling vainly to her Majesty's Government for
redress, does steadily undermine the influence and reputation of
Great Britain within the Queen's dominions. A section of the press,
not in the Transvaal only, preaches openly and constantly the
doctrine of a republic embracing all South Africa, and supports it
by menacing references to the armaments of the Transvaal, its
alliance with the Orange Free State, and the active sympathy which,
in case of war, it would receive from a section of her Majesty's
subjects. I regret to say that this doctrine, supported as it is by
a ceaseless stream of malignant lies about the intentions of her
Majesty's Government, is producing a great effect on a large number
of our Dutch fellow colonists. Language is frequently used which
seems to imply that the Dutch have some superior right, even in
this colony, to their fellow-citizens of British birth. Thousands
of men peaceably disposed, and if left alone perfectly satisfied
with their position as British subjects, are being drawn into
disaffection, and there is a corresponding exasperation upon the
part of the British.
'I can see nothing which will put a stop to this mischievous
propaganda but some striking proof of the intention of her
Majesty's Government not to be ousted from its position in South
Africa.'
Such were the grave and measured words with which the British
pro-consul warned his countrymen of what was to come. He saw the
storm-cloud piling in the north, but even his eyes had not yet
discerned how near and how terrible was the tempest.
Throughout the end of June and the early part of July much was
hoped from the mediation of the heads of the Afrikander Bond, the
political union of the Dutch Cape colonists. On the one hand, they
were the kinsmen of the Boers; on the other, they were British
subjects, and were enjoying the blessings of those liberal
institutions which we were anxious to see extended to the
Transvaal. 'Only treat our folk as we treat yours! Our whole
contention was compressed into that prayer. But nothing came of the
mission, though a scheme endorsed by Mr. Hofmeyer and Mr. Herholdt,
of the Bond, with Mr. Fischer of the Free State, was introduced
into the Raad and applauded by Mr. Schreiner, the Africander
Premier of Cape Colony. In its original form the provisions were
obscure and complicated, the franchise varying from nine years to
seven under different conditions. In debate, however, the terms
were amended until the time was reduced to seven years, and the
proposed representation of the gold fields placed at five. The
concession was not a great one, nor could the representation, five
out of thirty-one, be considered a generous provision for the
majority of the population; but the reduction of the years of
residence was eagerly hailed in England as a sign that a compromise
might be effected. A sigh of relief went up from the country. 'If,'
said the Colonial Secretary, 'this report is confirmed, this
important change in the proposals of President Kruger, coupled with
previous amendments, leads Government to hope that the new law may
prove to be the basis of a settlement on the lines laid down by Sir
Alfred Milner in the Bloemfontein Conference.' He added that there
were some vexatious conditions attached, but concluded, 'Her
Majesty's Government feel assured that the President, having
accepted the principle for which they have contended, will be
prepared to reconsider any detail of his scheme which can be shown
to be a possible hindrance to the full accomplishment of the object
in view, and that he will not allow them to be nullified or reduced
in value by any subsequent alterations of the law or acts of
administration.' At the same time, the 'Times' declared the crisis
to be at an end. 'If the Dutch statesmen of the Cape have induced
their brethren in the Transvaal to carry such a Bill, they will
have deserved the lasting gratitude, not only of their own
countrymen and of the English colonists in South Africa, but of the
British Empire and of the civilised world.'
But this fair prospect was soon destined to be overcast. Questions
of detail arose which, when closely examined, proved to be matters
of very essential importance. The Uitlanders and British South
Africans, who had experienced in the past how illusory the promises
of the President might be, insisted upon guarantees. The seven
years offered were two years more than that which Sir Alfred Milner
had declared to be an irreducible minimum. The difference of two
years would not have hindered their acceptance, even at the expense
of some humiliation to our representative. But there were
conditions which excited distrust when drawn up by so wily a
diplomatist. One was that the alien who aspired to burghership had
to produce a certificate of continuous registration for a certain
time. But the law of registration had fallen into disuse in the
Transvaal, and consequently this provision might render the whole
Bill valueless. Since it was carefully retained, it was certainly
meant for use. The door had been opened, but a stone was placed to
block it. Again, the continued burghership of the newcomers was
made to depend upon the resolution of the first Raad, so that
should the mining members propose any measure of reform, not only
their Bill but they also might be swept out of the house by a Boer
majority. What could an Opposition do if a vote of the Government
might at any moment unseat them all? It was clear that a measure
which contained such provisions must be very carefully sifted
before a British Government could accept it as a final settlement
and a complete concession of justice to its subjects. On the other
hand, it naturally felt loth to refuse those clauses which offered
some prospect of an amelioration in their condition. It took the
course, therefore, of suggesting that each Government should
appoint delegates to form a joint commission which should inquire
into the working of the proposed Bill before it was put into a
final form. The proposal was submitted to the Raad upon August 7th,
with the addition that when this was done Sir Alfred Milner was
prepared to discuss anything else, including arbitration without
the interference of foreign powers.
The suggestion of this joint commission has been criticised as an
unwarrantable intrusion into the internal affairs of another
country. But then the whole question from the beginning was about
the internal affairs of another country, since the internal
equality of the white inhabitants was the condition upon which
self-government was restored to the Transvaal. It is futile to
suggest analogies, and to imagine what France would do if Germany
were to interfere in a question of French franchise. Supposing that
France contained as many Germans as Frenchmen, and that they were
ill-treated, Germany would interfere quickly enough and continue to
do so until some fair modus vivendi was established. The fact is
that the case of the Transvaal stands alone, that such a condition
of things has never been known, and that no previous precedent can
apply to it, save the general rule that a minority of white men
cannot continue indefinitely to tax and govern a majority.
Sentiment inclines to the smaller nation, but reason and justice
are all on the side of England.
A long delay followed upon the proposal of the Secretary of the
Colonies. No reply was forthcoming from Pretoria. But on all sides
there came evidence that those preparations for war which had been
quietly going on even before the Jameson raid were now being
hurriedly perfected. For so small a State enormous sums were being
spent upon military equipment. Cases of rifles and boxes of
cartridges streamed into the arsenal, not only from Delagoa Bay,
but even, to the indignation of the English colonists, through Cape
Town and Port Elizabeth. Huge packing-cases, marked 'Agricultural
Instruments' and 'Mining Machinery,' arrived from Germany and
France, to find their places in the forts of Johannesburg or
Pretoria. Men of many nations but of a similar type showed their
martial faces in the Boer towns. The condottieri of Europe were as
ready as ever to sell their blood for gold, and nobly in the end
did they fulfill their share of the bargain. For three weeks and
more during which Mr. Kruger was silent these eloquent preparations
went on. But beyond them, and of infinitely more importance, there
was one fact which dominated the situation. A burgher cannot go to
war without his horse, his horse cannot move without grass, grass
will not come until after rain, and it was still some weeks before
the rain would be due. Negotiations, then, must not be unduly
hurried while the veld was a bare russet-coloured dust-swept plain.
Mr. Chamberlain and the British public waited week after week for
their answer. But there was a limit to their patience, and it was
reached on August 26th, when the Colonial Secretary showed, with a
plainness of speech which is as unusual as it is welcome in
diplomacy, that the question could not be hung up for ever. 'The
sands are running down in the glass,' said he. 'If they run out, we
shall not hold ourselves limited by that which we have already
offered, but, having taken the matter in hand, we will not let it
go until we have secured conditions which once for all shall
establish which is the paramount power in South Africa, and shall
secure for our fellow-subjects there those equal rights and equal
privileges which were promised them by President Kruger when the
independence of the Transvaal was granted by the Queen, and which
is the least that in justice ought to be accorded them.' Lord
Salisbury, a little time before, had been equally emphatic. 'No one
in this country wishes to disturb the conventions so long as it is
recognised that while they guarantee the independence of the
Transvaal on the one side, they guarantee equal political and civil
rights for settlers of all nationalities upon the other. But these
conventions are not like the laws of the Medes and the Persians.
They are mortal, they can be destroyed. . .and once destroyed they
can never be reconstructed in the same shape.' The long-enduring
patience of Great Britain was beginning to show signs of giving
way.
In the meantime a fresh dispatch had arrived from the Transvaal
which offered as an alternative proposal to the joint commission
that the Boer Government should grant the franchise proposals of
Sir Alfred Milner on condition that Great Britain withdrew or
dropped her claim to a suzerainty, agreed to arbitration, and
promised never again to interfere in the internal affairs of the
republic. To this Great Britain answered that she would agree to
arbitration, that she hoped never again to have occasion to
interfere for the protection of her own subjects, but that with the
grant of the franchise all occasion for such interference would
pass away, and, finally, that she would never consent to abandon
her position as suzerain power. Mr. Chamberlain's dispatch ended by
reminding the Government of the Transvaal that there were other
matters of dispute open between the two Governments apart from the
franchise, and that it would be as well to have them settled at the
same time. By these he meant such questions as the position of the
native races and the treatment of Anglo-Indians.
On September 2nd the answer of the Transvaal Government was
returned. It was short and uncompromising. They withdrew their
offer of the franchise. They re-asserted the non-existence of the
suzerainty. The negotiations were at a deadlock. It was difficult
to see how they could be re-opened. In view of the arming of the
burghers, the small garrison of Natal had been taking up positions
to cover the frontier. The Transvaal asked for an explanation of
their presence. Sir Alfred Milner answered that they were guarding
British interests, and preparing against contingencies. The roar of
the fall was sounding loud and near.
On September 8th there was held a Cabinet Council--one of the most
important in recent years. A message was sent to Pretoria, which
even the opponents of the Government have acknowledged to be
temperate, and offering the basis for a peaceful settlement. It
begins by repudiating emphatically the claim of the Transvaal to be
a sovereign international State in the same sense in which the
Orange Free State is one. Any proposal made conditional upon such
an acknowledgment could not be entertained.
The British Government, however, was prepared to accept the five
years' 'franchise' as stated in the note of August 19th, assuming
at the same time that in the Raad each member might talk his own
language.
'Acceptance of these terms by the South African Republic would at
once remove tension between the two Governments, and would in all
probability render unnecessary any future intervention to secure
redress for grievances which the Uitlanders themselves would be
able to bring to the notice of the Executive Council and the
Volksraad.
'Her Majesty's Government are increasingly impressed with the
danger of further delay in relieving the strain which has already
caused so much injury to the interests of South Africa, and they
earnestly press for an immediate and definite reply to the present
proposal. If it is acceded to they will be ready to make immediate
arrangements. . .to settle all details of the proposed tribunal of
arbitration. . .If, however, as they most anxiously hope will not
be the case, the reply of the South African Republic should be
negative or inconclusive, I am to state that her Majesty's
Government must reserve to themselves the right to reconsider the
situation de novo, and to formulate their own proposals for a final
settlement.'
Such was the message, and Great Britain waited with strained
attention for the answer. But again there was a delay, while the
rain came and the grass grew, and the veld was as a mounted
rifleman would have it. The burghers were in no humour for
concessions. They knew their own power, and they concluded with
justice that they were for the time far the strongest military
power in South Africa. 'We have beaten England before, but it is
nothing to the licking we shall give her now,' cried a prominent
citizen, and he spoke for his country as he said it. So the empire
waited and debated, but the sounds of the bugle were already
breaking through the wrangles of the politicians, and calling the
nation to be tested once more by that hammer of war and adversity
by which Providence still fashions us to some nobler and higher
end.
