CHAPTER 11.
BATTLE OF COLENSO.
Two serious defeats had within the week been inflicted upon the
British forces in South Africa. Cronje, lurking behind his trenches
and his barbed wire entanglements barred Methuen's road to
Kimberley, while in the northern part of Cape Colony Gatacre's
wearied troops had been defeated and driven by a force which
consisted largely of British subjects. But the public at home
steeled their hearts and fixed their eyes steadily upon Natal.
There was their senior General and there the main body of their
troops. As brigade after brigade and battery after battery touched
at Cape Town, and were sent on instantly to Durban, it was evident
that it was in this quarter that the supreme effort was to be made,
and that there the light might at last break. In club, and dining
room, and railway car--wherever men met and talked--the same words
might be heard: 'Wait until Buller moves.' The hopes of a great
empire lay in the phrase.
It was upon October 30th that Sir George White had been thrust back
into Ladysmith. On November 2nd telegraphic communication with the
town was interrupted. On November 3rd the railway line was cut. On
November 10th the Boers held Colenso and the line of the Tugela. On
the 14th was the affair of the armoured train. On the 18th the
enemy were near Estcourt. On the 21st they had reached the Mooi
River. On the 23rd Hildyard attacked them at Willow Grange. All
these actions will be treated elsewhere. This last one marks the
turn of the tide. From then onwards Sir Redvers Buller was massing
his troops at Chieveley in preparation for a great effort to cross
the river and to relieve Ladysmith, the guns of which, calling from
behind the line of northern hills, told their constant tale of
restless attack and stubborn defence.
But the task was as severe a one as the most fighting General could
ask for. On the southern side the banks formed a long slope which
could be shaved as with a razor by the rifle fire of the enemy. How
to advance across that broad open zone was indeed a problem. It was
one of many occasions in this war in which one wondered why, if a
bullet-proof shield capable of sheltering a lying man could be
constructed, a trial should not be given to it. Alternate rushes of
companies with a safe rest after each rush would save the troops
from the continued tension of that deadly never ending fire.
However, it is idle to discuss what might have been done to
mitigate their trials. The open ground had to be passed, and then
they came to--not the enemy, but a broad and deep river, with a
single bridge, probably undermined, and a single ford, which was
found not to exist in practice. Beyond the river was tier after
tier of hills, crowned with stone walls and seamed with trenches,
defended by thousands of the best marksmen in the world, supported
by an admirable artillery. If, in spite of the advance over the
open and in spite of the passage of the river, a ridge could still
be carried, it was only to be commanded by the next; and so, one
behind the other, like the billows of the ocean, a series of hills
and hollows rolled northwards to Ladysmith. All attacks must be in
the open. All defence was from under cover. Add to this, that the
young and energetic Louis Botha was in command of the Boers. It was
a desperate task, and yet honour forbade that the garrison should
be left to its fate. The venture must be made.
The most obvious criticism upon the operation is that if the attack
must be made it should not be made under the enemy's conditions. We
seem almost to have gone out of our way to make every obstacle--the
glacislike approach, the river, the trenches--as difficult as
possible. Future operations were to prove that it was not so
difficult to deceive Boer vigilance and by rapid movements to cross
the Tugela. A military authority has stated, I know not with what
truth, that there is no instance in history of a determined army
being stopped by the line of a river, and from Wellington at the
Douro to the Russians on the Danube many examples of the ease with
which they may be passed will occur to the reader. But Buller had
some exceptional difficulties with which to contend. He was weak in
mounted troops, and was opposed to an enemy of exceptional mobility
who might attack his flank and rear if he exposed them. He had not
that great preponderance of numbers which came to him later, and
which enabled him to attempt a wide turning movement. One advantage
he had, the possession of a more powerful artillery, but his
heaviest guns were naturally his least mobile, and the more direct
his advance the more effective would his guns be. For these or
other reasons he determined upon a frontal attack on the formidable
Boer position, and he moved out of Chieveley Camp for that purpose
at daybreak on Friday, December 15th.
The force which General Buller led into action was the finest which
any British general had handled since the battle of the Alma. Of
infantry he had four strong brigades: the 2nd (Hildyard's)
consisting of the 2nd Devons, the 2nd Queen's or West Surrey, the
2nd West Yorkshire, and the 2nd East Surrey; the 4th Brigade
(Lyttelton's) comprising the 2nd Cameronians, the 3rd Rifles, the
1st Durhams, and the 1st Rifle Brigade; the 5th Brigade (Hart's)
with the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 1st Connaught Rangers, 2nd
Dublin Fusiliers, and the Border Regiment, this last taking the
place of the 2nd Irish Rifles, who were with Gatacre. There
remained the 6th Brigade (Barton's), which included the 2nd Royal
Fusiliers, the 2nd Scots Fusiliers, the 1st Welsh Fusiliers, and
the 2nd Irish Fusiliers--in all about 16,000 infantry. The mounted
men, who were commanded by Lord Dundonald, included the 13th
Hussars, the 1st Royals, Bethune's Mounted Infantry, Thorneycroft's
Mounted Infantry, three squadrons of South African Horse, with a
composite regiment formed from the mounted infantry of the Rifles
and of the Dublin Fusiliers with squadrons of the Natal Carabineers
and the Imperial Light Horse. These irregular troops of horse might
be criticised by martinets and pedants, but they contained some of
the finest fighting material in the army, some urged on by personal
hatred of the Boers and some by mere lust of adventure. As an
example of the latter one squadron of the South African Horse was
composed almost entirely of Texan muleteers, who, having come over
with their animals, had been drawn by their own gallant spirit into
the fighting line of their kinsmen.
Cavalry was General Buller's weakest arm, but his artillery was
strong both in its quality and its number of guns. There were five
batteries (30 guns) of the Field Artillery, the 7th, 14th, 63rd,
64th, and 66th. Besides these there were no fewer than sixteen
naval guns from H.M.S. 'Terrible'--fourteen of which were
12-pounders, and the other two of the 4.7 type which had done such
good service both at Ladysmith and with Methuen. The whole force
which moved out from Chieveley Camp numbered about 21,000 men.
The work which was allotted to the army was simple in conception,
however terrible it might prove in execution. There were two points
at which the river might be crossed, one three miles off on the
left, named Bridle Drift, the other straight ahead at the Bridge of
Colenso. The 5th or Irish Brigade was to endeavour to cross at
Bridle Drift, and then to work down the river bank on the far side
so as to support the 2nd or English Brigade,--which was to cross at
Colenso. The 4th Brigade was to advance between these, so as to
help either which should be in difficulties. Meanwhile on the
extreme right the mounted troops under Dundonald were to cover the
flank and to attack Hlangwane Hill, a formidable position held
strongly by the enemy upon the south bank of the Tugela. The
remaining Fusilier brigade of infantry was to support this movement
on the right. The guns were to cover the various attacks, and if
possible gain a position from which the trenches might be
enfiladed. This, simply stated, was the work which lay before the
British army. In the bright clear morning sunshine, under a
cloudless blue sky, they advanced with high hopes to the assault.
Before them lay the long level plain, then the curve of the river,
and beyond, silent and serene, like some peaceful dream landscape,
stretched the lines and lines of gently curving hills. It was just
five o'clock in the morning when the naval guns began to bay, and
huge red dustclouds from the distant foothills showed where the
lyddite was bursting. No answer came back, nor was there any
movement upon the sunlit hills. It was almost brutal, this furious
violence to so gentle and unresponsive a countryside. In no place
could the keenest eye detect a sign of guns or men, and yet death
lurked in every hollow and crouched by every rock.
It is so difficult to make a modern battle intelligible when
fought, as this was, over a front of seven or eight miles, that it
is best perhaps to take the doings of each column in turn,
beginning with the left flank, where Hart's Irish Brigade had
advanced to the assault of Bridle Drift.
Under an unanswered and therefore an unaimed fire from the heavy
guns the Irish infantry moved forward upon the points which they
had been ordered to attack. The Dublins led, then the Connaughts,
the Inniskillings, and the Borderers. Incredible as it may appear
after the recent experiences of Magersfontein and of Stormberg, the
men in the two rear regiments appear to have been advanced in
quarter column, and not to have deployed until after the enemy's
fire had opened. Had shrapnel struck this close formation, as it
was within an ace of doing, the loss of life must have been as
severe as it was unnecessary.
On approaching the Drift--the position or even the existence of
which does not seem to have been very clearly defined--it was found
that the troops had to advance into a loop formed by the river, so
that they were exposed to a very heavy cross-fire upon their right
flank, while they were rained on by shrapnel from in front. No sign
of the enemy could be seen, though the men were dropping fast. It
is a weird and soul-shaking experience to advance over a sunlit and
apparently a lonely countryside, with no slightest movement upon
its broad face, while the path which you take is marked behind you
by sobbing, gasping, writhing men, who can only guess by the
position of their wounds whence the shots came which struck them
down. All round, like the hissing of fat in the pan, is the
monotonous crackle and rattle of the Mausers; but the air is full
of it, and no one can define exactly whence it comes. Far away on
some hill upon the skyline there hangs the least gauzy veil of thin
smoke to indicate whence the six men who have just all fallen
together, as if it were some grim drill, met their death. Into such
a hell-storm as this it was that the soldiers have again and again
advanced in the course of this war, but it may be questioned
whether they will not prove to be among the last of mortals to be
asked to endure such an ordeal. Other methods of attack must be
found or attacks must be abandoned, for smokeless powder,
quick-firing guns, and modern rifles make it all odds on the
defence!
The gallant Irishmen pushed on, flushed with battle and careless
for their losses, the four regiments clubbed into one, with all
military organisation rapidly disappearing, and nothing left but
their gallant spirit and their furious desire to come to hand-grips
with the enemy. Rolling on in a broad wave of shouting angry men,
they never winced from the fire until they had swept up to the bank
of the river. Northern Inniskilling and Southern man of Connaught,
orange and green, Protestant and Catholic, Celt and Saxon, their
only rivalry now was who could shed his blood most freely for the
common cause. How hateful seem those provincial politics and narrow
sectarian creeds which can hold such men apart!
The bank of the river had been gained, but where was the ford? The
water swept broad and unruffled in front of them, with no
indication of shallows. A few dashing fellows sprang in, but their
cartridges and rifles dragged them to the bottom. One or two may
even have struggled through to the further side, but on this there
is a conflict of evidence. It may be, though it seems incredible,
that the river had been partly dammed to deepen the Drift, or, as
is more probable, that in the rapid advance and attack the position
of the Drift was lost. However this may be, the troops could find
no ford, and they lay down, as had been done in so many previous
actions, unwilling to retreat and unable to advance, with the same
merciless pelting from front and flank. In every fold and behind
every anthill the Irishmen lay thick and waited for better times.
There are many instances of their cheery and uncomplaining humour.
Colonel Brooke, of the Connaughts, fell at the head of his men.
Private Livingstone helped to carry him into safety, and then, his
task done, he confessed to having 'a bit of a rap meself,' and sank
fainting with a bullet through his throat. Another sat with a
bullet through both legs. 'Bring me a tin whistle and I'll blow ye
any tune ye like,' he cried, mindful of the Dargai piper. Another
with his arm hanging by a tendon puffed morosely at his short black
pipe. Every now and then, in face of the impossible, the fiery
Celtic valour flamed furiously upwards. 'Fix bayonets, men, and let
us make a name for ourselves,' cried a colour sergeant, and he
never spoke again. For five hours, under the tropical sun, the
grimy parched men held on to the ground they had occupied. British
shells pitched short and fell among them. A regiment in support
fired at them, not knowing that any of the line were so far
advanced. Shot at from the front, the flank, and the rear, the 5th
Brigade held grimly on.
But fortunately their orders to retire were at hand, and it is
certain that had they not reached them the regiments would have
been uselessly destroyed where they lay. It seems to have been
Buller himself, who showed extraordinary and ubiquitous personal
energy during the day, that ordered them to fall back. As they
retreated there was an entire absence of haste and panic, but
officers and men were hopelessly jumbled up, and General
Hart--whose judgment may occasionally be questioned, but whose cool
courage was beyond praise--had hard work to reform the splendid
brigade which six hours before had tramped out of Chieveley Camp.
Between five and six hundred of them had fallen--a loss which
approximates to that of the Highland Brigade at Magersfontein. The
Dublins and the Connaughts were the heaviest sufferers.
So much for the mishap of the 5th Brigade. It is superfluous to
point out that the same old omissions were responsible for the same
old results. Why were the men in quarter column when advancing
against an unseen foe? Why had no scouts gone forward to be certain
of the position of the ford? Where were the clouds of skirmishers
which should precede such an advance? The recent examples in the
field and the teachings of the text-books were equally set at
naught, as they had been, and were to be, so often in this
campaign. There may be a science of war in the lecture-rooms at
Camberley, but very little of it found its way to the veld. The
slogging valour of the private, the careless dash of the regimental
officer--these were our military assets--but seldom the care and
foresight of our commanders. It is a thankless task to make such
comments, but the one great lesson of the war has been that the
army is too vital a thing to fall into the hands of a caste, and
that it is a national duty for every man to speak fearlessly and
freely what he believes to be the truth.
Passing from the misadventure of the 5th Brigade we come as we move
from left to right upon the 4th, or Lyttelton's Brigade, which was
instructed not to attack itself but to support the attack on either
side of it. With the help of the naval guns it did what it could to
extricate and cover the retreat of the Irishmen, but it could play
no very important part in the action, and its losses were
insignificant. On its right in turn Hildyard's English Brigade had
developed its attack upon Colenso and the bridge. The regiments
under Hildyard's lead were the 2nd West Surrey, the 2nd Devons
(whose first battalion was doing so well with the Ladysmith force),
the East Surreys, and the West Yorkshires. The enemy had evidently
anticipated the main attack on this position, and not only were the
trenches upon the other side exceptionally strong, but their
artillery converged upon the bridge, at least a dozen heavy pieces,
besides a number of quick-firers, bearing upon it. The Devons and
the Queens, in open order (an extended line of khaki dots, blending
so admirably with the plain that they were hardly visible when they
halted), led the attack, being supported by the East Surrey and the
West Yorkshires. Advancing under a very heavy fire the brigade
experienced much the same ordeal as their comrades of Hart's
brigade, which was mitigated by the fact that from the first they
preserved their open order in columns of half-companies extended to
six paces, and that the river in front of them did not permit that
right flank fire which was so fatal to the Irishmen. With a loss of
some two hundred men the leading regiments succeeded in reaching
Colenso, and the West Surrey, advancing by rushes of fifty yards at
a time, had established itself in the station, but a catastrophe
had occurred at an earlier hour to the artillery which was
supporting it which rendered all further advance impossible. For
the reason of this we must follow the fortunes of the next unit
upon their right.
This consisted of the important body of artillery who had been told
off to support the main attack. It comprised two field batteries,
the 14th and the 66th, under the command of Colonel Long, and six
naval guns (two of 4.7, and four 12-pounders) under Lieutenant
Ogilvy of the 'Terrible.' Long has the record of being a most
zealous and dashing officer, whose handling of the Egyptian
artillery at the battle of the Atbara had much to do with the
success of the action. Unfortunately, these barbarian campaigns, in
which liberties may be taken with impunity, leave an evil
tradition, as the French have found with their Algerians. Our own
close formations, our adherence to volley firing, and in this
instance the use of our artillery all seem to be legacies of our
savage wars. Be the cause what it may, at an early stage of the
action Long's guns whirled forwards, outstripped the infantry
brigades upon their flanks, left the slow-moving naval guns with
their ox-teams behind them, and unlimbered within a thousand yards
of the enemy's trenches. From this position he opened fire upon
Fort Wylie, which was the centre of that portion of the Boer
position which faced him.
But his two unhappy batteries were destined not to turn the tide of
battle, as he had hoped, but rather to furnish the classic example
of the helplessness of artillery against modern rifle fire. Not
even Mercer's famous description of the effect of a flank fire upon
his troop of horse artillery at Waterloo could do justice to the
blizzard of lead which broke over the two doomed batteries. The
teams fell in heaps, some dead, some mutilated, and mutilating
others in their frantic struggles. One driver, crazed with horror,
sprang on a leader, cut the traces and tore madly off the field.
But a perfect discipline reigned among the vast majority of the
gunners, and the words of command and the laying and working of the
guns were all as methodical as at Okehampton. Not only was there a
most deadly rifle fire, partly from the lines in front and partly
from the village of Colenso upon their left flank, but the Boer
automatic quick-firers found the range to a nicety, and the little
shells were crackling and banging continually over the batteries.
Already every gun had its litter of dead around it, but each was
still fringed by its own group of furious officers and sweating
desperate gunners. Poor Long was down, with a bullet through his
arm and another through his liver. 'Abandon be damned! We don't
abandon guns!' was his last cry as they dragged him into the
shelter of a little donga hard by. Captain Goldie dropped dead. So
did Lieutenant Schreiber. Colonel Hunt fell, shot in two places.
Officers and men were falling fast. The guns could not be worked,
and yet they could not be removed, for every effort to bring up
teams from the shelter where the limbers lay ended in the death of
the horses. The survivors took refuge from the murderous fire in
that small hollow to which Long had been carried, a hundred yards
or so from the line of bullet-splashed cannon. One gun on the right
was still served by four men who refused to leave it. They seemed
to bear charmed lives, these four, as they strained and wrestled
with their beloved 15-pounder, amid the spurting sand and the blue
wreaths of the bursting shells. Then one gasped and fell against
the trail, and his comrade sank beside the wheel with his chin upon
his breast. The third threw up his hands and pitched forward upon
his face; while the survivor, a grim powder-stained figure, stood
at attention looking death in the eyes until he too was struck
down. A useless sacrifice, you may say; but while the men who saw
them die can tell such a story round the camp fire the example of
such deaths as these does more than clang of bugle or roll of drum
to stir the warrior spirit of our race.
For two hours the little knot of heart-sick humiliated officers and
men lay in the precarious shelter of the donga and looked out at
the bullet-swept plain and the line of silent guns. Many of them
were wounded. Their chief lay among them, still calling out in his
delirium for his guns. They had been joined by the gallant Baptie,
a brave surgeon, who rode across to the donga amid a murderous
fire, and did what he could for the injured men. Now and then a
rush was made into the open, sometimes in the hope of firing
another round, sometimes to bring a wounded comrade in from the
pitiless pelt of the bullets. How fearful was that lead-storm may
be gathered from the fact that one gunner was found with sixty-four
wounds in his body. Several men dropped in these sorties, and the
disheartened survivors settled down once more in the donga.
The hope to which they clung was that their guns were not really
lost, but that the arrival of infantry would enable them to work
them once more. Infantry did at last arrive, but in such small
numbers that it made the situation more difficult instead of easing
it. Colonel Bullock had brought up two companies of the Devons to
join the two companies (A and B) of Scots Fusiliers who had been
the original escort of the guns, but such a handful could not turn
the tide. They also took refuge in the donga, and waited for better
times.
In the meanwhile the attention of Generals Buller and Clery had
been called to the desperate position of the guns, and they had
made their way to that further nullah in the rear where the
remaining limber horses and drivers were. This was some distance
behind that other donga in which Long, Bullock, and their Devons
and gunners were crouching. 'Will any of you volunteer to save the
guns?' cried Buller. Corporal Nurse, Gunner Young, and a few others
responded. The desperate venture was led by three aides-de-camp of
the Generals, Congreve, Schofield, and Roberts, the only son of the
famous soldier. Two gun teams were taken down; the horses galloping
frantically through an infernal fire, and each team succeeded in
getting back with a gun. But the loss was fearful. Roberts was
mortally wounded. Congreve has left an account which shows what a
modern rifle fire at a thousand yards is like. 'My first bullet
went through my left sleeve and made the joint of my elbow bleed,
next a clod of earth caught me smack on the right arm, then my
horse got one, then my right leg one, then my horse another, and
that settled us.' The gallant fellow managed to crawl to the group
of castaways in the donga. Roberts insisted on being left where he
fell, for fear he should hamper the others.
In the meanwhile Captain Reed, of the 7th Battery, had arrived with
two spare teams of horses, and another determined effort was made
under his leadership to save some of the guns. But the fire was too
murderous. Two-thirds of his horses and half his men, including
himself, were struck down, and General Buller commanded that all
further attempts to reach the abandoned batteries should be given
up. Both he and General Clery had been slightly wounded, and there
were many operations over the whole field of action to engage their
attention. But making every allowance for the pressure of many
duties and for the confusion and turmoil of a great action, it does
seem one of the most inexplicable incidents in British military
history that the guns should ever have been permitted to fall into
the hands of the enemy. It is evident that if our gunners could not
live under the fire of the enemy it would be equally impossible for
the enemy to remove the guns under a fire from a couple of
battalions of our infantry. There were many regiments which had
hardly been engaged, and which could have been advanced for such a
purpose. The men of the Mounted Infantry actually volunteered for
this work, and none could have been more capable of carrying it
out. There was plenty of time also, for the guns were abandoned
about eleven and the Boers did not venture to seize them until
four. Not only could the guns have been saved, but they might, one
would think, have been transformed into an excellent bait for a
trap to tempt the Boers out of their trenches. It must have been
with fear and trembling that Cherry Emmett and his men first
approached them, for how could they believe that such incredible
good fortune had come to them? However, the fact, humiliating and
inexplicable, is that the guns were so left, that the whole force
was withdrawn, and that not only the ten cannon, but also the
handful of Devons, with their Colonel, and the Fusiliers were taken
prisoners in the donga which had sheltered them all day.
We have now, working from left to right, considered the operations
of Hart's Brigade at Bridle Drift, of Lyttelton's Brigade in
support, of Hildyard's which attacked Colenso, and of the luckless
batteries which were to have helped him. There remain two bodies of
troops upon the right, the further consisting of Dundonald's
mounted men who were to attack Hlangwane Hill, a fortified Boer
position upon the south of the river, while Barton's Brigade was to
support it and to connect this attack with the central operations.
Dundonald's force was entirely too weak for such an operation as
the capture of the formidable entrenched hill, and it is probable
that the movement was meant rather as a reconnaissance than as an
assault. He had not more than a thousand men in all, mostly
irregulars, and the position which faced him was precipitous and
entrenched, with barbed-wire entanglements and automatic guns. But
the gallant colonials were out on their first action, and their
fiery courage pushed the attack home. Leaving their horses, they
advanced a mile and a half on foot before they came within easy
range of the hidden riflemen, and learned the lesson which had been
taught to their comrades all along the line, that given
approximately equal numbers the attack in the open has no possible
chance against the concealed defence, and that the more bravely it
is pushed the more heavy is the repulse. The irregulars carried
themselves like old soldiers, they did all that mortal man could
do, and they retired coolly and slowly with the loss of 130 of the
brave troopers. The 7th Field Battery did all that was possible to
support the advance and cover the retirement. In no single place,
on this day of disaster, did one least gleam of success come to
warm the hearts and reward the exertions of our much-enduring men.
Of Barton's Brigade there is nothing to be recorded, for they
appear neither to have supported the attack upon Hlangwane Hill on
the one side nor to have helped to cover the ill-fated guns on the
other. Barton was applied to for help by Dundonald, but refused to
detach any of his troops. If General Buller's real idea was a
reconnaissance in force in order to determine the position and
strength of the Boer lines, then of course his brigadiers must have
felt a reluctance to entangle their brigades in a battle which was
really the result of a misunderstanding. On the other hand, if, as
the orders of the day seem to show, a serious engagement was always
intended, it is strange that two brigades out of four should have
played so insignificant a part. To Barton's Brigade was given the
responsibility of seeing that no right flank attack was carried out
by the Boers, and this held it back until it was clear that no such
attack was contemplated. After that one would have thought that,
had the situation been appreciated, at least two battalions might
have been spared to cover the abandoned guns with their rifle fire.
Two companies of the Scots Fusiliers did share the fortunes of the
guns. Two others, and one of the Irish Fusiliers, acted in support,
but the brigade as a whole, together with the 1st Royals and the
13th Hussars, might as well have been at Aldershot for any bearing
which their work had upon the fortunes of the day.
And so the first attempt at the relief of Ladysmith came to an end.
At twelve o'clock all the troops upon the ground were retreating
for the camp. There was nothing in the shape of rout or panic, and
the withdrawal was as orderly as the advance; but the fact remained
that we had just 1200 men in killed, wounded, and missing, and had
gained absolutely nothing. We had not even the satisfaction of
knowing that we had inflicted as well as endured punishment, for
the enemy remained throughout the day so cleverly concealed that it
is doubtful whether more than a hundred casualties occurred in
their ranks. Once more it was shown how weak an arm is artillery
against an enemy who lies in shelter.
Our wounded fortunately bore a high proportion to our killed, as
they always will do when it is rifle fire rather than shell fire
which is effective. Roughly we had 150 killed and about 720
wounded. A more humiliating item is the 250 or so who were missing.
These men were the gunners, the Devons, and the Scots Fusiliers,
who were taken in the donga together with small bodies from the
Connaughts, the Dublins, and other regiments who, having found some
shelter, were unable to leave it, and clung on until the retirement
of their regiments left them in a hopeless position. Some of these
small knots of men were allowed to retire in the evening by the
Boers, who seemed by no means anxious to increase the number of
their prisoners. Colonel Thackeray, of the Inniskilling Fusiliers,
found himself with a handful of his men surrounded by the enemy,
but owing to their good humour and his own tact he succeeded in
withdrawing them in safety. The losses fell chiefly on Hart's
Brigade, Hildyard's Brigade, and the colonial irregulars, who bore
off the honours of the fight.
In his official report General Buller states that were it not for
the action of Colonel Long and the subsequent disaster to the
artillery he thought that the battle might have been a successful
one. This is a hard saying, and throws perhaps too much
responsibility upon the gallant but unfortunate gunner. There have
been occasions in the war when greater dash upon the part of our
artillery might have changed the fate of the day, and it is bad
policy to be too severe upon the man who has taken a risk and
failed. The whole operation, with its advance over the open against
a concealed enemy with a river in his front, was so absolutely
desperate that Long may have seen that only desperate measures
could save the situation. To bring guns into action in front of the
infantry without having clearly defined the position of the
opposing infantry must always remain one of the most hazardous
ventures of war. 'It would certainly be mere folly,' says Prince
Kraft, 'to advance artillery to within 600 or 800 yards of a
position held by infantry unless the latter were under the fire of
infantry from an even shorter range.' This 'mere folly' is exactly
what Colonel Long did, but it must be remembered in extenuation
that he shared with others the idea that the Boers were up on the
hills, and had no inkling that their front trenches were down at
the river. With the imperfect means at his disposal he did such
scouting as he could, and if his fiery and impetuous spirit led him
into a position which cost him so dearly it is certainly more easy
for the critic to extenuate his fault than that subsequent one
which allowed the abandoned guns to fall into the hands of the
enemy. Nor is there any evidence that the loss of these guns did
seriously affect the fate of the action, for at those other parts
of the field where the infantry had the full and unceasing support
of the artillery the result was not more favourable than at the
centre.
So much for Colenso. A more unsatisfactory and in some ways
inexplicable action is not to be found in the range of British
military history. And the fuller the light which has been poured
upon it, the more extraordinary does the battle appear. There are a
preface and a sequel to the action which have put a severe strain
upon the charity which the British public has always shown that it
is prepared to extend to a defeated General. The preface is that
General Buller sent word to General White that he proposed to
attack upon the 17th, while the actual attack was delivered upon
the 15th, so that the garrison was not prepared to make that
demonstration which might have prevented the besiegers from sending
important reinforcements to Botha, had he needed them. The sequel
is more serious. Losing all heart at his defeat, General Buller,
although he had been officially informed that White had provisions
for seventy days, sent a heliogram advising the surrender of the
garrison. White's first reply, which deserves to live with the
anecdote of Nelson's telescope at his blind eye, was to the effect
that he believed the enemy had been tampering with Buller's
messages. To this Buller despatched an amended message, which with
Sir George White's reply, is here appended:
Message of December 16th, as altered by that of December 17th,
1899.
'I tried Colenso yesterday, but failed; the enemy is too strong for
my force except with siege operations, and these will take one full
month to prepare. Can you last so long?
'How many days can you hold out? I suggest you firing away as much
ammunition as you can, and making best terms you can. I can remain
here if you have alternative suggestion, but unaided I cannot break
in. I find my infantry cannot fight more than ten miles from camp,
and then only if water can be got, and it is scarce here. Whatever
happens, recollect to burn your cipher, decipher, and code books,
and all deciphered messages.'
From Sir G. White to Sir R. Buller. December 16th, 1899.
'Yours of today received and understood. My suggestion is that you
take up strongest available position that will enable you to keep
touch of the enemy and harass him constantly with artillery fire,
and in other ways as much as possible. I can make food last for
much longer than a month, and will not think of making terms till I
am forced to. You may have hit enemy harder than you think. All our
native spies report that your artillery fire made considerable
impression on enemy. Have your losses been very heavy? If you lose
touch of enemy, it will immensely increase his opportunities of
crushing me, and have worst effect elsewhere. While you are in
touch with him and in communication with me, he has both of our
forces to reckon with. Make every effort to get reinforcements as
early as possible, including India, and enlist every man in both
colonies who will serve and can ride. Things may look brighter. The
loss of 12,000 men here would be a heavy blow to England. We must
not yet think of it. I fear I could not cut my way to you. Enteric
fever is increasing alarmingly here. There are now 180 cases, all
within last month. Answer fully. I am keeping everything secret for
the present till I know your plans.'
Much allowance is to be made for a man who is staggering under the
mental shock of defeat and the physical exertions which Buller had
endured. That the Government made such allowance is clear from the
fact that he was not instantly recalled. And yet the cold facts are
that we have a British General, at the head of 25,000 men,
recommending another General, at the head of 12,000 men only twelve
miles off, to lay down his arms to an army which was certainly very
inferior in numbers to the total British force; and this because he
had once been defeated, although he knew that there was still time
for the whole resources of the Empire to be poured into Natal in
order to prevent so shocking a disaster. Such is a plain statement
of the advice which Buller gave and which White rejected. For the
instant the fate not only of South Africa but even, as I believe,
of the Empire hung upon the decision of the old soldier in
Ladysmith, who had to resist the proposals of his own General as
sternly as the attacks of the enemy. He who sorely needed help and
encouragement became, as his message shows, the helper and the
encourager. It was a tremendous test, and Sir George White came
through it with a staunchness and a loyalty which saved us not only
from overwhelming present disaster, but from a hideous memory which
must have haunted British military annals for centuries to come.
