CHAPTER 12.
THE DARK HOUR.
The week which extended from December 10th to December 17th, 1899,
was the blackest one known during our generation, and the most
disastrous for British arms during the century. We had in the short
space of seven days lost, beyond all extenuation or excuse, three
separate actions. No single defeat was of vital importance in
itself, but the cumulative effect, occurring as they did to each of
the main British forces in South Africa, was very great. The total
loss amounted to about three thousand men and twelve guns, while
the indirect effects in the way of loss of prestige to ourselves
and increased confidence and more numerous recruits to our enemy
were incalculable.
It is singular to glance at the extracts from the European press at
that time and to observe the delight and foolish exultation with
which our reverses were received. That this should occur in the
French journals is not unnatural, since our history has been
largely a contest with that Power, and we can regard with
complacency an enmity which is the tribute to our success. Russia,
too, as the least progressive of European States, has a natural
antagonism of thought, if not of interests, to the Power which
stands most prominently for individual freedom and liberal
institutions. The same poor excuse may be made for the organs of
the Vatican. But what are we to say of the insensate railing of
Germany, a country whose ally we have been for centuries? In the
days of Marlborough, in the darkest hours of Frederick the Great,
in the great world struggle of Napoleon, we have been the
brothers-in-arms of these people. So with the Austrians also. If
both these countries were not finally swept from the map by
Napoleon, it is largely to British subsidies and British tenacity
that they owe it. And yet these are the folk who turned most
bitterly against us at the only time in modern history when we had
a chance of distinguishing our friends from our foes. Never again,
I trust, on any pretext will a British guinea be spent or a British
soldier or sailor shed his blood for such allies. The political
lesson of this writer has been that we should make ourselves strong
within the empire, and let all outside it, save only our kinsmen of
America, go their own way and meet their own fate without let or
hindrance from us. It is amazing to find that even the Americans
could understand the stock from which they are themselves sprung so
little that such papers as the 'New York Herald' should imagine
that our defeat at Colenso was a good opportunity for us to
terminate the war. The other leading American journals, however,
took a more sane view of the situation, and realised that ten years
of such defeats would not find the end either of our resolution or
of our resources.
In the British Islands and in the empire at large our misfortunes
were met by a sombre but unalterable determination to carry the war
to a successful conclusion and to spare no sacrifices which could
lead to that end. Amid the humiliation of our reverses there was a
certain undercurrent of satisfaction that the deeds of our foemen
should at least have made the contention that the strong was
wantonly attacking the weak an absurd one. Under the stimulus of
defeat the opposition to the war sensibly decreased. It had become
too absurd even for the most unreasonable platform orator to
contend that a struggle had been forced upon the Boers when every
fresh detail showed how thoroughly they had prepared for such a
contingency and how much we had to make up. Many who had opposed
the war simply on that sporting instinct which backs the smaller
against the larger began to realise that what with the geographical
position of these people, what with the nature of their country,
and what with the mobility, number, and hardihood of their forces,
we had undertaken a task which would necessitate such a military
effort as we had never before been called upon to make. When
Kipling at the dawn of the war had sung of 'fifty thousand horse
and foot going to Table Bay,' the statement had seemed extreme. Now
it was growing upon the public mind that four times this number
would not be an excessive estimate. But the nation rose grandly to
the effort. Their only fear, often and loudly expressed, was that
Parliament would deal too tamely with the situation and fail to
demand sufficient sacrifices. Such was the wave of feeling over the
country that it was impossible to hold a peace meeting anywhere
without a certainty of riot. The only London daily which had
opposed the war, though very ably edited, was overborne by the
general sentiment and compelled to change its line. In the
provinces also opposition was almost silent, and the great colonies
were even more unanimous than the mother country. Misfortune had
solidified us where success might have caused a sentimental
opposition.
On the whole, the energetic mood of the nation was reflected by the
decided measures of the Government. Before the deep-sea cables had
told us the lists of our dead, steps had been taken to prove to the
world how great were our latent resources and how determined our
spirit. On December 18th, two days after Colenso, the following
provisions were made for carrying on the campaign.
1. That as General Buller's hands were full in Natal the
supervision and direction of the whole campaign should be placed in
the hands of Lord Roberts, with Lord Kitchener as his chief of
staff. Thus the famous old soldier and the famous young one were
called together to the assistance of the country.
2. That all the remaining army reserves should be called out.
3. That the 7th Division (10,000 men) should be despatched to
Africa, and that an 8th Division should be formed ready for
service.
4. That considerable artillery reinforcements, including a howitzer
brigade, should go out.
5. That eleven Militia battalions be sent abroad.
6. That a strong contingent of Volunteers be sent out.
7. That a Yeomanry mounted force be despatched.
8. That mounted corps be raised at the discretion of the
Commander-in-Chief in South Africa.
9. That the patriotic offers of further contingents from the
colonies be gratefully accepted.
By these measures it was calculated that from seventy to a hundred
thousand men would be added to our South African armies, the
numbers of which were already not short of a hundred thousand.
It is one thing, however, to draw up paper reinforcements, and it
is another, in a free country where no compulsion would be
tolerated, to turn these plans into actual regiments and squadrons.
But if there were any who doubted that this ancient nation still
glowed with the spirit of its youth his fears must soon have passed
away. For this far-distant war, a war of the unseen foe and of the
murderous ambuscade, there were so many volunteers that the
authorities were embarrassed by their numbers and their
pertinacity. It was a stimulating sight to see those long queues of
top-hatted, frock-coated young men who waited their turn for the
orderly room with as much desperate anxiety as if hard fare, a veld
bed, and Boer bullets were all that life had that was worth the
holding. Especially the Imperial Yeomanry, a corps of riders and
shots, appealed to the sporting instincts of our race. Many could
ride and not shoot, many could shoot and not ride, more candidates
were rejected than were accepted, and yet in a very short time
eight thousand men from every class were wearing the grey coats and
bandoliers. This singular and formidable force was drawn from every
part of England and Scotland, with a contingent of hard-riding
Irish fox-hunters. Noblemen and grooms rode knee to knee in the
ranks, and the officers included many well-known country gentlemen
and masters of hounds. Well horsed and well armed, a better force
for the work in hand could not be imagined. So high did the
patriotism run that corps were formed in which the men not only
found their own equipment but contributed their pay to the war
fund. Many young men about town justified their existence for the
first time. In a single club, which is peculiarly consecrated to
the jeunesse doree, three hundred members rode to the wars.
Without waiting for these distant but necessary reinforcements, the
Generals in Africa had two divisions to look to, one of which was
actually arriving while the other was on the sea. These formed the
5th Division under Sir Charles Warren, and the 6th Division under
General Kelly-Kenny. Until these forces should arrive it was
obviously best that the three armies should wait, for, unless there
should be pressing need of help on the part of the besieged
garrisons or imminent prospects of European complications, every
week which passed was in our favour. There was therefore a long
lull in the war, during which Methuen strengthened his position at
Modder River, Gatacre held his own at Sterkstroom, and Buller built
up his strength for another attempt at the relief of Ladysmith. The
only connected series of operations during that time were those of
General French in the neighbourhood of Colesberg, an account of
which will be found in their entirety elsewhere. A short narrative
may be given here of the doings of each of these forces until the
period of inaction came to an end.
Methuen after the repulse at Magersfontein had fallen back upon the
lines of Modder River, and had fortified them in such a way that he
felt himself secure against assault. Cronje, on the other hand, had
extended his position both to the right and to the left, and had
strengthened the works which we had already found so formidable. In
this way a condition of inaction was established which was really
very much to our advantage, since Methuen retained his
communications by rail, while all supplies to Cronje had to come a
hundred miles by road. The British troops, and especially the
Highland Brigade, were badly in need of a rest after the very
severe ordeal which they had undergone. General Hector Macdonald,
whose military record had earned the soldierly name of 'Fighting
Mac,' was sent for from India to take the place of the ill-fated
Wauchope. Pending his arrival and that of reinforcements, Methuen
remained quiet, and the Boers fortunately followed his example.
From over the northern horizon those silver flashes of light told
that Kimberley was dauntless in the present and hopeful of the
future. On January 1st the British post of Kuruman fell, by which
twelve officers and 120 police were captured. The town was
isolated, and its capture could have no effect upon the general
operations, but it is remarkable as the only capture of a fortified
post up to this point made by the Boers.
The monotony of the long wait was broken by one dashing raid
carried out by a detachment from Methuen's line of communications.
This force consisted of 200 Queenslanders, 100 Canadians (Toronto
Company), 40 mounted Munster Fusiliers, a New South Wales
Ambulance, and 200 of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry with
one horse battery. This singular force, so small in numbers and yet
raked from the ends of the earth, was under the command of Colonel
Pilcher. Moving out suddenly and rapidly from Belmont, it struck at
the extreme right of the Boer line, which consisted of a laager
occupied by the colonial rebels of that part of the country.
Nothing could exceed the enthusiasm of the colonists at the
prospect of action. 'At last!' was the cry which went up from the
Canadians when they were ordered to advance. The result was an
absolute success. The rebels broke and fled, their camp was taken,
and forty of them fell into our hands. Our own loss was slight,
three killed and a few wounded. The flying column occupied the town
of Douglas and hoisted the British flag there; but it was decided
that the time had not yet come when it could be held, and the force
fell back upon Belmont. The rebel prisoners were sent down to Cape
Town for trial. The movement was covered by the advance of a force
under Babington from Methuen's force. This detachment, consisting
of the 9th and 12th Lancers, with some mounted infantry and G troop
of Horse Artillery, prevented any interference with Pilcher's force
from the north. It is worthy of record that though the two bodies
of troops were operating at a distance of thirty miles, they
succeeded in preserving a telephonic connection, seventeen minutes
being the average time taken over question and reply.
Encouraged by this small success, Methuen's cavalry on January 9th
made another raid over the Free State border, which is remarkable
for the fact that, save in the case of Colonel Plumer's Rhodesian
Force, it was the first time that the enemy's frontier had been
violated. The expedition under Babington consisted of the same
regiments and the same battery which had covered Pilcher's advance.
The line taken was a south-easterly one, so as to get far round the
left flank of the Boer position. With the aid of a party of the
Victorian Mounted Rifles a considerable tract of country was
overrun, and some farmhouses destroyed. The latter extreme measure
may have been taken as a warning to the Boers that such
depredations as they had carried out in parts of Natal could not
pass with impunity, but both the policy and the humanity of such a
course appear to be open to question, and there was some cause for
the remonstrance which President Kruger shortly after addressed to
us upon the subject. The expedition returned to Modder Camp at the
end of two days without having seen the enemy. Save for one or two
similar cavalry reconnaissances, an occasional interchange of
long-range shells, a little sniping, and one or two false alarms at
night, which broke the whole front of Magersfontein into yellow
lines of angry light, nothing happened to Methuen's force which is
worthy of record up to the time of that movement of General Hector
Macdonald to Koodoosberg which may be considered in connection with
Lord Roberts's decisive operations, of which it was really a part.
The doings of General Gatacre's force during the long interval
which passed between his disaster at Stormberg and the final
general advance may be rapidly chronicled. Although nominally in
command of a division, Gatacre's troops were continually drafted
off to east and to west, so that it was seldom that he had more
than a brigade under his orders. During the weeks of waiting, his
force consisted of three field batteries, the 74th, 77th, and 79th,
some mounted police and irregular horse, the remains of the Royal
Irish Rifles and the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, the 1st Royal
Scots, the Derbyshire regiment, and the Berkshires, the whole
amounting to about 5500 men, who had to hold the whole district
from Sterkstroom to East London on the coast, with a victorious
enemy in front and a disaffected population around. Under these
circumstances he could not attempt to do more than to hold his
ground at Sterkstroom, and this he did unflinchingly until the line
of the Boer defence broke down. Scouting and raiding expeditions,
chiefly organised by Captain De Montmorency--whose early death cut
short the career of one who possessed every quality of a partisan
leader--broke the monotony of inaction. During the week which ended
the year a succession of small skirmishes, of which the town of
Dordrecht was the centre, exercised the troops in irregular
warfare.
On January 3rd the Boer forces advanced and attacked the camp of
the Cape Mounted Police, which was some eight miles in advance of
Gatacre's main position. The movement, however, was a half-hearted
one, and was beaten off with small loss upon their part and less
upon ours. From then onwards no movement of importance took place
in Gatacre's column until the general advance along the whole line
had cleared his difficulties from in front of him.
In the meantime General Buller had also been playing a waiting
game, and, secure in the knowledge that Ladysmith could still hold
out, he had been building up his strength for a second attempt to
relieve the hard-pressed and much-enduring garrison. After the
repulse at Colenso, Hildyard's and Barton's brigades had remained
at Chieveley with the mounted infantry, the naval guns, and two
field batteries. The rest of the force retired to Frere, some miles
in the rear. Emboldened by their success, the Boers sent raiding
parties over the Tugela on either flank, which were only checked by
our patrols being extended from Springfield on the west to Weenen
on the east. A few plundered farmhouses and a small list of killed
and wounded horsemen on either side were the sole result of these
spasmodic and half-hearted operations.
Time here as elsewhere was working for the British, for
reinforcements were steadily coming to Buller's army. By the new
year Sir Charles Warren's division (the 5th) was nearly complete at
Estcourt, whence it could reach the front at any moment. This
division included the 10th brigade, consisting of the Imperial
Light Infantry, 2nd Somersets, the 2nd Dorsets, and the 2nd
Middlesex; also the 11th, called the Lancashire Brigade, formed by
the 2nd Royal Lancaster, the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, the 1st
South Lancashire, and the York and Lancaster. The division also
included the 14th Hussars and the 19th, 20th, and 28th batteries of
Field Artillery. Other batteries of artillery, including one
howitzer battery, came to strengthen Buller's force, which amounted
now to more than 30,000 men. Immense transport preparations had to
be made, however, before the force could have the mobility
necessary for a flank march, and it was not until January 11th that
General Buller's new plans for advance could be set into action.
Before describing what these plans were and the disappointing fate
which awaited them, we will return to the story of the siege of
Ladysmith, and show how narrowly the relieving force escaped the
humiliation--some would say the disgrace--of seeing the town which
looked to them for help fall beneath their very eyes. That this did
not occur is entirely due to the fierce tenacity and savage
endurance of the disease-ridden and half-starved men who held on to
the frail lines which covered it.
