CHAPTER 14.
THE COLESBERG OPERATIONS.
Of the four British armies in the field I have attempted to tell
the story of the western one which advanced to help Kimberley, of
the eastern one which was repulsed at Colenso, and of the central
one which was checked at Stormberg. There remains one other central
one, some account of which must now be given.
It was, as has already been pointed out, a long three weeks after
the declaration of war before the forces of the Orange Free State
began to invade Cape Colony. But for this most providential delay
it is probable that the ultimate fighting would have been, not
among the mountains and kopjes of Stormberg and Colesberg, but amid
those formidable passes which lie in the Hex Valley, immediately to
the north of Cape Town, and that the armies of the invader would
have been doubled by their kinsmen of the Colony. The ultimate
result of the war must have been the same, but the sight of all
South Africa in flames might have brought about those Continental
complications which have always been so grave a menace.
The invasion of the Colony was at two points along the line of the
two railways which connect the countries, the one passing over the
Orange River at Norval's Pont and the other at Bethulie, about
forty miles to the eastward. There were no British troops available
(a fact to be considered by those, if any remain, who imagine that
the British entertained any design against the Republics), and the
Boers jogged slowly southward amid a Dutch population who hesitated
between their unity of race and speech and their knowledge of just
and generous treatment by the Empire. A large number were won over
by the invaders, and, like all apostates, distinguished themselves
by their virulence and harshness towards their loyal neighbours.
Here and there in towns which were off the railway line, in Barkly
East or Ladygrey, the farmers met together with rifle and
bandolier, tied orange puggarees round their hats, and rode off to
join the enemy. Possibly these ignorant and isolated men hardly
recognised what it was that they were doing. They have found out
since. In some of the border districts the rebels numbered ninety
per cent of the Dutch population.
In the meanwhile, the British leaders had been strenuously
endeavouring to scrape together a few troops with which to make
some stand against the enemy. For this purpose two small forces
were necessary--the one to oppose the advance through Bethulie and
Stormberg, the other to meet the invaders, who, having passed the
river at Norval's Pont, had now occupied Colesberg. The former task
was, as already shown, committed to General Gatacre. The latter was
allotted to General French, the victor of Elandslaagte, who had
escaped in the very last train from Ladysmith, and had taken over
this new and important duty. French's force assembled at Arundel
and Gatacre's at Sterkstroom. It is with the operations of the
former that we have now to deal.
General French, for whom South Africa has for once proved not the
grave but the cradle of a reputation, had before the war gained
some name as a smart and energetic cavalry officer. There were some
who, watching his handling of a considerable body of horse at the
great Salisbury manoeuvres in 1898, conceived the highest opinion
of his capacity, and it was due to the strong support of General
Buller, who had commanded in these peaceful operations, that French
received his appointment for South Africa. In person he is short
and thick, with a pugnacious jaw. In character he is a man of cold
persistence and of fiery energy, cautious and yet audacious,
weighing his actions well, but carrying them out with the dash
which befits a mounted leader. He is remarkable for the quickness
of his decision--'can think at a gallop,' as an admirer expressed
it. Such was the man, alert, resourceful, and determined, to whom
was entrusted the holding back of the Colesberg Boers.
Although the main advance of the invaders was along the lines of
the two railways, they ventured, as they realised how weak the
forces were which opposed them, to break off both to the east and
west, occupying Dordrecht on one side and Steynsberg on the other.
Nothing of importance accrued from the possession of these points,
and our attention may be concentrated upon the main line of action.
French's original force was a mere handful of men, scraped together
from anywhere. Naauwpoort was his base, and thence he made a
reconnaissance by rail on November 23rd towards Arundel, the next
hamlet along the line, taking with him a company of the Black
Watch, forty mounted infantry, and a troop of the New South Wales
Lancers. Nothing resulted from the expedition save that the two
forces came into touch with each other, a touch which was sustained
for months under many vicissitudes, until the invaders were driven
back once more over Norval's Pont. Finding that Arundel was weakly
held, French advanced up to it, and established his camp there
towards the end of December, within six miles of the Boer lines at
Rensburg, to the south of Colesberg. His mission--with his present
forces--was to prevent the further advance of the enemy into the
Colony, but he was not strong enough yet to make a serious attempt
to drive them out.
Before the move to Arundel on December 13th his detachment had
increased in size, and consisted largely of mounted men, so that it
attained a mobility very unusual for a British force. On December
13th there was an attempt upon the part of the Boers to advance
south, which was easily held by the British Cavalry and Horse
Artillery. The country over which French was operating is dotted
with those singular kopjes which the Boer loves--kopjes which are
often so grotesque in shape that one feels as if they must be due
to some error of refraction when one looks at them. But, on the
other hand, between these hills there lie wide stretches of the
green or russet savanna, the noblest field that a horseman or a
horse gunner could wish. The riflemen clung to the hills, French's
troopers circled warily upon the plain, gradually contracting the
Boer position by threatening to cut off this or that outlying
kopje, and so the enemy was slowly herded into Colesberg. The small
but mobile British force covered a very large area, and hardly a
day passed that one or other part of it did not come in contact
with the enemy. With one regiment of infantry (the Berkshires) to
hold the centre, his hard-riding Tasmanians, New Zealanders, and
Australians, with the Scots Greys, the Inniskillings, and the
Carabineers, formed an elastic but impenetrable screen to cover the
Colony. They were aided by two batteries, O and R, of Horse
Artillery. Every day General French rode out and made a close
personal examination of the enemy's position, while his scouts and
outposts were instructed to maintain the closest possible touch.
On December 30th the enemy abandoned Rensburg, which had been their
advanced post, and concentrated at Colesberg, upon which French
moved his force up and seized Rensburg. The very next day, December
31st, he began a vigorous and long-continued series of operations.
At five o'clock on Sunday evening he moved out of Rensburg camp,
with R and half of O batteries R.H.A., the 10th Hussars, the
Inniskillings, and the Berkshires, to take up a position on the
west of Colesberg. At the same time Colonel Porter, with the
half-battery of O, his own regiment (the Carabineers), and the New
Zealand Mounted Rifles, left camp at two on the Monday morning and
took a position on the enemy's left flank. The Berkshires under
Major McCracken seized the hill, driving a Boer picket off it, and
the Horse enfiladed the enemy's right flank, and after a risky
artillery duel succeeded in silencing his guns. Next morning,
however (January 2nd, 1900), it was found that the Boers, strongly
reinforced, were back near their old positions, and French had to
be content to hold them and to wait for more troops.
These were not long in coming, for the Suffolk Regiment had
arrived, followed by the Composite Regiment (chosen from the
Household Cavalry) and the 4th Battery R.F.A. The Boers, however,
had also been reinforced, and showed great energy in their effort
to break the cordon which was being drawn round them. Upon the 4th
a determined effort was made by about a thousand of them under
General Schoeman to turn the left flank of the British, and at dawn
it was actually found that they had eluded the vigilance of the
outposts and had established themselves upon a hill to the rear of
the position. They were shelled off of it, however, by the guns of
O Battery, and in their retreat across the plain they were pursued
by the 10th Hussars and by one squadron of the Inniskillings, who
cut off some of the fugitives. At the same time, De Lisle with his
mounted infantry carried the position which they had originally
held. In this successful and well-managed action the Boer loss was
ninety, and we took in addition twenty-one prisoners. Our own
casualties amounted only to six killed, including Major Harvey of
the 10th, and to fifteen wounded.
Encouraged by this success an attempt was made by the Suffolk
Regiment to carry a hill which formed the key of the enemy's
position. The town of Colesberg lies in a basin surrounded by a
ring of kopjes, and the possession by us of any one of them would
have made the place untenable. The plan has been ascribed to
Colonel Watson of the Suffolks, but it is time that some protest
should be raised against this devolution of responsibility upon
subordinates in the event of failure. When success has crowned our
arms we have been delighted to honour our general; but when our
efforts end in failure our attention is called to Colonel Watson,
Colonel Long, or Colonel Thorneycroft. It is fairer to state that
in this instance General French ordered Colonel Watson to make a
night attack upon the hill.
The result was disastrous. At midnight four companies in canvas
shoes or in their stocking feet set forth upon their venture, and
just before dawn they found themselves upon the slope of the hill.
They were in a formation of quarter column with files extended to
two paces; H Company was leading. When half-way up a warm fire was
opened upon them in the darkness. Colonel Watson gave the order to
retire, intending, as it is believed, that the men should get under
the shelter of the dead ground which they had just quitted, but his
death immediately afterwards left matters in a confused condition.
The night was black, the ground broken, a hail of bullets whizzing
through the ranks. Companies got mixed in the darkness and
contradictory orders were issued. The leading company held its
ground, though each of the officers, Brett, Carey, and Butler, was
struck down. The other companies had retired, however, and the dawn
found this fringe of men, most of them wounded, lying under the
very rifles of the Boers. Even then they held out for some time,
but they could neither advance, retire, or stay where they were
without losing lives to no purpose, so the survivors were compelled
to surrender. There is better evidence here than at Magersfontein
that the enemy were warned and ready. Every one of the officers
engaged, from the Colonel to the boy subaltern, was killed,
wounded, or taken. Eleven officers and one hundred and fifty men
were our losses in this unfortunate but not discreditable affair,
which proves once more how much accuracy and how much secrecy is
necessary for a successful night attack. Four companies of the
regiment were sent down to Port Elizabeth to re-officer, but the
arrival of the 1st Essex enabled French to fill the gap which had
been made in his force.
In spite of this annoying check, French continued to pursue his
original design of holding the enemy in front and working round him
on the east. On January 9th, Porter, of the Carabineers, with his
own regiment, two squadrons of Household Cavalry, the New
Zealanders, the New South Wales Lancers, and four guns, took
another step forward and, after a skirmish, occupied a position
called Slingersfontein, still further to the north and east, so as
to menace the main road of retreat to Norval's Pont. Some
skirmishing followed, but the position was maintained. On the 15th
the Boers, thinking that this long extension must have weakened us,
made a spirited attack upon a position held by New Zealanders and a
company of the 1st Yorkshires, this regiment having been sent up to
reinforce French. The attempt was met by a volley and a bayonet
charge. Captain Orr, of the Yorkshires, was struck down; but
Captain Madocks, of the New Zealanders, who behaved with
conspicuous gallantry at a critical instant, took command, and the
enemy was heavily repulsed. Madocks engaged in a point-blank rifle
duel with the frock-coated top-hatted Boer leader, and had the good
fortune to kill his formidable opponent. Twenty-one Boer dead and
many wounded left upon the field made a small set-off to the
disaster of the Suffolks.
The next day, however (January 16th), the scales of fortune, which
swung alternately one way and the other, were again tipped against
us. It is difficult to give an intelligible account of the details
of these operations, because they were carried out by thin fringes
of men covering on both sides a very large area, each kopje
occupied as a fort, and the intervening plains patrolled by
cavalry.
As French extended to the east and north the Boers extended also to
prevent him from outflanking them, and so the little armies
stretched and stretched until they were two long mobile skirmishing
lines. The actions therefore resolve themselves into the encounters
of small bodies and the snapping up of exposed patrols--a game in
which the Boer aptitude for guerrilla tactics gave them some
advantage, though our own cavalry quickly adapted themselves to the
new conditions. On this occasion a patrol of sixteen men from the
South Australian Horse and New South Wales Lancers fell into an
ambush, and eleven were captured. Of the remainder, three made
their way back to camp, while one was killed and one was wounded.
The duel between French on the one side and Schoeman and Lambert on
the other was from this onwards one of maneuvering rather than of
fighting. The dangerously extended line of the British at this
period, over thirty miles long, was reinforced, as has been
mentioned, by the 1st Yorkshire and later by the 2nd Wiltshire and
a section of the 37th Howitzer Battery. There was probably no very
great difference in numbers between the two little armies, but the
Boers now, as always, were working upon internal lines. The
monotony of the operations was broken by the remarkable feat of the
Essex Regiment, which succeeded by hawsers and good-will in getting
two 15-pounder guns of the 4th Field Battery on to the top of
Coleskop, a hill which rises several hundred feet from the plain
and is so precipitous that it is no small task for an unhampered
man to climb it. From the summit a fire, which for some days could
not be localised by the Boers, was opened upon their laagers, which
had to be shifted in consequence. This energetic action upon the
part of our gunners may be set off against those other examples
where commanders of batteries have shown that they had not yet
appreciated what strong tackle and stout arms can accomplish. The
guns upon Coleskop not only dominated all the smaller kopjes for a
range of 9000 yards, but completely commanded the town of
Colesberg, which could not however, for humanitarian and political
reasons, be shelled.
By gradual reinforcements the force under French had by the end of
January attained the respectable figure of ten thousand men, strung
over a large extent of country. His infantry consisted of the 2nd
Berkshires, 1st Royal Irish, 2nd Wiltshires, 2nd Worcesters, 1st
Essex, and 1st Yorkshires; his cavalry, of the 10th Hussars, the
6th Dragoon Guards, the Inniskillings, the New Zealanders, the N.S.
W. Lancers, some Rimington Guides, and the composite Household
Regiment; his artillery, the R and O batteries of R.H.A., the 4th
R.F.A., and a section of the 37th Howitzer Battery. At the risk of
tedium I have repeated the units of this force, because there are
no operations during the war, with the exception perhaps of those
of the Rhodesian Column, concerning which it is so difficult to get
a clear impression. The fluctuating forces, the vast range of
country covered, and the petty farms which give their names to
positions, all tend to make the issue vague and the narrative
obscure. The British still lay in a semicircle extending from
Slingersfontein upon the right to Kloof Camp upon the left, and the
general scheme of operations continued to be an enveloping movement
upon the right. General Clements commanded this section of the
forces, while the energetic Porter carried out the successive
advances. The lines had gradually stretched until they were nearly
fifty miles in length, and something of the obscurity in which the
operations have been left is due to the impossibility of any single
correspondent having a clear idea of what was occurring over so
extended a front.
On January 25th French sent Stephenson and Brabazon to push a
reconnaissance to the north of Colesberg, and found that the Boers
were making a fresh position at Rietfontein, nine miles nearer
their own border. A small action ensued, in which we lost ten or
twelve of the Wiltshire Regiment, and gained some knowledge of the
enemy's dispositions. For the remainder of the month the two forces
remained in a state of equilibrium, each keenly on its guard, and
neither strong enough to penetrate the lines of the other. General
French descended to Cape Town to aid General Roberts in the
elaboration of that plan which was soon to change the whole
military situation in South Africa.
Reinforcements were still dribbling into the British force, Hoad's
Australian Regiment, which had been changed from infantry to
cavalry, and J battery R.H.A. from India, being the last arrivals.
But very much stronger reinforcements had arrived for the Boers--so
strong that they were able to take the offensive. De la Rey had
left the Modder with three thousand men, and their presence infused
new life into the defenders of Colesberg. At the moment, too, that
the Modder Boers were coming to Colesberg, the British had begun to
send cavalry reinforcements to the Modder in preparation for the
march to Kimberley, so that Clements's Force (as it had now become)
was depleted at the very instant when that of the enemy was largely
increased. The result was that it was all they could do not merely
to hold their own, but to avoid a very serious disaster.
The movements of De la Rey were directed towards turning the right
of the position. On February 9th and 10th the mounted patrols,
principally the Tasmanians, the Australians, and the Inniskillings,
came in contact with the Boers, and some skirmishing ensued, with
no heavy loss upon either side. A British patrol was surrounded and
lost eleven prisoners, Tasmanians and Guides. On the 12th the Boer
turning movement developed itself, and our position on the right at
Slingersfontein was strongly attacked.
The key of the British position at this point was a kopje held by
three companies of the 2nd Worcester Regiment. Upon this the Boers
made a fierce onslaught, but were as fiercely repelled. They came
up in the dark between the set of moon and rise of sun, as they had
done at the great assault of Ladysmith, and the first dim light saw
them in the advanced sangars. The Boer generals do not favour night
attacks, but they are exceedingly fond of using darkness for taking
up a good position and pushing onwards as soon as it is possible to
see. This is what they did upon this occasion, and the first
intimation which the outposts had of their presence was the rush of
feet and loom of figures in the cold misty light of dawn. The
occupants of the sangars were killed to a man, and the assailants
rushed onwards. As the sun topped the line of the veld half the
kopje was in their possession. Shouting and firing, they pressed
onwards.
But the Worcester men were steady old soldiers, and the battalion
contained no less than four hundred and fifty marksmen in its
ranks. Of these the companies upon the hill had their due
proportion, and their fire was so accurate that the Boers found
themselves unable to advance any further. Through the long day a
desperate duel was maintained between the two lines of riflemen.
Colonel Cuningham and Major Stubbs were killed while endeavouring
to recover the ground which had been lost. Hovel and Bartholomew
continued to encourage their men, and the British fire became so
deadly that that of the Boers was dominated. Under the direction of
Hacket Pain, who commanded the nearest post, guns of J battery were
brought out into the open and shelled the portion of the kopje
which was held by the Boers. The latter were reinforced, but could
make no advance against the accurate rifle fire with which they
were met. The Bisley champion of the battalion, with a bullet
through his thigh, expended a hundred rounds before sinking from
loss of blood. It was an excellent defence, and a pleasing
exception to those too frequent cases where an isolated force has
lost heart in face of a numerous and persistent foe. With the
coming of darkness the Boers withdrew with a loss of over two
hundred killed and wounded. Orders had come from Clements that the
whole right wing should be drawn in, and in obedience to them the
remains of the victorious companies were called in by Hacket Pain,
who moved his force by night in the direction of Rensburg. The
British loss in the action was twenty-eight killed and nearly a
hundred wounded or missing, most of which was incurred when the
sangars were rushed in the early morning.
While this action was fought upon the extreme right of the British
position another as severe had occurred with much the same result
upon the extreme left, where the 2nd Wiltshire Regiment was
stationed. Some companies of this regiment were isolated upon a
kopje and surrounded by the Boer riflemen when the pressure upon
them was relieved by a desperate attack by about a hundred of the
Victorian Rifles. The gallant Australians lost Major Eddy and six
officers out of seven, with a large proportion of their men, but
they proved once for all that amid all the scattered nations who
came from the same home there is not one with a more fiery courage
and a higher sense of martial duty than the men from the great
island continent. It is the misfortune of the historian when
dealing with these contingents that, as a rule, by their very
nature they were employed in detached parties in fulfilling the
duties which fall to the lot of scouts and light cavalry--duties
which fill the casualty lists but not the pages of the chronicler.
Be it said, however, once for all that throughout the whole African
army there was nothing but the utmost admiration for the dash and
spirit of the hard-riding, straight-shooting sons of Australia and
New Zealand. In a host which held many brave men there were none
braver than they.
It was evident from this time onwards that the turning movement had
failed, and that the enemy had developed such strength that we were
ourselves in imminent danger of being turned. The situation was a
most serious one: for if Clements's force could be brushed aside
there would be nothing to keep the enemy from cutting the
communications of the army which Roberts had assembled for his
march into the Free State. Clements drew in his wings hurriedly and
concentrated his whole force at Rensburg. It was a difficult
operation in the face of an aggressive enemy, but the movements
were well timed and admirably carried out. There is always the
possibility of a retreat degenerating into a panic, and a panic at
that moment would have been a most serious matter. One misfortune
occurred, through which two companies of the Wiltshire regiment
were left without definite orders, and were cut off and captured
after a resistance in which a third of their number was killed and
wounded. No man in that trying time worked harder than Colonel
Carter of the Wiltshires (the night of the retreat was the sixth
which he had spent without sleep), and the loss of the two
companies is to be set down to one of those accidents which may
always occur in warfare. Some of the Inniskilling Dragoons and
Victorian Mounted Rifles were also cut off in the retreat, but on
the whole Clements was very fortunate in being able to concentrate
his scattered army with so few mishaps. The withdrawal was
heartbreaking to the soldiers who had worked so hard and so long in
extending the lines, but it might be regarded with equanimity by
the Generals, who understood that the greater strength the enemy
developed at Colesberg the less they would have to oppose the
critical movements which were about to be carried out in the west.
Meanwhile Coleskop had also been abandoned, the guns removed, and
the whole force on February 14th passed through Rensburg and fell
back upon Arundel, the spot from which six weeks earlier French had
started upon this stirring series of operations. It would not be
fair, however, to suppose that they had failed because they ended
where they began. Their primary object had been to prevent the
further advance of the Freestaters into the colony, and, during the
most critical period of the war, this had been accomplished with
much success and little loss. At last the pressure had become so
severe that the enemy had to weaken the most essential part of
their general position in order to relieve it. The object of the
operations had really been attained when Clements found himself
back at Arundel once more. French, the stormy petrel of the war,
had flitted on from Cape Town to Modder River, where a larger prize
than Colesberg awaited him. Clements continued to cover Naauwport,
the important railway junction, until the advance of Roberts's army
caused a complete reversal of the whole military situation.
