CHAPTER 17.
BULLER'S FINAL ADVANCE.
The heroic moment of the siege of Ladysmith was that which
witnessed the repulse of the great attack. The epic should have
ended at that dramatic instant. But instead of doing so the story
falls back to an anticlimax of crowded hospitals, slaughtered
horses, and sporadic shell fire. For another six weeks of
inactivity the brave garrison endured all the sordid evils which
had steadily grown from inconvenience to misfortune and from
misfortune to misery. Away in the south they heard the thunder of
Buller's guns, and from the hills round the town they watched with
pale faces and bated breath the tragedy of Spion Kop, preserving a
firm conviction that a very little more would have transformed it
into their salvation. Their hearts sank with the sinking of the
cannonade, and rose again with the roar of Vaalkranz. But Vaalkranz
also failed them, and they waited on in the majesty of their hunger
and their weakness for the help which was to come.
It has been already narrated how General Buller had made his three
attempts for the relief of the city. The General who was inclined
to despair was now stimulated by despatches from Lord Roberts,
while his army, who were by no means inclined to despair, were
immensely cheered by the good news from the Kimberley side. Both
General and army prepared for a last supreme effort. This time, at
least, the soldiers hoped that they would be permitted to burst
their way to the help of their starving comrades or leave their
bones among the hills which had faced them so long. All they asked
was a fight to a finish, and now they were about to have one.
General Buller had tried the Boers' centre, he had tried their
extreme right, and now he was about to try their extreme left.
There were some obvious advantages on this side which make it
surprising that it was not the first to be attempted. In the first
place, the enemy's main position upon that flank was at Hlangwane
mountain, which is to the south of the Tugela, so that in case of
defeat the river ran behind them. In the second, Hlangwane mountain
was the one point from which the Boer position at Colenso could be
certainly enfiladed, and therefore the fruits of victory would be
greater on that flank than on the other. Finally, the operations
could be conducted at no great distance from the railhead, and the
force would be exposed to little danger of having its flank
attacked or its communications cut, as was the case in the Spion
Kop advance. Against these potent considerations there is only to
be put the single fact that the turning of the Boer right would
threaten the Freestaters' line of retreat. On the whole, the
balance of advantage lay entirely with the new attempt, and the
whole army advanced to it with a premonition of success. Of all the
examples which the war has given of the enduring qualities of the
British troops there is none more striking than the absolute
confidence and whole hearted delight with which, after three bloody
repulses, they set forth upon another venture.
On February 9th the movements were started which transferred the
greater part of the force from the extreme left to the centre and
right. By the 11th Lyttelton's (formerly Clery's) second division
and Warren's fifth division had come eastward, leaving Burn
Murdoch's cavalry brigade to guard the Western side. On the 12th
Lord Dundonald, with all the colonial cavalry, two battalions of
infantry, and a battery, made a strong reconnaissance towards
Hussar Hill, which is the nearest of the several hills which would
have to be occupied in order to turn the position. The hill was
taken, but was abandoned again by General Buller after he had used
it for some hours as an observatory. A long-range action between
the retiring cavalry and the Boers ended in a few losses upon each
side.
What Buller had seen during the hour or two which he had spent with
his telescope upon Hussar Hill had evidently confirmed him in his
views, for two days later (February 14th) the whole army set forth
for this point. By the morning of the 15th twenty thousand men were
concentrated upon the sides and spurs of this eminence. On the 16th
the heavy guns were in position, and all was ready for the advance.
Facing them now were the formidable Boer lines of Hlangwane Hill
and Green Hill, which would certainly cost several thousands of men
if they were to take them by direct storm. Beyond them, upon the
Boer flank, were the hills of Monte Christo and Cingolo, which
appeared to be the extreme outside of the Boer position. The plan
was to engage the attention of the trenches in front by a terrific
artillery fire and the threat of an assault, while at the same time
sending the true flank attack far round to carry the Cingolo ridge,
which must be taken before any other hill could be approached.
On the 17th, in the early morning, with the first tinge of violet
in the east, the irregular cavalry and the second division
(Lyttelton's) with Wynne's Brigade started upon their widely
curving flanking march. The country through which they passed was
so broken that the troopers led their horses in single file, and
would have found themselves helpless in face of any resistance.
Fortunately, Cingolo Hill was very weakly held, and by evening both
our horsemen and our infantry had a firm grip upon it, thus turning
the extreme left flank of the Boer position. For once their
mountainous fortresses were against them, for a mounted Boer force
is so mobile that in an open position, such as faced Methuen, it is
very hard and requires great celerity of movement ever to find a
flank at all. On a succession of hills, however, it was evident
that some one hill must mark the extreme end of their line, and
Buller had found it at Cingolo. Their answer to this movement was
to throw their flank back so as to face the new position.
Even now, however, the Boer leaders had apparently not realised
that this was the main attack, or it is possible that the
intervention of the river made it difficult for them to send
reinforcements. However that may be, it is certain that the task
which the British found awaiting them on the 18th proved to be far
easier than they had dared to hope. The honours of the day rested
with Hildyard's English Brigade (East Surrey, West Surrey, West
Yorkshires, and 2nd Devons). In open order and with a rapid
advance, taking every advantage of the cover--which was better than
is usual in South African warfare--they gained the edge of the
Monte Christo ridge, and then swiftly cleared the crest. One at
least of the regiments engaged, the Devons, was nerved by the
thought that their own first battalion was waiting for them at
Ladysmith. The capture of the hill made the line of trenches which
faced Buller untenable, and he was at once able to advance with
Barton's Fusilier Brigade and to take possession of the whole Boer
position of Hlangwane and Green Hill. It was not a great tactical
victory, for they had no trophies to show save the worthless debris
of the Boer camps. But it was a very great strategical victory, for
it not only gave them the whole south side of the Tugela, but also
the means of commanding with their guns a great deal of the north
side, including those Colenso trenches which had blocked the way so
long. A hundred and seventy killed and wounded (of whom only
fourteen were killed) was a trivial price for such a result. At
last from the captured ridges the exultant troops could see far
away the haze which lay over the roofs of Ladysmith, and the
besieged, with hearts beating high with hope, turned their glasses
upon the distant mottled patches which told them that their
comrades were approaching.
By February 20th the British had firmly established themselves
along the whole south bank of the river, Hart's brigade had
occupied Colenso, and the heavy guns had been pushed up to more
advanced positions. The crossing of the river was the next
operation, and the question arose where it should be crossed. The
wisdom which comes with experience shows us now that it would have
been infinitely better to have crossed on their extreme left flank,
as by an advance upon this line we should have turned their strong
Pieters position just as we had already turned their Colenso one.
With an absolutely master card in our hand we refused to play it,
and won the game by a more tedious and perilous process. The
assumption seems to have been made (on no other hypothesis can one
understand the facts) that the enemy were demoralised and that the
positions would not be strongly held. Our flanking advantage was
abandoned and a direct advance was ordered from Colenso, involving
a frontal attack upon the Pieters position.
On February 21st Buller threw his pontoon bridge over the river
near Colenso, and the same evening his army began to cross. It was
at once evident that the Boer resistance had by no means collapsed.
Wynne's Lancashire Brigade were the first across, and found
themselves hotly engaged before nightfall. The low kopjes in front
of them were blazing with musketry fire. The brigade held its own,
but lost the Brigadier (the second in a month) and 150 rank and
file. Next morning the main body of the infantry was passed across,
and the army was absolutely committed to the formidable and
unnecessary enterprise of fighting its way straight to Ladysmith.
The force in front had weakened, however, both in numbers and in
morale. Some thousands of the Freestaters had left in order to
defend their own country from the advance of Roberts, while the
rest were depressed by as much of the news as was allowed by their
leaders to reach them. But the Boer is a tenacious fighter, and
many a brave man was still to fall before Buller and White should
shake hands in the High Street of Ladysmith.
The first obstacle which faced the army, after crossing the river,
was a belt of low rolling ground, which was gradually cleared by
the advance of our infantry. As night closed in the advance lines
of Boers and British were so close to each other that incessant
rifle fire was maintained until morning, and at more than one point
small bodies of desperate riflemen charged right up to the bayonets
of our infantry. The morning found us still holding our positions
all along the line, and as more and more of our infantry came up
and gun after gun roared into action we began to push our stubborn
enemy northwards. On the 21st the Dorsets, Middlesex, and Somersets
had borne the heat of the day. On the 22nd it was the Royal
Lancasters, followed by the South Lancashires, who took up the
running. It would take the patience and also the space of a
Kinglake in this scrambling broken fight to trace the doings of
those groups of men who strove and struggled through the rifle
fire. All day a steady advance was maintained over the low kopjes,
until by evening we were faced by the more serious line of the
Pieter's Hills. The operations had been carried out with a monotony
of gallantry. Always the same extended advance, always the same
rattle of Mausers and clatter of pom-poms from a ridge, always the
same victorious soldiers on the barren crest, with a few crippled
Boers before them and many crippled comrades behind. They were
expensive triumphs, and yet every one brought them nearer to their
goal. And now, like an advancing tide, they lapped along the base
of Pieter's Hill. Could they gather volume enough to carry
themselves over? The issue of the long-drawn battle and the fate of
Ladysmith hung upon the question.
Brigadier Fitzroy Hart, to whom the assault was entrusted, is in
some ways as singular and picturesque a type as has been evolved in
the war. A dandy soldier, always the picture of neatness from the
top of his helmet to the heels of his well-polished brown boots, he
brings to military matters the same precision which he affects in
dress. Pedantic in his accuracy, he actually at the battle of
Colenso drilled the Irish Brigade for half an hour before leading
them into action, and threw out markers under a deadly fire in
order that his change from close to extended formation might be
academically correct. The heavy loss of the Brigade at this action
was to some extent ascribed to him and affected his popularity; but
as his men came to know him better, his romantic bravery, his
whimsical soldierly humour, their dislike changed into admiration.
His personal disregard for danger was notorious and reprehensible.
'Where is General Hart?' asked some one in action. 'I have not seen
him, but I know where you will find him. Go ahead of the skirmish
line and you will see him standing on a rock,' was the answer. He
bore a charmed life. It was a danger to be near him. 'Whom are you
going to?' 'General Hart,' said the aide-de-camp. 'Then good-bye!'
cried his fellows. A grim humour ran through his nature. It is
gravely recorded and widely believed that he lined up a regiment on
a hill-top in order to teach them not to shrink from fire. Amid the
laughter of his Irishmen, he walked through the open files of his
firing line holding a laggard by the ear. This was the man who had
put such a spirit into the Irish Brigade that amid that army of
valiant men there were none who held such a record. 'Their rushes
were the quickest, their rushes were the longest, and they stayed
the shortest time under cover,' said a shrewd military observer. To
Hart and his brigade was given the task of clearing the way to
Ladysmith.
The regiments which he took with him on his perilous enterprise
were the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 2nd Dublin Fusiliers, the
1st Connaught Rangers, and the Imperial Light Infantry, the whole
forming the famous 5th Brigade. They were already in the extreme
British advance, and now, as they moved forwards, the Durham Light
Infantry and the 1st Rifle Brigade from Lyttelton's Brigade came up
to take their place. The hill to be taken lay on the right, and the
soldiers were compelled to pass in single file under a heavy fire
for more than a mile until they reached the spot which seemed best
for their enterprise. There, short already of sixty of their
comrades, they assembled and began a cautious advance upon the
lines of trenches and sangars which seamed the brown slope above
them.
For a time they were able to keep some cover, and the casualties
were comparatively few. But now at last, as the evening sun threw a
long shadow from the hills, the leading regiment, the
Inniskillings, found themselves at the utmost fringe of boulders
with a clear slope between them and the main trench of the enemy.
Up there where the shrapnel was spurting and the great lyddite
shells crashing they could dimly see a line of bearded faces and
the black dots of the slouch hats. With a yell the Inniskillings
sprang out, carried with a rush the first trench, and charged
desperately onwards for the second one. It was a supremely dashing
attack against a supremely steady resistance, for among all their
gallant deeds the Boers have never fought better than on that
February evening. Amid such a smashing shell fire as living mortals
have never yet endured they stood doggedly, these hardy men of the
veld, and fired fast and true into the fiery ranks of the Irishmen.
The yell of the stormers was answered by the remorseless roar of
the Mausers and the deep-chested shouts of the farmers. Up and up
surged the infantry, falling, rising, dashing bull-headed at the
crackling line of the trench. But still the bearded faces glared at
them over the edge, and still the sheet of lead pelted through
their ranks. The regiment staggered, came on, staggered again, was
overtaken by supporting companies of the Dublins and the
Connaughts, came on, staggered once more, and finally dissolved
into shreds, who ran swiftly back for cover, threading their way
among their stricken comrades. Never on this earth was there a
retreat of which the survivors had less reason to be ashamed. They
had held on to the utmost capacity of human endurance. Their
Colonel, ten officers, and more than half the regiment were lying
on the fatal hill. Honour to them, and honour also to the gallant
Dutchmen who, rooted in the trenches, had faced the rush and fury
of such an onslaught! Today to them, tomorrow to us--but it is for
a soldier to thank the God of battles for worthy foes.
It is one thing, however, to repulse the British soldier and it is
another to rout him. Within a few hundred yards of their horrible
ordeal at Magersfontein the Highlanders reformed into a military
body. So now the Irishmen fell back no further than the nearest
cover, and there held grimly on to the ground which they had won.
If you would know the advantage which the defence has over the
attack, then do you come and assault this line of tenacious men,
now in your hour of victory and exultation, friend Boer! Friend
Boer did attempt it, and skilfully too, moving a flanking party to
sweep the position with their fire. But the brigade, though sorely
hurt, held them off without difficulty, and was found on the
morning of the 24th to be still lying upon the ground which they
had won.
Our losses had been very heavy, Colonel Thackeray of the
Inniskillings, Colonel Sitwell of the Dublins, three majors, twenty
officers, and a total of about six hundred out of 1200 actually
engaged. To take such punishment and to remain undemoralised is the
supreme test to which troops can be put. Could the loss have been
avoided? By following the original line of advance from Monte
Christo, perhaps, when we should have turned the enemy's left. But
otherwise no. The hill was in the way and had to be taken. In the
war game you cannot play without a stake. You lose and you pay
forfeit, and where the game is fair the best player is he who pays
with the best grace. The attack was well prepared, well delivered,
and only miscarried on account of the excellence of the defence. We
proved once more what we had proved so often before, that all
valour and all discipline will not avail in a frontal attack
against brave coolheaded men armed with quick-firing rifles.
While the Irish Brigade assaulted Railway Hill an attack had been
made upon the left, which was probably meant as a demonstration to
keep the Boers from reinforcing their comrades rather than as an
actual attempt upon their lines. Such as it was, however, it cost
the life of at least one brave soldier, for Colonel Thorold, of the
Welsh Fusiliers, was among the fallen. Thorold, Thackeray, and
Sitwell in one evening. Who can say that British colonels have not
given their men a lead?
The army was now at a deadlock. Railway Hill barred the way, and if
Hart's men could not carry it by assault it was hard to say who
could. The 24th found the two armies facing each other at this
critical point, the Irishmen still clinging to the slopes of the
hill and the Boers lining the top. Fierce rifle firing broke out
between them during the day, but each side was well covered and lay
low. The troops in support suffered somewhat, however, from a
random shell fire. Mr. Winston Churchill has left it upon record
that within his own observation three of their shrapnel shells
fired at a venture on to the reverse slope of a hill accounted for
nineteen men and four horses. The enemy can never have known how
hard those three shells had hit us, and so we may also believe that
our artillery fire has often been less futile than it appeared.
General Buller had now realised that it was no mere rearguard
action which the Boers were fighting, but that their army was
standing doggedly at bay; so he reverted to that flanking movement
which, as events showed, should never have been abandoned. Hart's
Irish Brigade was at present almost the right of the army. His new
plan--a masterly one--was to keep Hart pinning the Boers at that
point, and to move his centre and left across the river, and then
back to envelope the left wing of the enemy. By this manoeuvre Hart
became the extreme left instead of the extreme right, and the Irish
Brigade would be the hinge upon which the whole army should turn.
It was a large conception, finely carried out. The 24th was a day
of futile shell fire--and of plans for the future. The heavy guns
were got across once more to the Monte Christo ridge and to
Hlangwane, and preparations made to throw the army from the west to
the east. The enemy still snarled and occasionally snapped in front
of Hart's men, but with four companies of the 2nd Rifle Brigade to
protect their flanks their position remained secure.
In the meantime, through a contretemps between our outposts and the
Boers, no leave had been given to us to withdraw our wounded, and
the unfortunate fellows, some hundreds of them, had lain between
the lines in agonies of thirst for thirty-six hours--one of the
most painful incidents of the campaign. Now, upon the 25th, an
armistice was proclaimed, and the crying needs of the survivors
were attended to. On the same day the hearts of our soldiers sank
within them as they saw the stream of our wagons and guns crossing
the river once more. What, were they foiled again? Was the blood of
these brave men to be shed in vain? They ground their teeth at the
thought. The higher strategy was not for them, but back was back
and forward was forward, and they knew which way their proud hearts
wished to go.
The 26th was occupied by the large movements of troops which so
complete a reversal of tactics necessitated. Under the screen of a
heavy artillery fire, the British right became the left and the
left the right. A second pontoon bridge was thrown across near the
old Boer bridge at Hlangwane, and over it was passed a large force
of infantry, Barton's Fusilier Brigade, Kitchener's (vice Wynne's,
vice Woodgate's) Lancashire Brigade, and two battalions of
Norcott's (formerly Lyttelton's) Brigade. Coke's Brigade was left
at Colenso to prevent a counter attack upon our left flank and
communications. In this way, while Hart with the Durhams and the
1st Rifle Brigade held the Boers in front, the main body of the
army was rapidly swung round on to their left flank. By the morning
of the 27th all were in place for the new attack.
Opposite the point where the troops had been massed were three Boer
hills; one, the nearest, may for convenience sake be called
Barton's Hill. As the army had formerly been situated the assault
upon this hill would have been a matter of extreme difficulty; but
now, with the heavy guns restored to their commanding position,
from which they could sweep its sides and summits, it had recovered
its initial advantage. In the morning sunlight Barton's Fusiliers
crossed the river, and advanced to the attack under a screaming
canopy of shells. Up they went and up, darting and crouching, until
their gleaming bayonets sparkled upon the summit. The masterful
artillery had done its work, and the first long step taken in this
last stage of the relief of Ladysmith. The loss had been slight and
the advantage enormous. After they had gained the summit the
Fusiliers were stung and stung again by clouds of skirmishers who
clung to the flanks of the hill, but their grip was firm and grew
firmer with every hour.
Of the three Boer hills which had to be taken the nearest (or
eastern one) was now in the hands of the British. The furthest (or
western one) was that on which the Irish Brigade was still
crouching, ready at any moment for a final spring which would take
them over the few hundred yards which separated them from the
trenches. Between the two intervened a central hill, as yet
untouched. Could we carry this the whole position would be ours.
Now for the final effort! Turn every gun upon it, the guns of Monte
Christo, the guns of Hlangwane! Turn every rifle upon it--the
rifles of Barton's men, the rifles of Hart's men, the carbines of
the distant cavalry! Scalp its crown with the machine-gun fire! And
now up with you, Lancashire men, Norcott's men! The summit or a
glorious death, for beyond that hill your suffering comrades are
awaiting you! Put every bullet and every man and all of fire and
spirit that you are worth into this last hour; for if you fail now
you have failed for ever, and if you win, then when your hairs are
white your blood will still run warm when you think of that
morning's work. The long drama had drawn to an end, and one short
day's work is to show what that end was to be.
But there was never a doubt of it. Hardly for one instant did the
advance waver at any point of its extended line. It was the supreme
instant of the Natal campaign, as, wave after wave, the long lines
of infantry went shimmering up the hill. On the left the
Lancasters, the Lancashire Fusiliers, the South Lancashires, the
York and Lancasters, with a burr of north country oaths, went
racing for the summit. Spion Kop and a thousand comrades were
calling for vengeance. 'Remember, men, the eyes of Lancashire are
watching you,' cried the gallant MacCarthy O'Leary. The old 40th
swept on, but his dead body marked the way which they had taken. On
the right the East Surrey, the, Cameronians, the 3rd Rifles, the
1st Rifle Brigade, the Durhams, and the gallant Irishmen, so sorely
stricken and yet so eager, were all pressing upwards and onwards.
The Boer fire lulls, it ceases--they are running! Wild hat-waving
men upon the Hlangwane uplands see the silhouette of the active
figures of the stormers along the sky-line and know that the
position is theirs. Exultant soldiers dance and cheer upon the
ridge. The sun is setting in glory over the great Drakensberg
mountains, and so also that night set for ever the hopes of the
Boer invaders of Natal. Out of doubt and chaos, blood and labour,
had come at last the judgment that the lower should not swallow the
higher, that the world is for the man of the twentieth and not of
the seventeenth century. After a fortnight of fighting the weary
troops threw themselves down that night with the assurance that at
last the door was ajar and the light breaking through. One more
effort and it would be open before them.
Behind the line of hills which had been taken there extended a
great plain as far as Bulwana--that evil neighbour who had wrought
such harm upon Ladysmith. More than half of the Pieters position
had fallen into Buller's hands on the 27th, and the remainder had
become untenable. The Boers had lost some five hundred in killed,
wounded, and prisoners. [Footnote: Accurate figures will probably
never be obtained, but a well-known Boer in Pretoria informed me
that Pieters was the most expensive fight to them of the whole war.
] It seemed to the British General and his men that one more action
would bring them safely into Ladysmith.
But here they miscalculated, and so often have we miscalculated on
the optimistic side in this campaign that it is pleasing to find
for once that our hopes were less than the reality. The Boers had
been beaten--fairly beaten and disheartened. It will always be a
subject for conjecture whether they were so entirely on the
strength of the Natal campaign, or whether the news of the Cronje
disaster from the western side had warned them that they must draw
in upon the east. For my own part I believe that the honour lies
with the gallant men of Natal, and that, moving on these lines,
they would, Cronje or no Cronje, have forced their way in triumph
to Ladysmith.
And now the long-drawn story draws to a swift close. Cautiously
feeling their way with a fringe of horse, the British pushed over
the great plain, delayed here and there by the crackle of musketry,
but finding always that the obstacle gave way and vanished as they
approached it. At last it seemed clear to Dundonald that there
really was no barrier between his horsemen and the beleaguered
city. With a squadron of Imperial Light Horse and a squadron of
Natal Carabineers he rode on until, in the gathering twilight, the
Ladysmith picket challenged the approaching cavalry, and the
gallant town was saved.
It is hard to say which had shown the greater endurance, the
rescued or their rescuers. The town, indefensible, lurking in a
hollow under commanding hills, had held out for 118 days. They had
endured two assaults and an incessant bombardment, to which,
towards the end, owing to the failure of heavy ammunition, they
were unable to make any adequate reply. It was calculated that 16,
000 shells had fallen within the town. In two successful sorties
they had destroyed three of the enemy's heavy guns. They had been
pressed by hunger, horseflesh was already running short, and they
had been decimated by disease. More than 2000 cases of enteric and
dysentery had been in hospital at one time, and the total number of
admissions had been nearly as great as the total number of the
garrison. One-tenth of the men had actually died of wounds or
disease. Ragged, bootless, and emaciated, there still lurked in the
gaunt soldiers the martial spirit of warriors. On the day after
their relief 2000 of them set forth to pursue the Boers. One who
helped to lead them has left it on record that the most piteous
sight that he has ever seen was these wasted men, stooping under
their rifles and gasping with the pressure of their accoutrements,
as they staggered after their retreating enemy. A Verestschagen
might find a subject these 2000 indomitable men with their
emaciated horses pursuing a formidable foe. It is God's mercy they
failed to overtake them.
If the record of the besieged force was great, that of the
relieving army was no less so. Through the blackest depths of
despondency and failure they had struggled to absolute success. At
Colenso they had lost 1200 men, at Spion Kop 1700, at Vaalkranz
400, and now, in this last long-drawn effort, 1600 more. Their
total losses were over 5000 men, more than 20 per cent of the whole
army. Some particular regiments had suffered horribly. The Dublin
and Inniskilling Fusiliers headed the roll of honour with only five
officers and 40 per cent of the men left standing. Next to them the
Lancashire Fusiliers and the Royal Lancasters had been the hardest
hit. It speaks well for Buller's power of winning and holding the
confidence of his men that in the face of repulse after repulse the
soldiers still went into battle as steadily as ever under his
command.
On March 3rd Buller's force entered Ladysmith in state between the
lines of the defenders. For their heroism the Dublin Fusiliers were
put in the van of the procession, and it is told how, as the
soldiers who lined the streets saw the five officers and small
clump of men, the remains of what had been a strong battalion,
realising, for the first time perhaps, what their relief had cost,
many sobbed like children. With cheer after cheer the stream of
brave men flowed for hours between banks formed by men as brave.
But for the purposes of war the garrison was useless. A month of
rest and food would be necessary before they could be ready to take
the field once more.
So the riddle of the Tugela had at last been solved. Even now, with
all the light which has been shed upon the matter, it is hard to
apportion praise and blame. To the cheerful optimism of Symons must
be laid some of the blame of the original entanglement; but man is
mortal, and he laid down his life for his mistake. White, who had
been but a week in the country, could not, if he would, alter the
main facts of the military situation. He did his best, committed
one or two errors, did brilliantly on one or two points, and
finally conducted the defence with a tenacity and a gallantry which
are above all praise. It did not, fortunately, develop into an
absolutely desperate affair, like Massena's defence of Genoa, but a
few more weeks would have made it a military tragedy. He was
fortunate in the troops whom he commanded--half of them old
soldiers from India--[Footnote: An officer in high command in
Ladysmith has told me, as an illustration of the nerve and
discipline of the troops, that though false alarms in the Boer
trenches were matters of continual occurrence from the beginning to
the end of the siege, there was not one single occasion when the
British outposts made a mistake.]--and exceedingly fortunate in his
officers, French (in the operations before the siege), Archibald
Hunter, Ian Hamilton, Hedworth Lambton, Dick-Cunyngham, Knox, De
Courcy Hamilton, and all the other good men and true who stood (as
long as they could stand) by his side. Above all, he was fortunate
in his commissariat officers, and it was in the offices of Colonels
Ward and Stoneman as much as in the trenches and sangars of
Caesar's Camp that the siege was won.
Buller, like White, had to take the situation as he found it. It is
well known that his own belief was that the line of the Tugela was
the true defence of Natal. When he reached Africa, Ladysmith was
already beleaguered, and he, with his troops, had to abandon the
scheme of direct invasion and to hurry to extricate White's
division. Whether they might not have been more rapidly extricated
by keeping to the original plan is a question which will long
furnish an excellent subject for military debate. Had Buller in
November known that Ladysmith was capable of holding out until
March, is it conceivable that he, with his whole army corps and as
many more troops as he cared to summon from England, would not have
made such an advance in four months through the Free State as would
necessitate the abandonment of the sieges both of Kimberley and of
Ladysmith? If the Boers persisted in these sieges they could not
possibly place more than 20,000 men on the Orange River to face 60,
000 whom Buller could have had there by the first week in December.
Methuen's force, French's force, Gatacre's force, and the Natal
force, with the exception of garrisons for Pietermaritzburg and
Durban, would have assembled, with a reserve of another sixty
thousand men in the colony or on the sea ready to fill the gaps in
his advance. Moving over a flat country with plenty of flanking
room, it is probable that he would have been in Bloemfontein by
Christmas and at the Vaal River late in January. What could the
Boers do then? They might remain before Ladysmith, and learn that
their capital and their gold mines had been taken in their absence.
Or they might abandon the siege and trek back to defend their own
homes. This, as it appears to a civilian critic, would have been
the least expensive means of fighting them; but after all the
strain had to come somewhere, and the long struggle of Ladysmith
may have meant a more certain and complete collapse in the future.
At least, by the plan actually adopted we saved Natal from total
devastation, and that must count against a great deal.
Having taken his line, Buller set about his task in a slow,
deliberate, but pertinacious fashion. It cannot be denied, however,
that the pertinacity was largely due to the stiffening counsel of
Roberts and the soldierly firmness of White who refused to
acquiesce in the suggestion of surrender. Let it be acknowledged
that Buller's was the hardest problem of the war, and that he
solved it. The mere acknowledgment goes far to soften criticism.
But the singular thing is that in his proceedings he showed
qualities which had not been generally attributed to him, and was
wanting in those very points which the public had imagined to be
characteristic of him. He had gone out with the reputation of a
downright John Bull fighter, who would take punishment or give it,
but slog his way through without wincing. There was no reason for
attributing any particular strategical ability to him. But as a
matter of fact, setting the Colenso attempt aside, the crossing for
the Spion Kop enterprise, the withdrawal of the compromised army,
the Vaalkranz crossing with the clever feint upon Brakfontein, the
final operations, and especially the complete change of front after
the third day of Pieters, were strategical movements largely
conceived and admirably carried out. On the other hand, a
hesitation in pushing onwards, and a disinclination to take a risk
or to endure heavy punishment, even in the case of temporary
failure, were consistent characteristics of his generalship. The
Vaalkranz operations are particularly difficult to defend from the
charge of having been needlessly slow and half-hearted. This
'saturnine fighter,' as he had been called, proved to be
exceedingly sensitive about the lives of his men--an admirable
quality in itself, but there are occasions when to spare them
to-day is to needlessly imperil them tomorrow. The victory was his,
and yet in the very moment of it he displayed the qualities which
marred him. With two cavalry brigades in hand he did not push the
pursuit of the routed Boers with their guns and endless streams of
wagons. It is true that he might have lost heavily, but it is true
also that a success might have ended the Boer invasion of Natal,
and the lives of our troopers would be well spent in such a
venture. If cavalry is not to be used in pursuing a retiring enemy
encumbered with much baggage, then its day is indeed past.
The relief of Ladysmith stirred the people of the Empire as
nothing, save perhaps the subsequent relief of Mafeking, has done
during our generation. Even sober unemotional London found its soul
for once and fluttered with joy. Men, women, and children, rich and
poor, clubman and cabman, joined in the universal delight. The
thought of our garrison, of their privations, of our impotence to
relieve them, of the impending humiliation to them and to us, had
lain dark for many months across our spirits. It had weighed upon
us, until the subject, though ever present in our thoughts, was too
painful for general talk. And now, in an instant, the shadow was
lifted. The outburst of rejoicing was not a triumph over the
gallant Boers. But it was our own escape from humiliation, the
knowledge that the blood of our sons had not been shed in vain,
above all the conviction that the darkest hour had now passed and
that the light of peace was dimly breaking far away--that was why
London rang with joy bells that March morning, and why those bells
echoed back from every town and hamlet, in tropical sun and in
Arctic snow, over which the flag of Britain waved.
