CHAPTER 26.
DIAMOND HILL--RUNDLE'S OPERATIONS.
The military situation at the time of the occupation of Pretoria
was roughly as follows. Lord Roberts with some thirty thousand men
was in possession of the capital, but had left his long line of
communications very imperfectly guarded behind him. On the flank of
this line of communications, in the eastern and north-eastern
corner of the Free State, was an energetic force of unconquered
Freestaters who had rallied round President Steyn. They were some
eight or ten thousand in number, well horsed, with a fair number of
guns, under the able leadership of De Wet, Prinsloo, and Olivier.
Above all, they had a splendid position, mountainous and broken,
from which, as from a fortress, they could make excursions to the
south or west. This army included the commandos of Ficksburg,
Senekal, and Harrismith, with all the broken and desperate men from
other districts who had left their farms and fled to the mountains.
It was held in check as a united force by Rundle's Division and the
Colonial Division on the south, while Colvile, and afterwards
Methuen, endeavoured to pen them in on the west. The task was a
hard one, however, and though Rundle succeeded in holding his line
intact, it appeared to be impossible in that wide country to coop
up altogether an enemy so mobile. A strange game of hide-and-seek
ensued, in which De Wet, who led the Boer raids, was able again and
again to strike our line of rails and to get back without serious
loss. The story of these instructive and humiliating episodes will
be told in their order. The energy and skill of the guerilla chief
challenge our admiration, and the score of his successes would be
amusing were it not that the points of the game are marked by the
lives of British soldiers.
General Buller had spent the latter half of May in making his way
from Ladysmith to Laing's Nek, and the beginning of June found him
with twenty thousand men in front of that difficult position. Some
talk of a surrender had arisen, and Christian Botha, who commanded
the Boers, succeeded in gaining several days' armistice, which
ended in nothing. The Transvaal forces at this point were not more
than a few thousand in number, but their position was so formidable
that it was a serious task to turn them out. Van Wyk's Hill,
however, had been left unguarded, and as its possession would give
the British the command of Botha's Pass, its unopposed capture by
the South African Light Horse was an event of great importance.
With guns upon this eminence the infantry were able, on June 8th,
to attack and to carry with little loss the rest of the high
ground, and so to get the Pass into their complete possession.
Botha fired the grass behind him, and withdrew sullenly to the
north. On the 9th and 10th the convoys were passed over the Pass,
and on the 11th the main body of the army followed them.
The operations were now being conducted in that extremely acute
angle of Natal which runs up between the Transvaal and the Orange
Free State. In crossing Botha's Pass the army had really entered
what was now the Orange River Colony. But it was only for a very
short time, as the object of the movement was to turn the Laing's
Nek position, and then come back into the Transvaal through
Alleman's Pass. The gallant South African Light Horse led the way,
and fought hard at one point to clear a path for the army, losing
six killed and eight wounded in a sharp skirmish. On the morning of
the 12th the flanking movement was far advanced, and it only
remained for the army to force Alleman's Nek, which would place it
to the rear of Laing's Nek, and close to the Transvaal town of
Volksrust.
Had the Boers been the men of Colenso and of Spion Kop, this
storming of Alleman's Nek would have been a bloody business. The
position was strong, the cover was slight, and there was no way
round. But the infantry came on with the old dash without the old
stubborn resolution being opposed to them. The guns prepared the
way, and then the Dorsets, the Dublins, the Middlesex, the Queen's,
and the East Surrey did the rest. The door was open and the
Transvaal lay before us. The next day Volksrust was in our hands.
The whole series of operations were excellently conceived and
carried out. Putting Colenso on one side, it cannot be denied that
General Buller showed considerable power of manoeuvring large
bodies of troops. The withdrawal of the compromised army after
Spion Kop, the change of the line of attack at Pieter's Hill, and
the flanking marches in this campaign of Northern Natal, were all
very workmanlike achievements. In this case a position which the
Boers had been preparing for months, scored with trenches and
topped by heavy artillery, had been rendered untenable by a clever
flank movement, the total casualties in the whole affair being less
than two hundred killed and wounded. Natal was cleared of the
invader, Buller's foot was on the high plateau of the Transvaal,
and Roberts could count on twenty thousand good men coming up to
him from the south-east. More important than all, the Natal railway
was being brought up, and soon the central British Army would
depend upon Durban instead of Cape Town for its supplies--a saving
of nearly two-thirds of the distance. The fugitive Boers made
northwards in the Middelburg direction, while Buller advanced to
Standerton, which town he continued to occupy until Lord Roberts
could send a force down through Heidelberg to join hands with him.
Such was the position of the Natal Field Force at the end of June.
From the west and the south-west British forces were also
converging upon the capital. The indomitable Baden-Powell sought
for rest and change of scene after his prolonged trial by harrying
the Boers out of Zeerust and Rustenburg. The forces of Hunter and
of Mahon converged upon Potchefstroom, from which, after settling
that district, they could be conveyed by rail to Krugersdorp and
Johannesburg.
Before briefly recounting the series of events which took place
upon the line of communications, the narrative must return to Lord
Roberts at Pretoria, and describe the operations which followed his
occupation of that city. In leaving the undefeated forces of the
Free State behind him, the British General had unquestionably run a
grave risk, and was well aware that his railway communication was
in danger of being cut. By the rapidity of his movements he
succeeded in gaining the enemy's capital before that which he had
foreseen came to pass; but if Botha had held him at Pretoria while
De Wet struck at him behind, the situation would have been a
serious one. Having once attained his main object, Roberts could
receive with equanimity the expected news that De Wet with a mobile
force of less than two thousand men had, on June 7th, cut the line
at Roodeval to the north of Kroonstad. Both rail and telegraph were
destroyed, and for a few days the army was isolated. Fortunately
there were enough supplies to go on with, and immediate steps were
taken to drive away the intruder, though, like a mosquito, he was
brushed from one place only to settle upon another.
Leaving others to restore his broken communications, Lord Roberts
turned his attention once more to Botha, who still retained ten or
fifteen thousand men under his command. The President had fled from
Pretoria with a large sum of money, estimated at over two millions
sterling, and was known to be living in a saloon railway carriage,
which had been transformed into a seat of government even more
mobile than that of President Steyn. From Waterval-Boven, a point
beyond Middelburg, he was in a position either to continue his
journey to Delagoa Bay, and so escape out of the country, or to
travel north into that wild Lydenburg country which had always been
proclaimed as the last ditch of the defence. Here he remained with
his gold-bags waiting the turn of events.
Botha and his stalwarts had not gone far from the capital. Fifteen
miles out to the east the railway line runs through a gap in the
hills called Pienaars Poort, and here was such a position as the
Boer loves to hold. It was very strong in front, and it had widely
spread formidable flanking hills to hamper those turning movements
which had so often been fatal to the Boer generals. Behind was the
uncut railway line along which the guns could in case of need be
removed. The whole position was over fifteen miles from wing to
wing, and it was well known to the Boer general that Lord Roberts
had no longer that preponderance of force which would enable him to
execute wide turning movements, as he had done in his advance from
the south. His army had decreased seriously in numbers. The mounted
men, the most essential branch of all, were so ill horsed that
brigades were not larger than regiments. One brigade of infantry
(the 14th) had been left to garrison Johannesburg, and another (the
18th) had been chosen for special duty in Pretoria. Smith-Dorrien's
Brigade had been detached for duty upon the line of communications.
With all these deductions and the wastage caused by wounds and
disease, the force was in no state to assume a vigorous offensive.
So hard pressed were they for men that the three thousand released
prisoners from Waterval were hurriedly armed with Boer weapons and
sent down the line to help to guard the more vital points.
Had Botha withdrawn to a safe distance, Lord Roberts would
certainly have halted, as he had done at Bloemfontein, and waited
for remounts and reinforcements. But the war could not be allowed
to languish when an active enemy lay only fifteen miles off, within
striking distance of two cities and of the line of rail. Taking all
the troops that he could muster, the British General moved out once
more on Monday, June 11th, to drive Botha from his position. He had
with him Pole-Carew's 11th Division, which numbered about six
thousand men with twenty guns, Ian Hamilton's force, which included
one infantry brigade (Bruce Hamilton's), one cavalry brigade, and a
corps of mounted infantry, say, six thousand in all, with thirty
guns. There remained French's Cavalry Division, with Hutton's
Mounted Infantry, which could not have exceeded two thousand sabres
and rifles. The total force was, therefore, not more than sixteen
or seventeen thousand men, with about seventy guns. Their task was
to carry a carefully prepared position held by at least ten
thousand burghers with a strong artillery. Had the Boer of June
been the Boer of December, the odds would have been against the
British.
There had been some negotiations for peace between Lord Roberts and
Botha, but the news of De Wet's success from the south had hardened
the Boer general's heart, and on June 9th the cavalry had their
orders to advance. Hamilton was to work round the left wing of the
Boers, and French round their right, while the infantry came up in
the centre. So wide was the scene of action that the attack and the
resistance in each flank and in the centre constituted, on June
11th, three separate actions. Of these the latter was of least
importance, as it merely entailed the advance of the infantry to a
spot whence they could take advantage of the success of the
flanking forces when they had made their presence felt. The centre
did not on this as on several other occasions in the campaign make
the mistake of advancing before the way had been prepared for it.
French with his attenuated force found so vigorous a resistance on
Monday and Tuesday that he was hard put to it to hold his own.
Fortunately he had with him three excellent Horse Artillery
batteries, G, O, and T, who worked until, at the end of the
engagement, they had only twenty rounds in their limbers. The
country was an impossible one for cavalry, and the troopers fought
dismounted, with intervals of twenty or thirty paces between the
men. Exposed all day to rifle and shell fire, unable to advance and
unwilling to retreat, it was only owing to their open formation
that they escaped with about thirty casualties. With Boers on his
front, his flank, and even on his rear, French held grimly on,
realising that a retreat upon his part would mean a greater
pressure at all other points of the British advance. At night his
weary men slept upon the ground which they had held. All Monday and
all Tuesday French kept his grip at Kameelsdrift, stolidly
indifferent to the attempt of the enemy to cut his line of
communications. On Wednesday, Hamilton, upon the other flank, had
gained the upper hand, and the pressure was relaxed. French then
pushed forward, but the horses were so utterly beaten that no
effective pursuit was possible.
During the two days that French had been held up by the Boer right
wing Hamilton had also been seriously engaged upon the left--so
seriously that at one time the action appeared to have gone against
him. The fight presented some distinctive features, which made it
welcome to soldiers who were weary of the invisible man with his
smokeless gun upon the eternal kopje. It is true that man, gun, and
kopje were all present upon this occasion, but in the endeavours to
drive him off some new developments took place, which formed for
one brisk hour a reversion to picturesque warfare. Perceiving a gap
in the enemy's line, Hamilton pushed up the famous Q battery--the
guns which had plucked glory out of disaster at Sanna's Post. For
the second time in one campaign they were exposed and in imminent
danger of capture. A body of mounted Boers with great dash and
hardihood galloped down within close range and opened fire.
Instantly the 12th Lancers were let loose upon them. How they must
have longed for their big-boned long-striding English troop horses
as they strove to raise a gallop out of their spiritless overworked
Argentines! For once, however, the lance meant more than five
pounds dead weight and an encumbrance to the rider. The guns were
saved, the Boers fled, and a dozen were left upon the ground. But a
cavalry charge has to end in a re-formation, and that is the
instant of danger if any unbroken enemy remains within range. Now a
sleet of bullets hissed through their ranks as they retired, and
the gallant Lord Airlie, as modest and brave a soldier as ever drew
sword, was struck through the heart. 'Pray moderate your language!'
was his last characteristic remark, made to a battle-drunken
sergeant. Two officers, seventeen men, and thirty horses went down
with their Colonel, the great majority only slightly injured. In
the meantime the increasing pressure upon his right caused
Broadwood to order a second charge, of the Life Guards this time,
to drive off the assailants. The appearance rather than the swords
of the Guards prevailed, and cavalry as cavalry had vindicated
their existence more than they had ever done during the campaign.
The guns were saved, the flank attack was rolled back, but one
other danger had still to be met, for the Heidelberg commando--a
corps d'elite of the Boers--had made its way outside Hamilton's
flank and threatened to get past him. With cool judgment the
British General detached a battalion and a section of a battery,
which pushed the Boers back into a less menacing position. The rest
of Bruce Hamilton's Brigade were ordered to advance upon the hills
in front, and, aided by a heavy artillery fire, they had succeeded,
before the closing in of the winter night, in getting possession of
this first line of the enemy's defences. Night fell upon an
undecided fight, which, after swaying this way and that, had
finally inclined to the side of the British. The Sussex and the
City Imperial Volunteers were clinging to the enemy's left flank,
while the 11th Division were holding them in front. All promised
well for the morrow.
By order of Lord Roberts the Guards were sent round early on
Tuesday, the 12th, to support the flank attack of Bruce Hamilton's
infantry. It was afternoon before all was ready for the advance,
and then the Sussex, the London Volunteers, and the Derbyshires won
a position upon the ridge, followed later by the three regiments of
Guards. But the ridge was the edge of a considerable plateau, swept
by Boer fire, and no advance could be made over its bare expanse
save at a considerable loss. The infantry clung in a long fringe to
the edge of the position, but for two hours no guns could be
brought up to their support, as the steepness of the slope was
insurmountable. It was all that the stormers could do to hold their
ground, as they were enfiladed by a Vickers-Maxim, and exposed to
showers of shrapnel as well as to an incessant rifle fire. Never
were guns so welcome as those of the 82nd battery, brought by Major
Connolly into the firing line. The enemy's riflemen were only a
thousand yards away, and the action of the artillery might have
seemed as foolhardy as that of Long at Colenso. Ten horses went
down on the instant, and a quarter of the gunners were hit; but the
guns roared one by one into action, and their shrapnel soon decided
the day. Undoubtedly it is with Connolly and his men that the
honours lie.
At four o'clock, as the sun sank towards the west, the tide of
fight had set in favour of the attack. Two more batteries had come
up, every rifle was thrown into the firing line, and the Boer reply
was decreasing in volume. The temptation to an assault was great,
but even now it might mean heavy loss of life, and Hamilton shrank
from the sacrifice. In the morning his judgment was justified, for
Botha had abandoned the position, and his army was in full retreat.
The mounted men followed as far as Elands River Station, which is
twenty-five miles from Pretoria, but the enemy was not overtaken,
save by a small party of De Lisle's Australians and Regular Mounted
Infantry. This force, less than a hundred in number, gained a kopje
which overlooked a portion of the Boer army. Had they been more
numerous, the effect would have been incalculable. As it was, the
Australians fired every cartridge which they possessed into the
throng, and killed many horses and men. It would bear examination
why it was that only this small corps was present at so vital a
point, and why, if they could push the pursuit to such purpose,
others should not be able to do the same. Time was bringing some
curious revenges. Already Paardeberg had come upon Majuba Day.
Buller's victorious soldiers had taken Laing's Nek. Now, the Spruit
at which the retreating Boers were so mishandled by the Australians
was that same Bronkers Spruit at which, nineteen years before, a
regiment had been shot down. Many might have prophesied that the
deed would be avenged; but who could ever have guessed the men who
would avenge it?
Such was the battle of Diamond Hill, as it was called from the name
of the ridge which was opposite to Hamilton's attack. The prolonged
two days' struggle showed that there was still plenty of fight in
the burghers. Lord Roberts had not routed them, nor had he captured
their guns; but he had cleared the vicinity of the capital, he had
inflicted a loss upon them which was certainly as great as his own,
and he had again proved to them that it was vain for them to
attempt to stand. A long pause followed at Pretoria, broken by
occasional small alarms and excursions, which served no end save to
keep the army from ennui. In spite of occasional breaks in his line
of communications, horses and supplies were coming up rapidly, and,
by the middle of July, Roberts was ready for the field again. At
the same time Hunter had come up from Potchefstroom, and Hamilton
had taken Heidelberg, and his force was about to join hands with
Buller at Standerton. Sporadic warfare broke out here and there in
the west, and in the course of it Snyman of Mafeking had
reappeared, with two guns, which were promptly taken from him by
the Canadian Mounted Rifles. On all sides it was felt that if the
redoubtable De Wet could be captured there was every hope that the
burghers might discontinue a struggle which was disagreeable to the
British and fatal to themselves. As a point of honour it was
impossible for Botha to give in while his ally held out. We will
turn, therefore, to this famous guerilla chief, and give some
account of his exploits. To understand them some description must
be given of the general military situation in the Free State.
When Lord Roberts had swept past to the north he had brushed aside
the flower of the Orange Free State army, who occupied the
considerable quadrilateral which is formed by the north-east of
that State. The function of Rundle's 8th Division and of Brabant's
Colonial Division was to separate the sheep from the goats by
preventing the fighting burghers from coming south and disturbing
those districts which had been settled. For this purpose Rundle
formed a long line which should serve as a cordon. Moving up
through Trommel and Clocolan, Ficksburg was occupied on May 25th by
the Colonial Division, while Rundle seized Senekal, forty miles to
the north-west. A small force of forty Yeomanry, who entered the
town some time in advance of the main body, was suddenly attacked
by the Boers, and the gallant Dalbiac, famous rider and sportsman,
was killed, with four of his men. He was a victim, as so many have
been in this campaign, to his own proud disregard of danger.
The Boers were in full retreat, but now, as always, they were
dangerous. One cannot take them for granted, for the very moment of
defeat is that at which they are capable of some surprising effort.
Rundle, following them up from Senekal, found them in strong
possession of the kopjes at Biddulphsberg, and received a check in
his endeavour to drive them off. It was an action fought amid great
grass fires, where the possible fate of the wounded was horrible to
contemplate. The 2nd Grenadiers, the Scots Guards, the East
Yorkshires, and the West Kents were all engaged, with the 2nd and
79th Field Batteries and a force of Yeomanry. Our losses incurred
in the open from unseen rifles were thirty killed and 130 wounded,
including Colonel Lloyd of the Grenadiers. Two days later Rundle,
from Senekal, joined hands with Brabant from Ficksburg, and a
defensive line was formed between those two places, which was held
unbroken for two months, when the operations ended in the capture
of the greater part of the force opposed to him. Clements's
Brigade, consisting of the 1st Royal Irish, the 2nd Bedfords, the
2nd Worcesters, and the 2nd Wiltshires, had come to strengthen
Rundle, and altogether he may have had as many as twelve thousand
men under his orders. It was not a large force with which to hold a
mobile adversary at least eight thousand strong, who might attack
him at any point of his extended line. So well, however, did he
select his positions that every attempt of the enemy, and there
were many, ended in failure. Badly supplied with food, he and his
half-starved men held bravely to their task, and no soldiers in all
that great host deserve better of their country.
At the end of May, then, the Colonial Division, Rundle's Division,
and Clements's Brigade held the Boers from Ficksburg on the Basuto
border to Senekal. This prevented them from coming south. But what
was there to prevent them from coming west, and falling upon the
railway line? There was the weak point of the British position.
Lord Methuen had been brought across from Boshof, and was available
with six thousand men. Colvile was on that side also, with the
Highland Brigade. A few details were scattered up and down the
line, waiting to be gathered up by an enterprising enemy. Kroonstad
was held by a single militia battalion; each separate force had to
be nourished by convoys with weak escorts. Never was there such a
field for a mobile and competent guerilla leader. And, as luck
would have it, such a man was at hand, ready to take full advantage
of his opportunities.
