CHAPTER 27.
THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION.
Christian de Wet, the elder of two brothers of that name, was at
this time in the prime of life, a little over forty years of age.
He was a burly middle-sized bearded man, poorly educated, but
endowed with much energy and common-sense. His military experience
dated back to Majuba Hill, and he had a large share of that curious
race hatred which is intelligible in the case of the Transvaal, but
inexplicable in a Freestater who has received no injury from the
British Empire. Some weakness of his sight compels the use of
tinted spectacles, and he had now turned these, with a pair of
particularly observant eyes behind them, upon the scattered British
forces and the long exposed line of railway.
De Wet's force was an offshoot from the army of Freestaters under
De Villiers, Olivier, and Prinsloo, which lay in the mountainous
north-east of the State. To him were committed five guns, fifteen
hundred men, and the best of the horses. Well armed, well mounted,
and operating in a country which consisted of rolling plains with
occasional fortress kopjes, his little force had everything in its
favour. There were so many tempting objects of attack lying before
him that he must have had some difficulty in knowing where to
begin. The tinted spectacles were turned first upon the isolated
town of Lindley.
Colvile with the Highland Brigade had come up from Ventersburg with
instructions to move onward to Heilbron, pacifying the country as
he passed. The country, however, refused to be pacified, and his
march from Ventersburg to Lindley was harassed by snipers every
mile of the way. Finding that De Wet and his men were close upon
him, he did not linger at Lindley, but passed on to his
destination, his entire march of 126 miles costing him sixty-three
casualties, of which nine were fatal. It was a difficult and
dangerous march, especially for the handful of Eastern Province
Horse, upon whom fell all the mounted work. By evil fortune a force
of five hundred Yeomanry, the 18th battalion, including the Duke of
Cambridge's Own and the Irish companies, had been sent from
Kroonstad to join Colvile at Lindley. Colonel Spragge was in
command. On May 27th this body of horsemen reached their
destination only to find that Colvile had already abandoned it.
They appear to have determined to halt for a day in Lindley, and
then follow Colvile to Heilbron. Within a few hours of their
entering the town they were fiercely attacked by De Wet.
Colonel Spragge seems to have acted for the best. Under a heavy
fire he caused his troopers to fall back upon his transport, which
had been left at a point a few miles out upon the Kroonstad Road,
where three defensible kopjes sheltered a valley in which the
cattle and horses could be herded. A stream ran through it. There
were all the materials there for a stand which would have brought
glory to the British arms. The men were of peculiarly fine quality,
many of them from the public schools and from the universities, and
if any would fight to the death these with their sporting spirit
and their high sense of honour might have been expected to do so.
They had the stronger motive for holding out, as they had taken
steps to convey word of their difficulty to Colvile and to Methuen.
The former continued his march to Heilbron, and it is hard to blame
him for doing so, but Methuen on hearing the message, which was
conveyed to him at great personal peril by Corporal Hankey of the
Yeomanry, pushed on instantly with the utmost energy, though he
arrived too late to prevent, or even to repair, a disaster. It must
be remembered that Colvile was under orders to reach Heilbron on a
certain date, that he was himself fighting his way, and that the
force which he was asked to relieve was much more mobile than his
own. His cavalry at that date consisted of 100 men of the Eastern
Province Horse.
Colonel Spragge's men had held their own for the first three days
of their investment, during which they had been simply exposed to a
long-range rifle fire which inflicted no very serious loss upon
them. Their principal defence consisted of a stone kraal about
twenty yards square, which sheltered them from rifle bullets, but
must obviously be a perfect death-trap in the not improbable event
of the Boers sending for artillery. The spirit of the troopers was
admirable. Several dashing sorties were carried out under the
leadership of Captain Humby and Lord Longford. The latter was a
particularly dashing business, ending in a bayonet charge which
cleared a neighbouring ridge. Early in the siege the gallant Keith
met his end. On the fourth day the Boers brought up five guns. One
would have thought that during so long a time as three days it
would have been possible for the officer in command to make such
preparations against this obvious possibility as were so
successfully taken at a later stage of the war by the handful who
garrisoned Ladybrand. Surely in this period, even without
engineers, it would not have been hard to construct such trenches
as the Boers have again and again opposed to our own artillery. But
the preparations which were made proved to be quite inadequate. One
of the two smaller kopjes was carried, and the garrison fled to the
other. This also was compelled to surrender, and finally the main
kopje also hoisted the white flag. No blame can rest upon the men,
for their presence there at all is a sufficient proof of their
public spirit and their gallantry. But the lessons of the war seem
to have been imperfectly learned, especially that very certain
lesson that shell fire in a close formation is insupportable, while
in an open formation with a little cover it can never compel
surrender. The casualty lists (80 killed and wounded out of a force
of 470) show that the Yeomanry took considerable punishment before
surrendering, but do not permit us to call the defence desperate or
heroic. It is only fair to add that Colonel Spragge was acquitted
of all blame by a court of inquiry, which agreed, however, that the
surrender was premature, and attributed it to the unauthorised
hoisting of a white flag upon one of the detached kopjes. With
regard to the subsequent controversy as to whether General Colvile
might have returned to the relief of the Yeomanry, it is impossible
to see how that General could have acted in any other way than he
did.
Some explanation is needed of Lord Methuen's appearance upon the
central scene of warfare, his division having, when last described,
been at Boshof, not far from Kimberley, where early in April he
fought the successful action which led to the death of Villebois.
Thence he proceeded along the Vaal and then south to Kroonstad,
arriving there on May 28th. He had with him the 9th Brigade
(Douglas's), which contained the troops which had started with him
for the relief of Kimberley six months before. These were the
Northumberland Fusiliers, Loyal North Lancashires, Northamptons,
and Yorkshire Light Infantry. With him also were the Munsters, Lord
Chesham's Yeomanry (five companies), with the 4th and 37th
batteries, two howitzers and two pom-poms. His total force was
about 6000 men. On arriving at Kroonstad he was given the task of
relieving Heilbron, where Colvile, with the Highland Brigade, some
Colonial horse, Lovat's Scouts, two naval guns, and the 5th
battery, were short of food and ammunition. The more urgent message
from the Yeomen at Lindley, however, took him on a fruitless
journey to that town on June 1st. So vigorous was the pursuit of
the Yeomanry that the leading squadrons, consisting of South Notts
Hussars and Sherwood Rangers, actually cut into the Boer convoy and
might have rescued the prisoners had they been supported. As it was
they were recalled, and had to fight their way back to Lindley with
some loss, including Colonel Rolleston, the commander, who was
badly wounded. A garrison was left under Paget, and the rest of the
force pursued its original mission to Heilbron, arriving there on
June 7th, when the Highlanders had been reduced to quarter rations.
'The Salvation Army' was the nickname by which they expressed their
gratitude to the relieving force.
A previous convoy sent to the same destination had less good
fortune. On June 1st fifty-five wagons started from the railway
line to reach Heilbron. The escort consisted of one hundred and
sixty details belonging to Highland regiments without any guns,
Captain Corballis in command. But the gentleman with the tinted
glasses was waiting on the way. 'I have twelve hundred men and five
guns. Surrender at once!' Such was the message which reached the
escort, and in their defenceless condition there was nothing for it
but to comply. Thus one disaster leads to another, for, had the
Yeomanry held out at Lindley, De Wet would not on June 4th have
laid hands upon our wagons; and had he not recruited his supplies
from our wagons it is doubtful if he could have made his attack
upon Roodeval. This was the next point upon which he turned his
attention.
Two miles beyond Roodeval station there is a well-marked kopje by
the railway line, with other hills some distance to the right and
the left. A militia regiment, the 4th Derbyshire, had been sent up
to occupy this post. There were rumours of Boers on the line, and
Major Haig, who with one thousand details of various regiments
commanded at railhead, had been attacked on June 6th but had beaten
off his assailants. De Wet, acting sometimes in company with, and
sometimes independently of, his lieutenant Nel, passed down the
line looking fur some easier prey, and on the night of June 7th
came upon the militia regiment, which was encamped in a position
which could be completely commanded by artillery. It is not true
that they had neglected to occupy the kopje under which they lay,
for two companies had been posted upon it. But there seems to have
been no thought of imminent danger, and the regiment had pitched
its tents and gone very comfortably to sleep without a thought of
the gentleman in the tinted glasses. In the middle of the night he
was upon them with a hissing sleet of bullets. At the first dawn
the guns opened and the shells began to burst among them. It was a
horrible ordeal for raw troops. The men were miners and
agricultural labourers, who had never seen more bloodshed than a
cut finger in their lives. They had been four months in the
country, but their life had been a picnic, as the luxury of their
baggage shows. Now in an instant the picnic was ended, and in the
grey cold dawn war was upon them--grim war with the whine of
bullets, the screams of pain, the crash of shell, the horrible
rending and riving of body and limb. In desperate straits, which
would have tried the oldest soldiers, the brave miners did well.
They never from the beginning had a chance save to show how gamely
they could take punishment, but that at least they did. Bullets
were coming from all sides at once and yet no enemy was visible.
They lined one side of the embankment, and they were shot in the
back. They lined the other, and were again shot in the back.
Baird-Douglas, the Colonel, vowed to shoot the man who should raise
the white flag, and he fell dead himself before he saw the hated
emblem. But it had to come. A hundred and forty of the men were
down, many of them suffering from the horrible wounds which shell
inflicts. The place was a shambles. Then the flag went up and the
Boers at last became visible. Outnumbered, outgeneralled, and
without guns, there is no shadow of stain upon the good name of the
one militia regiment which was ever seriously engaged during the
war. Their position was hopeless from the first, and they came out
of it with death, mutilation, and honour.
Two miles south of the Rhenoster kopje stands Roodeval station, in
which, on that June morning, there stood a train containing the
mails for the army, a supply of great-coats, and a truck full of
enormous shells. A number of details of various sorts, a hundred or
more, had alighted from the train, twenty of them Post-office
volunteers, some of the Pioneer Railway corps, a few Shropshires,
and other waifs and strays. To them in the early morning came the
gentleman with the tinted glasses, his hands still red with the
blood of the Derbies. 'I have fourteen hundred men and four guns.
Surrender!' said the messenger. But it is not in nature for a
postman to give up his postbag without a struggle. 'Never!' cried
the valiant postmen. But shell after shell battered the
corrugated-iron buildings about their ears, and it was not possible
for them to answer the guns which were smashing the life out of
them. There was no help for it but to surrender. De Wet added
samples of the British volunteer and of the British regular to his
bag of militia. The station and train were burned down, the
great-coats looted, the big shells exploded, and the mails burned.
The latter was the one unsportsmanlike action which can up to that
date be laid to De Wet's charge. Forty thousand men to the north of
him could forego their coats and their food, but they yearned
greatly for those home letters, charred fragments of which are
still blowing about the veld. [Footnote: Fragments continually met
the eye which must have afforded curious reading for the victors.
'I hope you have killed all those Boers by now,' was the beginning
of one letter which I could not help observing.]
For three days De Wet held the line, and during all that time he
worked his wicked will upon it. For miles and miles it was wrecked
with most scientific completeness. The Rhenoster bridge was
destroyed. So, for the second time, was the Roodeval bridge. The
rails were blown upwards with dynamite until they looked like an
unfinished line to heaven. De Wet's heavy hand was everywhere. Not
a telegraph-post remained standing within ten miles. His
headquarters continued to be the kopje at Roodeval.
On June 10th two British forces were converging upon the point of
danger. One was Methuen's, from Heilbron. The other was a small
force consisting of the Shropshires, the South Wales Borderers, and
a battery which had come south with Lord Kitchener. The energetic
Chief of the Staff was always sent by Lord Roberts to the point
where a strong man was needed, and it was seldom that he failed to
justify his mission. Lord Methuen, however, was the first to
arrive, and at once attacked De Wet, who moved swiftly away to the
eastward. With a tendency to exaggeration, which has been too
common during the war, the affair was described as a victory. It
was really a strategic and almost bloodless move upon the part of
the Boers. It is not the business of guerillas to fight pitched
battles. Methuen pushed for the south, having been informed that
Kroonstad had been captured. Finding this to be untrue, he turned
again to the eastward in search of De Wet.
That wily and indefatigable man was not long out of our ken. On
June 14th he appeared once more at Rhenoster, where the
construction trains, under the famous Girouard, were working
furiously at the repair of the damage which he had already done.
This time the guard was sufficient to beat him off, and he vanished
again to the eastward. He succeeded, however, in doing some harm,
and very nearly captured Lord Kitchener himself. A permanent post
had been established at Rhenoster under the charge of Colonel Spens
of the Shropshires, with his own regiment and several guns.
Smith-Dorrien, one of the youngest and most energetic of the
divisional commanders, had at the same time undertaken the
supervision and patrolling of the line.
An attack had at this period been made by a commando of some
hundred Boers at the Sand River to the south of Kroonstad, where
there is a most important bridge. The attempt was frustrated by the
Royal Lancaster regiment and the Railway Pioneer regiment, helped
by some mounted infantry and Yeomanry. The fight was for a time a
brisk one, and the Pioneers, upon whom the brunt of it fell,
behaved with great steadiness. The skirmish is principally
remarkable for the death of Major Seymour of the Pioneers, a noble
American, who gave his services and at last his life for what, in
the face of all slander and misrepresentation, he knew to be the
cause of justice and of liberty.
It was hoped now, after all these precautions, that the last had
been seen of the gentleman with the tinted glasses, but on June
21st he was back in his old haunts once more. Honing Spruit
Station, about midway between Kroonstad and Roodeval, was the scene
of his new raid. On that date his men appeared suddenly as a train
waited in the station, and ripped up the rails on either side of
it. There were no guns at this point, and the only available troops
were three hundred of the prisoners from Pretoria, armed with
Martini-Henry rifles and obsolete ammunition. A good man was in
command, however--the same Colonel Bullock of the Devons who had
distinguished himself at Colenso--and every tattered, half-starved
wastrel was nerved by a recollection of the humiliations which he
had already endured. For seven hours they lay helpless under the
shell-fire, but their constancy was rewarded by the arrival of
Colonel Brookfield with 300 Yeomanry and four guns of the 17th
R.F.A., followed in the evening by a larger force from the south.
The Boers fled, but left some of their number behind them; while
of the British, Major Hobbs and four men were killed and nineteen
wounded. This defence of three hundred half-armed men against seven
hundred Boer riflemen, with three guns firing shell and shrapnel,
was a very good performance. The same body of burghers immediately
afterwards attacked a post held by Colonel Evans with two companies
of the Shropshires and fifty Canadians. They were again beaten back
with loss, the Canadians under Inglis especially distinguishing
themselves by their desperate resistance in an exposed position.
All these attacks, irritating and destructive as they were, were
not able to hinder the general progress of the war. After the
battle of Diamond Hill the captured position was occupied by the
mounted infantry, while the rest of the forces returned to their
camps round Pretoria, there to await the much-needed remounts. At
other parts of the seat of war the British cordon was being drawn
more tightly round the Boer forces. Buller had come as far as
Standerton, and Ian Hamilton, in the last week of June, had
occupied Heidelberg. A week afterwards the two forces were able to
join hands, and so to completely cut off the Free State from the
Transvaal armies. Hamilton in these operations had the misfortune
to break his collar-bone, and for a time the command of his
division passed to Hunter--the one man, perhaps, whom the army
would regard as an adequate successor.
It was evident now to the British commanders that there would be no
peace and no safety for their communications while an undefeated
army of seven or eight thousand men, under such leaders as De Wet
and Olivier, was lurking amid the hills which flanked their
railroad. A determined effort was made, therefore, to clear up that
corner of the country. Having closed the only line of escape by the
junction of Ian Hamilton and of Buller, the attention of six
separate bodies of troops was concentrated upon the stalwart
Freestaters. These were the divisions of Rundle and of Brabant from
the south, the brigade of Clements on their extreme left, the
garrison of Lindley under Paget, the garrison of Heilbron under
Macdonald, and, most formidable of all, a detachment under Hunter
which was moving from the north. A crisis was evidently
approaching.
The nearest Free State town of importance still untaken was
Bethlehem--a singular name to connect with the operations of war.
The country on the south of it forbade an advance by Rundle or
Brabant, but it was more accessible from the west. The first
operation of the British consisted, therefore, in massing
sufficient troops to be able to advance from this side. This was
done by effecting a junction between Clements from Senekal, and
Paget who commanded at Lindley, which was carried out upon July 1st
near the latter place. Clements encountered some opposition, but
besides his excellent infantry regiments, the Royal Irish,
Worcesters, Wiltshires, and Bedfords, he had with him the 2nd
Brabant's Horse, with yeomanry, mounted infantry, two 5-inch guns,
and the 38th R.F.A. Aided by a demonstration on the part of
Grenfell and of Brabant, he pushed his way through after three days
of continual skirmish.
On getting into touch with Clements, Paget sallied out from
Lindley, leaving the Buffs behind to garrison the town. He had with
him Brookfield's mounted brigade one thousand strong, eight guns,
and two fine battalions of infantry, the Munster Fusiliers and the
Yorkshire Light Infantry. On July 3rd he found near Leeuw Kop a
considerable force of Boers with three guns opposed to him,
Clements being at that time too far off upon the flank to assist
him. Four guns of the 38th R.F.A. (Major Oldfield) and two
belonging to the City Volunteers came into action. The Royal
Artillery guns appear to have been exposed to a very severe fire,
and the losses were so heavy that for a time they could not be
served. The escort was inadequate, insufficiently advanced, and
badly handled, for the Boer riflemen were able, by creeping up a
donga, to get right into the 38th battery, and the gallant major,
with Lieutenant Belcher, was killed in the defence of the guns.
Captain FitzGerald, the only other officer present, was wounded in
two places, and twenty men were struck down, with nearly all the
horses of one section. Captain Marks, who was brigade-major of
Colonel Brookfield's Yeomanry, with the help of Lieutenant Keevil
Davis and the 15th I.Y. came to the rescue of the disorganised and
almost annihilated section. At the same time the C.I.V. guns were
in imminent danger, but were energetically covered by Captain
Budworth, adjutant of the battery. Soon, however, the infantry,
Munster Fusiliers, and Yorkshire Light Infantry, which had been
carrying out a turning movement, came into action, and the position
was taken. The force moved onwards, and on July 6th they were in
front of Bethlehem.
The place is surrounded by hills, and the enemy was found strongly
posted. Clements's force was now on the left and Paget's on the
right. From both sides an attempt was made to turn the Boer flanks,
but they were found to be very wide and strong. All day a
long-range action was kept up while Clements felt his way in the
hope of coming upon some weak spot in the position, but in the
evening a direct attack was made by Paget's two infantry regiments
upon the right, which gave the British a footing on the Boer
position. The Munster Fusiliers and the Yorkshire Light Infantry
lost forty killed and wounded, including four officers, in this
gallant affair, the heavier loss and the greater honour going to
the men of Munster.
The centre of the position was still held, and on the morning of
July 7th Clements gave instructions to the colonel of the Royal
Irish to storm it if the occasion should seem favourable. Such an
order to such a regiment means that the occasion will seem
favourable. Up they went in three extended lines, dropping forty or
fifty on the way, but arriving breathless and enthusiastic upon the
crest of the ridge. Below them, upon the further side, lay the
village of Bethlehem. On the slopes beyond hundreds of horsemen
were retreating, and a gun was being hurriedly dragged into the
town. For a moment it seemed as if nothing had been left as a
trophy, but suddenly a keen-eyed sergeant raised a cheer, which was
taken up again and again until it resounded over the veld. Under
the crest, lying on its side with a broken wheel, was a gun--one of
the 15-pounders of Stormberg which it was a point of honour to
regain once more. Many a time had the gunners been friends in need
to the infantry. Now it was the turn of the infantry to do
something in exchange. That evening Clements had occupied
Bethlehem, and one more of their towns had passed out of the hands
of the Freestaters.
A word now as to that force under General Hunter which was closing
in from the north. The gallant and energetic Hamilton, lean,
aquiline, and tireless, had, as already stated, broken his
collar-bone at Heidelberg, and it was as his lieutenant that Hunter
was leading these troops out of the Transvaal into the Orange River
Colony. Most of his infantry was left behind at Heidelberg, but he
took with him Broadwood's cavalry (two brigades) and Bruce
Hamilton's 21st infantry brigade, with Ridley's mounted infantry,
some seven thousand men in all. On the 2nd of July this force
reached Frankfort in the north of the Free State without
resistance, and on July 3rd they were joined there by Macdonald's
force from Heilbron, so that Hunter found himself with over eleven
thousand men under his command. Here was an instrument with which
surely the coup de grace could be given to the dying State. Passing
south, still without meeting serious resistance, Hunter occupied
Reitz, and finally sent on Broadwood's cavalry to Bethlehem, where
on July 8th they joined Paget and Clements.
The net was now in position, and about to be drawn tight, but at
this last moment the biggest fish of all dashed furiously out from
it. Leaving the main Free State force in a hopeless position behind
him, De Wet, with fifteen hundred well-mounted men and five guns,
broke through Slabbert's Nek between Bethlehem and Ficksburg, and
made swiftly for the north-west, closely followed by Paget's and
Broadwood's cavalry. It was on July 16th that he made his dash for
freedom. On the 19th Little, with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, had come
into touch with him near Lindley. De Wet shook himself clear, and
with splendid audacity cut the railway once more to the north of
Honing Spruit, gathering up a train as he passed, and taking two
hundred details prisoners. On July 22nd De Wet was at Vredefort,
still closely followed by Broadwood, Ridley, and Little, who
gleaned his wagons and his stragglers. Thence he threw himself into
the hilly country some miles to the south of the Vaal River, where
he lurked for a week or more while Lord Kitchener came south to
direct the operations which would, as it was hoped, lead to a
surrender.
Leaving the indomitable guerilla in his hiding-place, the narrative
must return to that drawing of the net which still continued in
spite of the escape of this one important fish. On all sides the
British forces had drawn closer, and they were both more numerous
and more formidable in quality. It was evident now that by a rapid
advance from Bethlehem in the direction of the Basuto border all
Boers to the north of Ficksburg would be hemmed in. On July 22nd
the columns were moving. On that date Paget moved out of Bethlehem,
and Rundle took a step forward from Ficksburg. Bruce Hamilton had
already, at the cost of twenty Cameron Highlanders, got a grip upon
a bastion of that rocky country in which the enemy lurked. On the
23rd Hunter's force was held by the Boers at the strong pass of
Retief's Nek, but on the 24th they were compelled to abandon it, as
the capture of Slabbert's Nek by Clements threatened their rear.
This latter pass was fortified most elaborately. It was attacked
upon the 23rd by Brabant's Horse and the Royal Irish without
success. Later in the day two companies of the Wiltshire Regiment
were also brought to a standstill, but retained a position until
nightfall within stone-throw of the Boer lines, though a single
company had lost 17 killed and wounded. Part of the Royal Irish
remained also close to the enemy's trenches. Under cover of
darkness, Clements sent four companies of the Royal Irish and two
of the Wiltshires under Colonel Guinness to make a flanking
movement along the crest of the heights. These six companies
completely surprised the enemy, and caused them to hurriedly
evacuate the position. Their night march was performed under great
difficulties, the men crawling on hands and knees along a rocky
path with a drop of 400 feet upon one side. But their exertions
were greatly rewarded. Upon the success of their turning movement
depended the fall of Slabbert's Nek. Retief's Nek was untenable if
we held Slabbert's Nek, and if both were in our hands the retreat
of Prinsloo was cut off.
At every opening of the hills the British guns were thundering, and
the heads of British columns were appearing on every height. The
Highland Brigade had fairly established themselves over the Boer
position, though not without hard fighting, in which a hundred men
of the Highland Light Infantry had been killed and wounded. The
Seaforths and the Sussex had also gripped the positions in front of
them, and taken some punishment in doing so. The outworks of the
great mountain fortress were all taken, and on July 26th the
British columns were converging on Fouriesburg, while Naauwpoort on
the line of retreat was held by Macdonald. It was only a matter of
time now with the Boers.
On the 28th Clements was still advancing, and contracting still
further the space which was occupied by our stubborn foe. He found
himself faced by the stiff position of Slaapkrantz, and a hot
little action was needed before the Boers could be dislodged. The
fighting fell upon Brabant's Horse, the Royal Irish, and the
Wiltshires. Three companies of the latter seized a farm upon the
enemy's left, but lost ten men in doing so, while their gallant
colonel, Carter, was severely wounded in two places. The
Wiltshires, who were excellently handled by Captain Bolton, held on
to the farm and were reinforced there by a handful of the Scots
Guards. In the night the position was abandoned by the Boers, and
the advance swept onwards. On all sides the pressure was becoming
unendurable. The burghers in the valley below could see all day the
twinkle of British heliographs from every hill, while at night the
constant flash of signals told of the sleepless vigilance which
hemmed them in. Upon July 29th, Prinsloo sent in a request for an
armistice, which was refused. Later in the day he despatched a
messenger with the white flag to Hunter, with an announcement of
his unconditional surrender.
On July 30th the motley army which had held the British off so long
emerged from among the mountains. But it soon became evident that
in speaking for all Prinsloo had gone beyond his powers. Discipline
was low and individualism high in the Boer army. Every man might
repudiate the decision of his commandant, as every man might
repudiate the white flag of his comrade. On the first day no more
than eleven hundred men of the Ficksburg and Ladybrand commandos,
with fifteen hundred horses and two guns, were surrendered. next
day seven hundred and fifty more men came in with eight hundred
horses, and by August 6th the total of the prisoners had mounted to
four thousand one hundred and fifty with three guns, two of which
were our own. But Olivier, with fifteen hundred men and several
guns, broke away from the captured force and escaped through the
hills. Of this incident General Hunter, an honourable soldier,
remarks in his official report: 'I regard it as a dishonourable
breach of faith upon the part of General Olivier, for which I hold
him personally responsible. He admitted that he knew that General
Prinsloo had included him in the unconditional surrender.' It is
strange that, on Olivier's capture shortly afterwards, he was not
court-martialled for this breach of the rules of war, but that
good-natured giant, the Empire, is quick--too quick, perhaps--to
let byegones be byegones. On August 4th Harrismith surrendered to
Macdonald, and thus was secured the opening of the Van Reenen's
Pass and the end of the Natal system of railways. This was of the
very first importance, as the utmost difficulty had been found in
supplying so large a body of troops so far from the Cape base. In a
day the base was shifted to Durban, and the distance shortened by
two-thirds, while the army came to be on the railway instead of a
hundred miles from it. This great success assured Lord Roberts's
communications from serious attack, and was of the utmost
importance in enabling him to consolidate his position at Pretoria.
