CHAPTER 28.
THE HALT AT PRETORIA.
Lord Roberts had now been six weeks in the capital, and British
troops had overrun the greater part of the south and west of the
Transvaal, but in spite of this there was continued Boer
resistance, which flared suddenly up in places which had been
nominally pacified and disarmed. It was found, as has often been
shown in history, that it is easier to defeat a republican army
than to conquer it. From Klerksdorp, from Ventersdorp, from
Rustenburg, came news of risings against the newly imposed British
authority. The concealed Mauser and the bandolier were dug up once
more from the trampled corner of the cattle kraal, and the farmer
was a warrior once again. Vague news of the exploits of De Wet
stimulated the fighting burghers and shamed those who had
submitted. A letter was intercepted from the guerilla chief to
Cronje's son, who had surrendered near Rustenburg. De Wet stated
that he had gained two great victories and had fifteen hundred
captured rifles with which to replace those which the burghers had
given up. Not only were the outlying districts in a state of
revolt, but even round Pretoria the Boers were inclined to take the
offensive, while both that town and Johannesburg were filled with
malcontents who were ready to fly to their arms once more.
Already at the end of June there were signs that the Boers realised
how helpless Lord Roberts was until his remounts should arrive. The
mosquitoes buzzed round the crippled lion. On June 29th there was
an attack upon Springs near Johannesburg, which was easily beaten
off by the Canadians. Early in July some of the cavalry and mounted
infantry patrols were snapped up in the neighbourhood of the
capital. Lord Roberts gave orders accordingly that Hutton and Mahon
should sweep the Boers back upon his right, and push them as far as
Bronkhorst Spruit. This was done on July 6th and 7th, the British
advance meeting with considerable resistance from artillery as well
as rifles. By this movement the pressure upon the right was
relieved, which might have created a dangerous unrest in
Johannesburg, and it was done at the moderate cost of thirty-four
killed and wounded, half of whom belonged to the Imperial Light
Horse. This famous corps, which had come across with Mahon from the
relief of Mafeking, had, a few days before, ridden with mixed
feelings through the streets of Johannesburg and past, in many
instances, the deserted houses which had once been their homes.
Many weary months were to pass before the survivors might occupy
them. On July 9th the Boers again attacked, but were again pushed
back to the eastward.
It is probable that all these demonstrations of the enemy upon the
right of Lord Roberts's extended position were really feints in
order to cover the far-reaching plans which Botha had in his mind.
The disposition of the Boer forces at this time appears to have
been as follows: Botha with his army occupied a position along
Delagoa railway line, further east than Diamond Hill, whence he
detached the bodies which attacked Hutton upon the extreme right of
the British position to the south-east of Pretoria. To the north of
Pretoria a second force was acting under Grobler, while a third
under De la Rey had been despatched secretly across to the left
wing of the British, north-west of Pretoria. While Botha engaged
the attention of Lord Roberts by energetic demonstrations on his
right, Grobler and De la Rey were to make a sudden attack upon his
centre and his left, each point being twelve or fifteen miles from
the other. It was well devised and very well carried out; but the
inherent defect of it was that, when subdivided in this way, the
Boer force was no longer strong enough to gain more than a mere
success of outposts.
De la Rey's attack was delivered at break of day on July 11th at
Uitval's Nek, a post some eighteen miles west of the capital. This
position could not be said to be part of Lord Roberts's line, but
rather to be a link to connect his army with Rustenburg. It was
weakly held by three companies of the Lincolns with two others in
support, one squadron of the Scots Greys, and two guns of O battery
R.H.A. The attack came with the first grey light of dawn, and for
many hours the small garrison bore up against a deadly fire,
waiting for the help which never came. All day they held their
assailants at bay, and it was not until evening that their
ammunition ran short and they were forced to surrender. Nothing
could have been better than the behaviour of the men, both
infantry, cavalry, and gunners, but their position was a hopeless
one. The casualties amounted to eighty killed and wounded. Nearly
two hundred were made prisoners and the two guns were taken.
On the same day that De la Rey made his coup at Uitval's Nek,
Grobler had shown his presence on the north side of the town by
treating very roughly a couple of squadrons of the 7th Dragoon
Guards which had attacked him. By the help of a section of the
ubiquitous O battery and of the 14th Hussars, Colonel Lowe was able
to disengage his cavalry from the trap into which they had fallen,
but it was at the cost of between thirty and forty officers and men
killed, wounded, or taken. The old 'Black Horse' sustained their
historical reputation, and fought their way bravely out of an
almost desperate situation, where they were exposed to the fire of
a thousand riflemen and four guns.
On this same day of skirmishes, July 11th, the Gordons had seen
some hot work twenty miles or so to the south of Uitval's Nek.
Orders had been given to the 19th Brigade (Smith-Dorrien's) to
proceed to Krugersdorp, and thence to make their way north. The
Scottish Yeomanry and a section of the 78th R.F.A. accompanied
them. The idea seems to have been that they would be able to drive
north any Boers in that district, who would then find the garrison
of Uitval's Nek at their rear. The advance was checked, however, at
a place called Dolverkrantz, which was strongly held by Boer
riflemen. The two guns were insufficiently protected, and the enemy
got within short range of them, killing or wounding many of the
gunners. The lieutenant in charge, Mr. A.J. Turner, the famous
Essex cricketer, worked the gun with his own hands until he also
fell wounded in three places. The situation was now very serious,
and became more so when news was flashed of the disaster at
Uitval's Nek, and they were ordered to retire. They could not
retire and abandon the guns, yet the fire was so hot that it was
impossible to remove them. Gallant attempts were made by volunteers
from the Gordons--Captain Younger and other brave men throwing away
their lives in the vain effort to reach and to limber up the guns.
At last, under the cover of night, the teams were harnessed and the
two field-pieces successfully removed, while the Boers who rushed
in to seize them were scattered by a volley. The losses in the
action were thirty-six and the gain nothing. Decidedly July 11th
was not a lucky day for the British arms.
It was well known to Botha that every train from the south was
bringing horses for Lord Roberts's army, and that it had become
increasingly difficult for De Wet and his men to hinder their
arrival. The last horse must win, and the Empire had the world on
which to draw. Any movement which the Boers would make must be made
at once, for already both the cavalry and the mounted infantry were
rapidly coming back to their full strength once more. This
consideration must have urged Botha to deliver an attack on July
16th, which had some success at first, but was afterwards beaten
off with heavy loss to the enemy. The fighting fell principally
upon Pole-Carew and Hutton, the corps chiefly engaged being the
Royal Irish Fusiliers, the New Zealanders, the Shropshires, and the
Canadian Mounted Infantry. The enemy tried repeatedly to assault
the position, but were beaten back each time with a loss of nearly
a hundred killed and wounded. The British loss was about sixty, and
included two gallant young Canadian officers, Borden and Birch, the
former being the only son of the minister of militia. So ended the
last attempt made by Botha upon the British positions round
Pretoria. The end of the war was not yet, but already its futility
was abundantly evident. This had become more apparent since the
junction of Hamilton and of Buller had cut off the Transvaal army
from that of the Free State. Unable to send their prisoners away,
and also unable to feed them, the Freestaters were compelled to
deliver up in Natal the prisoners whom they had taken at Lindley
and Roodeval. These men, a ragged and starving battalion, emerged
at Ladysmith, having made their way through Van Reenen's Pass. It
is a singular fact that no parole appears on these and similar
occasions to have been exacted by the Boers.
Lord Roberts, having remounted a large part of his cavalry, was
ready now to advance eastward and give Botha battle. The first town
of any consequence along the Delagoa Railway is Middelburg, some
seventy miles from the capital. This became the British objective,
and the forces of Mahon and Hamilton on the north, of Pole-Carew in
the centre, and of French and Hutton to the south, all converged
upon it. There was no serious resistance, though the weather was
abominable, and on July 27th the town was in the hands of the
invaders. From that date until the final advance to the eastward
French held this advanced post, while Pole-Carew guarded the
railway line. Rumours of trouble in the west had convinced Roberts
that it was not yet time to push his advantage to the east, and he
recalled Ian Hamilton's force to act for a time upon the other side
of the seat of the war. This excellent little army, consisting of
Mahon's and Pilcher's mounted infantry, M battery R.H.A., the
Elswick battery, two 5-inch and two 4.7 guns, with the Berkshires,
the Border Regiment, the Argyle and Sutherlands, and the Scottish
Borderers, put in as much hard work in marching and in fighting as
any body of troops in the whole campaign.
The renewal of the war in the west had begun some weeks before, but
was much accelerated by the transference of De la Rey and his
burghers to that side. There is no district in the Transvaal which
is better worth fighting for, for it is a fair country side,
studded with farmhouses and green with orange-groves, with many
clear streams running through it. The first sign of activity
appears to have been on July 7th, when a commando with guns
appeared upon the hills above Rustenburg. Hanbury Tracy, commandant
of Rustenburg, was suddenly confronted with a summons to surrender.
He had only 120 men and one gun, but he showed a bold front.
Colonel Houldsworth, at the first whisper of danger, had started
from Zeerust with a small force of Australian bushmen, and arrived
at Rustenburg in time to drive the enemy away in a very spirited
action. On the evening of July 8th Baden-Powell took over the
command, the garrison being reinforced by Plumer's command.
The Boer commando was still in existence, however, and it was
reinforced and reinvigorated by De la Rey's success at Uitval's
Nek. On July 18th they began to close in upon Rustenburg again, and
a small skirmish took place between them and the Australians.
Methuen's division, which had been doing very arduous service in
the north of the Free State during the last six weeks, now received
orders to proceed into the Transvaal and to pass northwards through
the disturbed districts en route for Rustenburg, which appeared to
be the storm centre. The division was transported by train from
Kroonstad to Krugersdorp, and advanced on the evening of July 18th
upon its mission, through a bare and fire-blackened country. On the
19th Lord Methuen manoeuvred the Boers out of a strong position,
with little loss to either side. On the 21st he forced his way
through Olifant's Nek, in the Magaliesberg range, and so
established communication with Baden-Powell, whose valiant bushmen,
under Colonel Airey, had held their own in a severe conflict near
Magato Pass, in which they lost six killed, nineteen wounded, and
nearly two hundred horses. The fortunate arrival of Captain
FitzClarence with the Protectorate Regiment helped on this occasion
to avert a disaster. The force, only 300 strong, without guns, had
walked into an ugly ambuscade, and only the tenacity and resource
of the men enabled them ever to extricate themselves.
Although Methuen came within reach of Rustenburg, he did not
actually join hands with Baden-Powell. No doubt he saw and heard
enough to convince him that that astute soldier was very well able
to take care of himself. Learning of the existence of a Boer force
in his rear, Methuen turned, and on July 29th he was back at
Frederickstad on the Potchefstroom to Krugersdorp railway. The
sudden change in his plans was caused doubtless by the desire to
head off De Wet in case he should cross the Vaal River. Lord
Roberts was still anxious to clear the neighbourhood of Rustenburg
entirely of the enemy; and he therefore, since Methuen was needed
to complete the cordon round De Wet, recalled Hamilton's force from
the east and despatched it, as already described, to the west of
Pretoria.
Before going into the details of the great De Wet hunt, in which
Methuen's force was to be engaged, I shall follow Hamilton's
division across, and give some account of their services. On August
1st he set out from Pretoria for Rustenburg. On that day and on the
next he had brisk skirmishes which brought him successfully through
the Magaliesberg range with a loss of forty wounded, mostly of the
Berkshires. On the 5th of August he had made his way to Rustenburg
and drove off the investing force. A smaller siege had been going
on to westward, where at Elands River another Mafeking man, Colonel
Hore, had been held up by the burghers. For some days it was
feared, and even officially announced, that the garrison had
surrendered. It was known that an attempt by Carrington to relieve
the place on August 5th had been beaten back, and that the state of
the country appeared so threatening that he had been compelled, or
had imagined himself to be compelled, to retreat as far as
Mafeking, evacuating Zeerust and Otto's Hoop, abandoning the
considerable stores which were collected at those places. In spite
of all these sinister indications the garrison was still holding
its own, and on August 16th it was relieved by Lord Kitchener.
This stand at Brakfontein on the Elands River appears to have been
one of the very finest deeds of arms of the war. The Australians
have been so split up during the campaign, that though their valour
and efficiency were universally recognised, they had no single
exploit which they could call their own. But now they can point to
Elands River as proudly as the Canadians can to Paardeberg. They
were 500 in number, Victorians, New South Welshmen, and
Queenslanders, the latter the larger unit, with a corps of
Rhodesians. Under Hore were Major Hopper of the Rhodesians, and
Major Toubridge of the Queenslanders. Two thousand five hundred
Boers surrounded them, and most favourable terms of surrender were
offered and scouted. Six guns were trained upon them, and during 11
days 1800 shells fell within their lines. The river was half a mile
off, and every drop of water for man or beast had to come from
there. Nearly all their horses and 75 of the men were killed or
wounded. With extraordinary energy and ingenuity the little band
dug shelters which are said to have exceeded in depth and
efficiency any which the Boers have devised. Neither the repulse of
Carrington, nor the jamming of their only gun, nor the death of the
gallant Annett, was sufficient to dishearten them. They were sworn
to die before the white flag should wave above them. And so fortune
yielded, as fortune will when brave men set their teeth, and
Broadwood's troopers, filled with wonder and admiration, rode into
the lines of the reduced and emaciated but indomitable garrison.
When the ballad-makers of Australia seek for a subject, let them
turn to Elands River, for there was no finer resistance in the war.
They will not grudge a place in their record to the 130 gallant
Rhodesians who shared with them the honours and the dangers of the
exploit.
On August 7th Ian Hamilton abandoned Rustenburg, taking
Baden-Powell and his men with him. It was obviously unwise to
scatter the British forces too widely by attempting to garrison
every single town. For the instant the whole interest of the war
centred upon De Wet and his dash into the Transvaal. One or two
minor events, however, which cannot be fitted into any continuous
narrative may be here introduced.
One of these was the action at Faber's Put, by which Sir Charles
Warren crushed the rebellion in Griqualand. In that sparsely
inhabited country of vast distances it was a most difficult task to
bring the revolt to a decisive ending. This Sir Charles Warren,
with his special local knowledge and interest, was able to do, and
the success is doubly welcome as bringing additional honour to a
man who, whatever view one may take of his action at Spion Kop, has
grown grey in the service of the Empire. With a column consisting
mainly of colonials and of yeomanry he had followed the rebels up
to a point within twelve miles of Douglas. Here at the end of May
they turned upon him and delivered a fierce night attack, so sudden
and so strongly pressed that much credit is due both to General and
to troops for having repelled it. The camp was attacked on all
sides in the early dawn. The greater part of the horses were
stampeded by the firing, and the enemy's riflemen were found to be
at very close quarters. For an hour the action was warm, but at the
end of that time the Boers fled, leaving a number of dead behind
them. The troops engaged in this very creditable action, which
might have tried the steadiness of veterans, were four hundred of
the Duke of Edinburgh's volunteers, some of Paget's horse and of
the 8th Regiment Imperial Yeomanry, four Canadian guns, and
twenty-five of Warren's Scouts. Their losses were eighteen killed
and thirty wounded. Colonel Spence, of the volunteers, died at the
head of his regiment. A few days before, on May 27th, Colonel Adye
had won a small engagement at Kheis, some distance to the westward,
and the effect of the two actions was to put an end to open
resistance. On June 20th De Villiers, the Boer leader, finally
surrendered to Sir Charles Warren, handing over two hundred and
twenty men with stores, rifles, and ammunition. The last sparks had
for the time been stamped out in the colony.
There remain to be mentioned those attacks upon trains and upon the
railway which had spread from the Free State to the Transvaal. On
July 19th a train was wrecked on the way from Potchefstroom to
Krugersdorp without serious injury to the passengers. On July 31st,
however, the same thing occurred with more murderous effect, the
train running at full speed off the metals. Thirteen of the
Shropshires were killed and thirty-seven injured in this deplorable
affair, which cost us more than many an important engagement. On
August 2nd a train coming up from Bloemfontein was derailed by
Sarel Theron and his gang some miles south of Kroonstad.
Thirty-five trucks of stores were burned, and six of the passengers
(unarmed convalescent soldiers) were killed or wounded. A body of
mounted infantry followed up the Boers, who numbered eighty, and
succeeded in killing and wounding several of them.
On July 21st the Boers made a determined attack upon the railhead
at a point thirteen miles east of Heidelberg, where over a hundred
Royal Engineers were engaged upon a bridge. They were protected by
three hundred Dublin Fusiliers under Major English. For some hours
the little party was hard pressed by the burghers, who had two
field-pieces and a pom-pom. They could make no impression, however,
upon the steady Irish infantry, and after some hours the arrival of
General Hart with reinforcements scattered the assailants, who
succeeded in getting their guns away in safety.
At the beginning of August it must be confessed that the general
situation in the Transvaal was not reassuring. Springs near
Johannesburg had in some inexplicable way, without fighting, fallen
into the hands of the enemy. Klerksdorp, an important place in the
south-west, had also been reoccupied, and a handful of men who
garrisoned it had been made prisoners without resistance.
Rustenburg was about to be abandoned, and the British were known to
be falling back from Zeerust and Otto's Hoop, concentrating upon
Mafeking. The sequel proved however, that there was no cause for
uneasiness in all this. Lord Roberts was concentrating his strength
upon those objects which were vital, and letting the others drift
for a time. At present the two obviously important things were to
hunt down De Wet and to scatter the main Boer army under Botha. The
latter enterprise must wait upon the former, so for a fortnight all
operations were in abeyance while the flying columns of the British
endeavoured to run down their extremely active and energetic
antagonist.
At the end of July De Wet had taken refuge in some exceedingly
difficult country near Reitzburg, seven miles south of the Vaal
River. The operations were proceeding vigorously at that time
against the main army at Fouriesberg, and sufficient troops could
not be spared to attack him, but he was closely observed by
Kitchener and Broadwood with a force of cavalry and mounted
infantry. With the surrender of Prinsloo a large army was
disengaged, and it was obvious that if De Wet remained where he was
he must soon be surrounded. On the other hand, there was no place
of refuge to the south of him. With great audacity he determined to
make a dash for the Transvaal, in the hope of joining hands with De
la Rey's force, or else of making his way across the north of
Pretoria, and so reaching Botha's army. President Steyn went with
him, and a most singular experience it must have been for him to be
harried like a mad dog through the country in which he had once
been an honoured guest. De Wet's force was exceedingly mobile, each
man having a led horse, and the ammunition being carried in light
Cape carts.
In the first week of August the British began to thicken round his
lurking-place, and De Wet knew that it was time for him to go. He
made a great show of fortifying a position, but it was only a ruse
to deceive those who watched him. Travelling as lightly as
possible, he made a dash on August 7th at the drift which bears his
own name, and so won his way across the Vaal River, Kitchener
thundering at his heels with his cavalry and mounted infantry.
Methuen's force was at that time at Potchefstroom, and instant
orders had been sent to him to block the drifts upon the northern
side. It was found as he approached the river that the vanguard of
the enemy was already across and that it was holding the spurs of
the hills which would cover the crossing of their comrades. By the
dash of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the exertions of the
artillery ridge after ridge was carried, but before evening De Wet
with supreme skill had got his convoy across, and had broken away,
first to the eastward and then to the north. On the 9th Methuen was
in touch with him again, and the two savage little armies, Methuen
worrying at the haunch, and De Wet snapping back over his shoulder,
swept northward over the huge plains. Wherever there was ridge or
kopje the Boer riflemen staved off the eager pursuers. Where the
ground lay flat and clear the British guns thundered onwards and
fired into the lines of wagons. Mile after mile the running fight
was sustained, but the other British columns, Broadwood's men and
Kitchener's men, had for some reason not come up. Methuen alone was
numerically inferior to the men he was chasing, but he held on with
admirable energy and spirit. The Boers were hustled off the kopjes
from which they tried to cover their rear. Twenty men of the
Yorkshire Yeomanry carried one hill with the bayonet, though only
twelve of them were left to reach the top.
De Wet trekked onwards during the night of the 9th, shedding wagons
and stores as he went. He was able to replace some of his exhausted
beasts from the farmhouses which he passed. Methuen on the morning
of the 10th struck away to the west, sending messages back to
Broadwood and Kitchener in the rear that they should bear to the
east, and so nurse the Boer column between them. At the same time
he sent on a messenger, who unfortunately never arrived, to warn
Smith-Dorrien at Bank Station to throw himself across De Wet's
path. On the 11th it was realised that De Wet had succeeded, in
spite of great exertions upon the part of Smith-Dorrien's infantry,
in crossing the railway line, and that he had left all his pursuers
to the south of him. But across his front lay the Magaliesberg
range. There are only three passes, the Magato Pass, Olifant's Nek,
and Commando Nek. It was understood that all three were held by
British troops. It was obvious, therefore, that if Methuen could
advance in such a way as to cut De Wet off from slipping through to
the west he would be unable to get away. Broadwood and Kitchener
would be behind him, and Pretoria, with the main British army, to
the east.
Methuen continued to act with great energy and judgment. At three
A.M. on the 12th be started from Fredericstadt, and by 5 P.M. on
Tuesday he had done eighty miles in sixty hours. The force which
accompanied him was all mounted, 1200 of the Colonial Division (1st
Brabant's, Cape Mounted Rifles, Kaffrarian Rifles, and Border
Horse), and the Yeomanry with ten guns. Douglas with the infantry
was to follow behind, and these brave fellows covered sixty-six
miles in seventy-six hours in their eagerness to be in time. No men
could have made greater efforts than did those of Methuen, for
there was not one who did not appreciate the importance of the
issue and long to come to close quarters with the wily leader who
had baffled us so long.
On the 12th Methuen's van again overtook De Wet's rear, and the old
game of rearguard riflemen on one side, and a pushing artillery on
the other, was once more resumed. All day the Boers streamed over
the veld with the guns and the horsemen at their heels. A shot from
the 78th battery struck one of De Wet's guns, which was abandoned
and captured. Many stores were taken and much more, with the wagons
which contained them, burned by the Boers. Fighting incessantly,
both armies traversed thirty-five miles of ground that day.
It was fully understood that Olifant's Nek was held by the British,
so Methuen felt that if he could block the Magato Pass all would be
well. He therefore left De Wet's direct track, knowing that other
British forces were behind him, and he continued his swift advance
until he had reached the desired position. It really appeared that
at last the elusive raider was in a corner. But, alas for fallen
hopes, and alas for the wasted efforts of gallant men! Olifant's
Nek had been abandoned and De Wet had passed safely through it into
the plains beyond, where De la Rey's force was still in possession.
In vain Methuen's weary column forced the Magato Pass and descended
into Rustenburg. The enemy was in a safe country once more. Whose
the fault, or whether there was a fault at all, it is for the
future to determine. At least unalloyed praise can be given to the
Boer leader for the admirable way in which he had extricated
himself from so many dangers. On the 17th., moving along the
northern side of the mountains, he appeared at Commando Nek on the
Little Crocodile River, where he summoned Baden-Powell to
surrender, and received some chaff in reply from that light-hearted
commander. Then, swinging to the eastward, he endeavoured to cross
to the north of Pretoria. On the 19th he was heard of at Hebron.
Baden-Powell and Paget had, however, already barred this path, and
De Wet, having sent Steyn on with a small escort, turned back to
the Free State. On the 22nd it was reported that, with only a
handful of his followers, he had crossed the Magaliesberg range by
a bridlepath and was riding southwards. Lord Roberts was at last
free to turn his undivided attention upon Botha.
Two Boer plots had been discovered during the first half of August,
the one in Pretoria and the other in Johannesburg, each having for
its object a rising against the British in the town. Of these the
former, which was the more serious, involving as it did the
kidnapping of Lord Roberts, was broken up by the arrest of the
deviser, Hans Cordua, a German lieutenant in the Transvaal
Artillery. On its merits it is unlikely that the crime would have
been met by the extreme penalty, especially as it was a question
whether the agent provocateur had not played a part. But the
repeated breaches of parole, by which our prisoners of one day were
in the field against us on the next, called imperatively for an
example, and it was probably rather for his broken faith than for
his hare-brained scheme that Cordua died. At the same time it is
impossible not to feel sorrow for this idealist of twenty-three who
died for a cause which was not his own. He was shot in the garden
of Pretoria Gaol upon August 24th. A fresh and more stringent
proclamation from Lord Roberts showed that the British Commander
was losing his patience in the face of the wholesale return of
paroled men to the field, and announced that such perfidy would in
future be severely punished. It was notorious that the same men had
been taken and released more than once. One man killed in action
was found to have nine signed passes in his pocket. It was against
such abuses that the extra severity of the British was aimed.
