CHAPTER 30.
THE CAMPAIGN OF DE WET.
It had been hoped that the dispersal of the main Boer army, the
capture of its guns and the expulsion of many both of the burghers
and of the foreign mercenaries, would have marked the end of the
war. These expectations were, however, disappointed, and South
Africa was destined to be afflicted and the British Empire
disturbed by a useless guerilla campaign. After the great and
dramatic events which characterised the earlier phases of the
struggle between the Briton and the Boer for the mastery of South
Africa it is somewhat of the nature of an anticlimax to turn one's
attention to those scattered operations which prolonged the
resistance for a turbulent year at the expense of the lives of many
brave men on either side. These raids and skirmishes, which had
their origin rather in the hope of vengeance than of victory,
inflicted much loss and misery upon the country, but, although we
may deplore the desperate resolution which bids brave men prefer
death to subjugation, it is not for us, the countrymen of Hereward
or Wallace, to condemn it.
In one important respect these numerous, though trivial, conflicts
differed from the battles in the earlier stages of the war. The
British had learned their lesson so thoroughly that they often
turned the tables upon their instructors. Again and again the
surprise was effected, not by the nation of hunters, but by those
rooineks whose want of cunning and of veld-craft had for so long
been a subject of derision and merriment. A year of the kopje and
the donga had altered all that. And in the proportion of casualties
another very marked change had occurred. Time was when in battle
after battle a tenth would have been a liberal estimate for the
losses of the Boers compared with those of the Briton. So it was at
Stormberg; so it was at Colenso; so it may have been at
Magersfontein. But in this last stage of the war the balance was
rather in favour of the British. It may have been because they were
now frequently acting on the defensive, or it may have been from an
improvement in their fire, or it may have come from the more
desperate mood of the burghers, but in any case the fact remains
that every encounter diminished the small reserves of the Boers
rather than the ample forces of their opponents.
One other change had come over the war, which caused more distress
and searchings of conscience among some of the people of Great
Britain than the darkest hours of their misfortunes. This lay in
the increased bitterness of the struggle, and in those more
strenuous measures which the British commanders felt themselves
entitled and compelled to adopt. Nothing could exceed the lenity of
Lord Roberts's early proclamations in the Free State. But, as the
months went on and the struggle still continued, the war assumed a
harsher aspect. Every farmhouse represented a possible fort, and a
probable depot for the enemy. The extreme measure of burning them
down was only carried out after a definite offence, such as
affording cover for snipers, or as a deterrent to railway wreckers,
but in either case it is evident that the women or children who
were usually the sole occupants of the farm could not by their own
unaided exertions prevent the line from being cut or the riflemen
from firing. It is even probable that the Boers may have committed
these deeds in the vicinity of houses the destruction of which they
would least regret. Thus, on humanitarian grounds there were strong
arguments against this policy of destruction being pushed too far,
and the political reasons were even stronger, since a homeless man
is necessarily the last man to settle down, and a burned-out family
the last to become contented British citizens. On the other hand,
the impatience of the army towards what they regarded as the abuses
of lenity was very great, and they argued that the war would be
endless if the women in the farm were allowed always to supply the
sniper on the kopje. The irregular and brigand-like fashion in
which the struggle was carried out had exasperated the soldiers,
and though there were few cases of individual outrage or
unauthorised destruction, the general orders were applied with some
harshness, and repressive measures were taken which warfare may
justify but which civilisation must deplore.
After the dispersal of the main army at Komatipoort there remained
a considerable number of men in arms, some of them irreconcilable
burghers, some of them foreign adventurers, and some of them Cape
rebels, to whom British arms were less terrible than British law.
These men, who were still well armed and well mounted, spread
themselves over the country, and acted with such energy that they
gave the impression of a large force. They made their way into the
settled districts, and brought fresh hope and fresh disaster to
many who had imagined that the war had passed for ever away from
them. Under compulsion from their irreconcilable countrymen, a
large number of the farmers broke their parole, mounted the horses
which British leniency had left with them, and threw themselves
once more into the struggle, adding their honour to the other
sacrifices which they had made for their country. In any account of
the continual brushes between these scattered bands and the British
forces, there must be such a similarity in procedure and result,
that it would be hard for the writer and intolerable for the reader
if they were set forth in detail. As a general statement it may be
said that during the months to come there was no British garrison
in any one of the numerous posts in the Transvaal, and in that
portion of the Orange River Colony which lies east of the railway,
which was not surrounded by prowling riflemen, there was no convoy
sent to supply those garrisons which was not liable to be attacked
upon the road, and there was no train upon any one of the three
lines which might not find a rail up and a hundred raiders covering
it with their Mausers. With some two thousand miles of railroad to
guard, so many garrisons to provide, and an escort to be furnished
to every convoy, there remained out of the large body of British
troops in the country only a moderate force who were available for
actual operations. This force was distributed in different
districts scattered over a wide extent of country, and it was
evident that while each was strong enough to suppress local
resistance, still at any moment a concentration of the Boer
scattered forces upon a single British column might place the
latter in a serious position. The distribution of the British in
October and November was roughly as follows. Methuen was in the
Rustenburg district, Barton at Krugersdorp and operating down the
line to Klerksdorp, Settle was in the West, Paget at Pienaar's
River, Clements in the Magaliesberg, Hart at Potchefstroom,
Lyttelton at Middelburg, Smith-Dorrien at Belfast, W. Kitchener at
Lydenburg, French in the Eastern Transvaal, Hunter, Rundle,
Brabant, and Bruce Hamilton in the Orange River Colony. Each of
these forces was occupied in the same sort of work, breaking up
small bodies of the enemy, hunting for arms, bringing in refugees,
collecting supplies, and rounding up cattle. Some, however, were
confronted with organised resistance and some were not. A short
account may be given in turn of each separate column.
I would treat first the operations of General Barton, because they
form the best introduction to that narrative of the doings of
Christian De Wet to which this chapter will be devoted.
The most severe operations during the month of October fell to the
lot of this British General, who, with some of the faithful
fusiliers whom he had led from the first days in Natal, was
covering the line from Krugersdorp to Klerksdorp. It is a long
stretch, and one which, as the result shows, is as much within
striking distance of the Orange Free Staters as of the men of the
Transvaal. Upon October 5th Barton left Krugersdorp with a force
which consisted of the Scots and Welsh Fusiliers, five hundred
mounted men, the 78th R.F.A., three pom-poms, and a 4.7 naval gun.
For a fortnight, as the small army moved slowly down the line of
the railroad, their progress was one continual skirmish. On October
6th they brushed the enemy aside in an action in which the
volunteer company of the Scots Fusiliers gained the applause of
their veteran comrades. On the 8th and 9th there was sharp
skirmishing, the brunt of which on the latter date fell upon the
Welsh Fusiliers, who had three officers and eleven men injured. The
commandos of Douthwaite, Liebenberg, and Van der Merwe seem to have
been occupied in harassing the column during their progress through
the Gatsrand range. On the 15th the desultory sniping freshened
again into a skirmish in which the honours and the victory belonged
mainly to the Welshmen and to that very keen and efficient body,
the Scottish Yeomanry. Six Boers were left dead upon the ground. On
October 17th the column reached Frederickstad, where it halted. On
that date six of Marshall's Horse were cut off while collecting
supplies. The same evening three hundred of the Imperial Light
Horse came in from Krugersdorp.
Up to this date the Boer forces which dogged the column had been
annoying but not seriously aggressive. On the 19th, however,
affairs took an unexpected turn. The British scouts rode in to
report a huge dust cloud whirling swiftly northwards from the
direction of the Vaal River--soon plainly visible to all, and
showing as it drew nearer the hazy outline of a long column of
mounted men. The dark coats of the riders, and possibly the speed
of their advance, showed that they were Boers, and soon it was
rumoured that it was no other than Christian De Wet with his merry
men, who, with characteristic audacity, had ridden back into the
Transvaal in the hope of overwhelming Barton's column.
It is some time since we have seen anything of this energetic
gentleman with the tinted glasses, but as the narrative will be
much occupied with him in the future a few words are needed to
connect him with the past. It has been already told how he escaped
through the net which caught so many of his countrymen at the time
of the surrender of Prinsloo, and how he was chased at furious
speed from the Vaal River to the mountains of Magaliesberg. Here he
eluded his pursuers, separated from Steyn, who desired to go east
to confer with Kruger, and by the end of August was back again in
his favourite recruiting ground in the north of the Orange River
Colony. Here for nearly two months he had lain very quiet,
refitting and reassembling his scattered force, until now, ready
for action once more, and fired by the hope of cutting off an
isolated British force, he rode swiftly northwards with two
thousand men under that rolling cloud which had been spied by the
watchers of Frederickstad.
The problem before him was a more serious one, however, than any
which he had ever undertaken, for this was no isolated regiment or
ill-manned post, but a complete little field force very ready to do
battle with him. De Wet's burghers, as they arrived, sprang from
their ponies and went into action in their usual invisible but
effective fashion, covered by the fire of several guns. The
soldiers had thrown up lines of sangars, however, and were able,
though exposed to a very heavy fire coming from several directions,
to hold their own until nightfall, when the defences were made more
secure. On the 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, and 24th the cordon of the
attack was drawn gradually closer, the Boers entirely surrounding
the British force, and it was evident that they were feeling round
for a point at which an assault might be delivered.
The position of the defenders upon the morning of October 25th was
as follows. The Scots Fusiliers were holding a ridge to the south.
General Barton with the rest of his forces occupied a hill some
distance off. Between the two was a valley down which ran the line,
and also the spruit upon which the British depended for their water
supply. On each side of the line were ditches, and at dawn on this
seventh day of the investment it was found that these had been
occupied by snipers during the night, and that it was impossible to
water the animals. One of two things must follow. Either the force
must shift its position or it must drive these men out of their
cover. No fire could do it, as they lay in perfect safety. They
must be turned out at the point of the bayonet.
About noon several companies of Scots and Welsh Fusiliers advanced
from different directions in very extended order upon the ditches.
Captain Baillie's company of the former regiment first attracted
the fire of the burghers. Wounded twice the brave officer staggered
on until a third bullet struck him dead. Six of his men were found
lying beside him. The other companies were exposed in their turn to
a severe fire, but rushing onwards they closed rapidly in upon the
ditches. There have been few finer infantry advances during the
war, for the veld was perfectly flat and the fire terrific. A mile
of ground was crossed by the fusiliers. Three gallant
officers--Dick, Elliot, and Best--went down; but the rush of the
men was irresistible. At the edge of the ditches the supports
overtook the firing line, and they all surged into the trenches
together. Then it was seen how perilous was the situation of the
Boer snipers. They had placed themselves between the upper and the
nether millstone. There was no escape for them save across the
open. It says much for their courage that they took that perilous
choice rather than wave the white flag, which would have ensured
their safety.
The scene which followed has not often been paralleled. About a
hundred and fifty burghers rushed out of the ditches, streaming
across the veld upon foot to the spot where their horses had been
secreted. Rifles, pom-poms, and shrapnel played upon them during
this terrible race. 'A black running mob carrying coats, blankets,
boots, rifles, &c., was seen to rise as if from nowhere and rush as
fast as they could, dropping the various things they carried as
they ran.' One of their survivors has described how awful was that
wild blind flight, through a dust-cloud thrown up by the shells.
For a mile the veld was dotted with those who had fallen.
Thirty-six were found dead, thirty were wounded, and thirty more
gave themselves up as prisoners. Some were so demoralised that they
rushed into the hospital and surrendered to the British doctor. The
Imperial Light Horse were for some reason slow to charge. Had they
done so at once, many eye-witnesses agree that not a fugitive
should have escaped. On the other hand, the officer in command may
have feared that in doing so he might mask the fire of the British
guns.
One incident in the action caused some comment at the time. A small
party of Imperial Light Horse, gallantly led by Captain Yockney of
B Squadron, came to close quarters with a group of Boers. Five of
the enemy having held up their hands Yockney passed them and pushed
on against their comrades. On this the prisoners seized their
rifles once more and fired upon their captors. A fierce fight
ensued with only a few feet between the muzzles of the rifles.
Three Boers were shot dead, five wounded, and eight taken. Of these
eight three were shot next day by order of court-martial for having
resumed their weapons after surrender, while two others were
acquitted. The death of these men in cold blood is to be deplored,
but it is difficult to see how any rules of civilised warfare can
be maintained if a flagrant breach of them is not promptly and
sternly punished.
On receiving this severe blow De Wet promptly raised the investment
and hastened to regain his favourite haunts. Considerable
reinforcements had reached Barton upon the same day, including the
Dublins, the Essex, Strathcona's Horse, and the Elswick Battery,
with some very welcome supplies of ammunition. As Barton had now
more than a thousand mounted men of most excellent quality it is
difficult to imagine why he did not pursue his defeated enemy. He
seems to have underrated the effect which he had produced, for
instead of instantly assuming the offensive he busied himself in
strengthening his defences. Yet the British losses in the whole
operations had not exceeded one hundred, so that there does not
appear to have been any reason why the force should be crippled. As
Barton was in direct and constant telegraphic communication with
Pretoria, it is possible that he was acting under superior orders
in the course which he adopted.
It was not destined, however, that De Wet should be allowed to
escape with his usual impunity. On the 27th, two days after his
retreat from Frederickstad he was overtaken--stumbled upon by pure
chance apparently--by the mounted infantry and cavalry of Charles
Knox and De Lisle. The Boers, a great disorganised cloud of
horsemen, swept swiftly along the northern bank of the Vaal,
seeking for a place to cross, while the British rode furiously
after them, spraying them with shrapnel at every opportunity.
Darkness and a violent storm gave De Wet his opportunity to cross,
but the closeness of the pursuit compelled him to abandon two of
his guns, one of them a Krupp and the other one of the British
twelve-pounders of Sanna's Post, which, to the delight of the
gunners, was regained by that very U battery to which it belonged.
Once across the river and back in his own country De Wet, having
placed seventy miles between himself and his pursuers, took it for
granted that he was out of their reach, and halted near the village
of Bothaville to refit. But the British were hard upon his track,
and for once they were able to catch this indefatigable man
unawares. Yet their knowledge of his position seems to have been
most hazy, and on the very day before that on which they found him,
General Charles Knox, with the main body of the force, turned
north, and was out of the subsequent action. De Lisle's mounted
troops also turned north, but fortunately not entirely out of call.
To the third and smallest body of mounted men, that under Le
Gallais, fell the honour of the action which I am about to
describe.
It is possible that the move northwards of Charles Knox and of De
Lisle had the effect of a most elaborate stratagem, since it
persuaded the Boer scouts that the British were retiring. So indeed
they were, save only the small force of Le Gallais, which seems to
have taken one last cast round to the south before giving up the
pursuit. In the grey of the morning of November 6th, Major Lean
with forty men of the 5th Mounted Infantry came upon three weary
Boers sleeping upon the veld. Having secured the men, and realising
that they were an outpost, Lean pushed on, and topping a rise some
hundreds of yards further, he and his men saw a remarkable scene.
There before them stretched the camp of the Boers, the men
sleeping, the horses grazing, the guns parked, and the wagons
outspanned.
There was little time for consideration. The Kaffir drivers were
already afoot and strolling out for their horses, or lighting the
fires for their masters' coffee. With splendid decision, although
he had but forty men to oppose to over a thousand, Lean sent back
for reinforcements and opened fire upon the camp. In an instant it
was buzzing like an overturned hive. Up sprang the sleepers, rushed
for their horses, and galloped away across the veld, leaving their
guns and wagons behind. A few stalwarts remained, however, and
their numbers were increased by those whose horses had stampeded,
and who were, therefore, unable to get away. They occupied an
enclosed kraal and a farmhouse in front of the British, whence they
opened a sharp fire. At the same time a number of the Boers who had
ridden away came back again, having realised how weak their
assailants were, and worked round the British flanks upon either
side.
Le Gallais, with his men, had come up, but the British force was
still far inferior to that which it was attacking. A section of U
battery was able to unlimber, and open fire at four hundred yards
from the Boer position. The British made no attempt to attack, but
contented themselves with holding on to the position from which
they could prevent the Boer guns from being removed. The burghers
tried desperately to drive off the stubborn fringe of riflemen. A
small stone shed in the possession of the British was the centre of
the Boer fire, and it was within its walls that Ross of the Durhams
was horribly wounded by an explosive ball, and that the brave
Jerseyman, Le Gallais, was killed. Before his fall he had
despatched his staff officer, Major Hickie, to hurry up men from
the rear.
On the fall of Ross and Le Gallais the command fell upon Major
Taylor of U battery. The position at that time was sufficiently
alarming. The Boers were working round each flank in considerable
numbers, and they maintained a heavy fire from a stone enclosure in
the centre. The British forces actually engaged were insignificant,
consisting of forty men of the 5th Mounted Infantry, and two guns
in the centre, forty-six men of the 17th and 18th Imperial Yeomanry
upon the right, and 105 of the 8th Mounted Infantry on the left or
191 rifles in all. The flanks of this tiny force had to extend to
half a mile to hold off the Boer flank attack, but they were
heartened in their resistance by the knowledge that their comrades
were hastening to their assistance. Taylor, realising that a great
effort must be made to tide over the crisis, sent a messenger back
with orders that the convoy should be parked, and every available
man sent up to strengthen the right flank, which was the weakest.
The enemy got close on to one of the guns, and swept down the whole
detachment, but a handful of the Suffolk Mounted Infantry under
Lieutenant Peebles most gallantly held them off from it. For an
hour the pressure was extreme. Then two companies of the 7th
Mounted Infantry came up, and were thrown on to each flank. Shortly
afterwards Major Welch, with two more companies of the same corps,
arrived, and the tide began slowly to turn. The Boers were
themselves outflanked by the extension of the British line and were
forced to fall back. At half-past eight De Lisle, whose force had
trotted and galloped for twelve miles, arrived with several
companies of Australians, and the success of the day was assured.
The smoke of the Prussian guns at Waterloo was not a more welcome
sight than the dust of De Lisle's horsemen. But the question now
was whether the Boers, who were in the walled inclosure and farm
which formed their centre, would manage to escape. The place was
shelled, but here, as often before, it was found how useless a
weapon is shrapnel against buildings. There was nothing for it but
to storm it, and a grim little storming party of fifty men, half
British, half Australian, was actually waiting with fixed bayonets
for the whistle which was to be their signal, when the white flag
flew out from the farm, and all was over. Warned by many a tragic
experience the British still lay low in spite of the flag. 'Come
out! come out!' they shouted. Eighty-two unwounded Boers filed out
of the enclosure, and the total number of prisoners came to 114,
while between twenty and thirty Boers were killed. Six guns, a
pom-pom, and 1000 head of cattle were the prizes of the victors.
This excellent little action showed that the British mounted
infantry had reached a point of efficiency at which they were quite
able to match the Boers at their own game. For hours they held them
with an inferior force, and finally, when the numbers became equal,
were able to drive them off and capture their guns. The credit is
largely due to Major Lean for his prompt initiative on discovering
their laager, and to Major Taylor for his handling of the force
during a very critical time. Above all, it was due to the dead
leader, Le Gallais, who had infected every man under him with his
own spirit of reckless daring. 'If I die, tell my mother that I die
happy, as we got the guns,' said he, with his failing breath. The
British total losses were twelve killed (four officers) and
thirty-three wounded (seven officers). Major Welch, a soldier of
great promise, much beloved by his men, was one of the slain.
Following closely after the repulse at Frederickstad this action
was a heavy blow to De Wet. At last, the British were beginning to
take something off the score which they owed the bold raider, but
there was to be many an item on either side before the long
reckoning should be closed. The Boers, with De Wet, fled south,
where it was not long before they showed that they were still a
military force with which we had to reckon.
In defiance of chronology it may perhaps make a clearer narrative
if I continue at once with the movements of De Wet from the time
that he lost his guns at Bothaville, and then come back to the
consideration of the campaign in the Transvaal, and to a short
account of those scattered and disconnected actions which break the
continuity of the story. Before following De Wet, however, it is
necessary to say something of the general state of the Orange River
Colony and of some military developments which had occurred there.
Under the wise and conciliatory rule of General Pretyman the
farmers in the south and west were settling down, and for the time
it looked as if a large district was finally pacified. The mild
taxation was cheerfully paid, schools were reopened, and a peace
party made itself apparent, with Fraser and Piet de Wet, the
brother of Christian, among its strongest advocates.
Apart from the operations of De Wet there appeared to be no large
force in the field in the Orange River Colony, but early in October
of 1900 a small but very mobile and efficient Boer force skirted
the eastern outposts of the British, struck the southern line of
communications, and then came up the western flank, attacking,
where an attack was possible, each of the isolated and weakly
garrisoned townlets to which it came, and recruiting its strength
from a district which had been hardly touched by the ravages of
war, and which by its prosperity alone might have proved the
amenity of British military rule. This force seems to have skirted
Wepener without attacking a place of such evil omen to their cause.
Their subsequent movements are readily traced by a sequence of
military events.
On October 1st Rouxville was threatened. On the 9th an outpost of
the Cheshire Militia was taken and the railway cut for a few hours
in the neighbourhood of Bethulie. A week later the Boer riders were
dotting the country round Phillipolis, Springfontein and
Jagersfontein, the latter town being occupied upon October 16th,
while the garrison held out upon the nearest kopje. The town was
retaken from the enemy by King Hall and his men, who were Seaforth
Highlanders and police. There was fierce fighting in the streets,
and from twenty to thirty of each side were killed or wounded.
Fauresmith was attacked on October 19th, but was also in the very
safe hands of the Seaforths, who held it against a severe assault.
Phillipolis was continually attacked between the 18th and the 24th,
but made a most notable defence, which was conducted by Gostling,
the resident magistrate, with forty civilians. For a week this band
of stalwarts held their own against 600 Boers, and were finally
relieved by a force from the railway. All the operations were not,
however, as successful as these three defences. On October 24th a
party of cavalry details belonging to many regiments were snapped
up in an ambuscade. On the next day Jacobsdal was attacked, with
considerable loss to the British. The place was entered in the
night, and the enemy occupied the houses which surrounded the
square. The garrison, consisting of about sixty men of the Capetown
Highlanders, had encamped in the square, and were helpless when
fire was opened upon them in the morning. There was practically no
resistance, and yet for hours a murderous fire was kept up upon the
tents in which they cowered, so that the affair seems not to have
been far removed from murder. Two-thirds of the little force were
killed or wounded. The number of the assailants does not appear to
have been great, and they vanished upon the appearance of a
relieving force from Modder River.
After the disaster at Jacobsdal the enemy appeared on November 1st
near Kimberley and captured a small convoy. The country round was
disturbed, and Settle was sent south with a column to pacify it. In
this way we can trace this small cyclone from its origin in the old
storm centre in the north-east of the Orange River Colony, sweeping
round the whole country, striking one post after another, and
finally blowing out at the corresponding point upon the other side
of the seat of war.
We have last seen De Wet upon November 6th, when he fled south from
Bothaville, leaving his guns but not his courage behind him.
Trekking across the line, and for a wonder gathering up no train as
he passed, he made for that part of the eastern Orange River Colony
which had been reoccupied by his countrymen. Here, in the
neighbourhood of Thabanchu, he was able to join other forces,
probably the commandos of Haasbroek and Fourie, which still
retained some guns. At the head of a considerable force he attacked
the British garrison of Dewetsdorp, a town some forty miles to the
south-east of Bloemfontein.
It was on November 18th that De Wet assailed the place, and it fell
upon the 24th, after a defence which appears to have been a very
creditable one. Several small British columns were moving in the
south-east of the Colony, but none of them arrived in time to avert
the disaster, which is the more inexplicable as the town is within
one day's ride of Bloemfontein. The place is a village hemmed in
upon its western side by a semicircle of steep rocky hills broken
in the centre by a gully. The position was a very extended one, and
had the fatal weakness that the loss of any portion of it meant the
loss of it all. The garrison consisted of one company of Highland
Light Infantry on the southern horn of the semicircle, three
companies of the 2nd Gloucester Regiment on the northern and
central part, with two guns of the 68th battery. Some of the Royal
Irish Mounted Infantry and a handful of police made up the total of
the defenders to something over four hundred, Major Massy in
command.
The attack developed at that end of the ridge which was held by the
company of Highlanders. Every night the Boer riflemen drew in
closer, and every morning found the position more desperate. On the
20th the water supply of the garrison was cut, though a little was
still brought up by volunteers during the night. The thirst in the
sultry trenches was terrible, but the garrison still, with black
lips and parched tongues, held on to their lines. On the 22nd the
attack had made such progress that the post had by the Highlanders
became untenable, and had to be withdrawn. It was occupied next
morning by the Boers, and the whole ridge was at their mercy. Out
of eighteen men who served one of the British guns sixteen were
killed or wounded, and the last rounds were fired by the
sergeant-farrier, who carried, loaded, and fired all by himself.
All day the soldiers held out, but the thirst was in itself enough
to justify if not to compel a surrender. At half-past five the
garrison laid down their arms, having lost about sixty killed or
wounded. There does not, as far as one can learn, seem to have been
any attempt to injure the two guns which fell into the hands of the
enemy. De Wet himself was one of the first to ride into the British
trenches, and the prisoners gazed with interest at the short strong
figure, with the dark tail coat and the square-topped bowler hat,
of the most famous of the Boer leaders.
British columns were converging, however, from several quarters,
and De Wet had to be at once on the move. On the 26th Dewetsdorp
was reoccupied by General Charles Knox with fifteen hundred men. De
Wet had two days' start, but so swift was Knox that on the 27th he
had run him down at Vaalbank, where he shelled his camp. De Wet
broke away, however, and trekking south for eighteen hours without
a halt, shook off the pursuit. He had with him at this time nearly
8000 men with several guns under Haasbroek, Fourie, Philip Botha,
and Steyn. It was his declared intention to invade Cape Colony with
his train of weary footsore prisoners, and the laurels of
Dewetsdorp still green upon him. He was much aided in all his plans
by that mistaken leniency which had refused to recognise that a
horse is in that country as much a weapon as a rifle, and had left
great numbers upon the farms with which he could replace his
useless animals. So numerous were they that many of the Boers had
two or three for their own use. It is not too much to say that our
weak treatment of the question of horses will come to be recognised
as the one great blot upon the conduct of the war, and that our
undue and fantastic scruples have prolonged hostilities for months,
and cost the country many lives and many millions of pounds.
De Wet's plan for the invasion of the Colony was not yet destined
to be realised, for a tenacious man had set himself to frustrate
it. Several small but mobile British columns, those of Pilcher, of
Barker, and of Herbert, under the supreme direction of Charles
Knox, were working desperately to head him off. In torrents of rain
which turned every spruit into a river and every road into a
quagmire, the British horsemen stuck manfully to their work. De Wet
had hurried south, crossed the Caledon River, and made for
Odendaal's Drift. But Knox, after the skirmish at Vaalbank, had
trekked swiftly south to Bethulie, and was now ready with three
mobile columns and a network of scouts and patrols to strike in any
direction. For a few days he had lost touch, but his arrangements
were such that he must recover it if the Boers either crossed the
railroad or approached the river. On December 2nd he had authentic
information that De Wet was crossing the Caledon, and in an instant
the British columns were all off at full cry once more, sweeping
over the country with a front of fifteen miles. On the 3rd and 4th,
in spite of frightful weather, the two little armies of horsemen
struggled on, fetlock-deep in mud, with the rain lashing their
faces. At night without cover, drenched and bitterly cold, the
troopers threw themselves down on the sodden veld to snatch a few
hours' sleep before renewing the interminable pursuit. The drift
over the Caledon flowed deep and strong, but the Boer had passed
and the Briton must pass also. Thirty guns took to the water,
diving completely under the coffee-coloured surface, to reappear
glistening upon the southern bank. Everywhere there were signs of
the passage of the enemy. A litter of crippled or dying horses
marked their track, and a Krupp gun was found abandoned by the
drift. The Dewetsdorp prisoners, too, had been set loose, and began
to stumble and stagger back to their countrymen, their boots worn
off, and their putties wrapped round their bleeding feet. It is
painful to add that they had been treated with a personal violence
and a brutality in marked contrast to the elaborate hospitality
shown by the British Government to its involuntary guests.
On December 6th De Wet had at last reached the Orange River a clear
day in front of his pursuers. But it was only to find that his
labours had been in vain. At Odendaal, where he had hoped to cross,
the river was in spate, the British flag waved from a post upon the
further side, and a strong force of expectant Guardsmen eagerly
awaited him there. Instantly recognising that the game was up, the
Boer leader doubled back for the north and safety. At Rouxville he
hesitated as to whether he should snap up the small garrison, but
the commandant, Rundle, showed a bold face, and De Wet passed on to
the Coomassie Bridge over the Caledon. The small post there refused
to be bluffed into a surrender, and the Boers, still dropping their
horses fast, passed on, and got over the drift at Amsterdam, their
rearguard being hardly across before Knox had also reached the
river.
On the 10th the British were in touch again near Helvetia, where
there was a rearguard skirmish. On the 11th both parties rode
through Reddersberg, a few hours separating them. The Boers in
their cross-country trekking go, as one of their prisoners
observed, 'slap-bang at everything,' and as they are past-masters
in the art of ox and mule driving, and have such a knowledge of the
country that they can trek as well by night as by day, it says much
for the energy of Knox and his men that he was able for a fortnight
to keep in close touch with them.
It became evident now that there was not much chance of overtaking
the main body of the burghers, and an attempt was therefore made to
interpose a fresh force who might head them off. A line of posts
existed between Thabanchu and Ladybrand, and Colonel Thorneycroft
was stationed there with a movable column. It was Knox's plan
therefore to prevent the Boers from breaking to the west and to
head them towards the Basuto border. A small column under Parsons
had been sent by Hunter from Bloemfontein, and pushed in upon the
flank of De Wet, who had on the 12th got back to Dewetsdorp. Again
the pursuit became warm, but De Wet's time was not yet come. He
headed for Springhaan Nek, about fifteen miles east of Thabanchu.
This pass is about four miles broad, with a British fort upon
either side of it. There was only one way to safety, for Knox's
mounted infantrymen and lancers were already dotting the southern
skyline. Without hesitation the whole Boer force, now some 2500
strong, galloped at full speed in open order through the Nek,
braving the long range fire of riflemen and guns. The tactics were
those of French in his ride to Kimberley, and the success was as
complete. De Wet's force passed through the last barrier which had
been held against him, and vanished into the mountainous country
round Ficksburg, where it could safely rest and refit.
The result then of these bustling operations had been that De Wet
and his force survived, but that he had failed in his purpose of
invading the Colony, and had dropped some five hundred horses, two
guns, and about a hundred of his men. Haasbroek's commando had been
detached by De Wet to make a feint at another pass while he made
his way through the Springhaan. Parsons's force followed Haasbroek
up and engaged him, but under cover of night he was able to get
away and to join his leader to the north of Thabanchu. On December
13th, this, the second great chase after De Wet, may be said to
have closed.
