CHAPTER 33.
THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO APRIL, 1901.
Three consecutive chapters have now given some account of the
campaign of De Wet, of the operations in the Transvaal up to the
end of the year 1900, and of the invasion of Cape Colony up to
April 1901. The present chapter will deal with the events in the
Transvaal from the beginning of the new century. The military
operations in that country, though extending over a very large
area, may be roughly divided into two categories: the attacks by
the Boers upon British posts, and the aggressive sweeping movements
of British columns. Under the first heading come the attacks on
Belfast, on Zuurfontein, on Kaalfontein, on Zeerust, on
Modderfontein, and on Lichtenburg, besides many minor affairs. The
latter comprises the operations of Babington and of Cunningham to
the west and south-west of Pretoria, those of Methuen still further
to the south-west, and the large movement of French in the
south-east. In no direction did the British forces in the field
meet with much active resistance. So long as they moved the gnats
did not settle; it was only when quiet that they buzzed about and
occasionally stung.
The early days of January 1901 were not fortunate for the British
arms, as the check in which Kitchener's Bodyguard was so roughly
handled, near Lindley, was closely followed by a brisk action at
Naauwpoort or Zandfontein, near the Magaliesberg, in which De la
Rey left his mark upon the Imperial Light Horse. The Boer
commandos, having been driven into the mountains by French and
Clements in the latter part of December, were still on the look-out
to strike a blow at any British force which might expose itself.
Several mounted columns had been formed to scour the country, one
under Kekewich, one under Gordon, and one under Babington. The two
latter, meeting in a mist upon the morning of January 5th, actually
turned their rifles upon each other, but fortunately without any
casualties resulting. A more deadly rencontre was, however,
awaiting them.
A force of Boers were observed, as the mist cleared, making for a
ridge which would command the road along which the convoy and guns
were moving. Two squadrons (B and C) of the Light Horse were
instantly detached to seize the point. They do not appear to have
realised that they were in the immediate presence of the enemy, and
they imagined that the ground over which they were passing had been
already reconnoitred by a troop of the 14th Hussars. It is true
that four scouts were thrown forward, but as both squadrons were
cantering there was no time for these to get ahead. Presently C
squadron, which was behind, was ordered to close up upon the left
of B squadron, and the 150 horsemen in one long line swept over a
low grassy ridge. Some hundreds of De la Rey's men were lying in
the long grass upon the further side, and their first volley, fired
at a fifty-yard range, emptied a score of saddles. It would have
been wiser, if less gallant, to retire at once in the presence of a
numerous and invisible enemy, but the survivors were ordered to
dismount and return the fire. This was done, but the hail of
bullets was terrific and the casualties were numerous. Captain
Norman, of C squadron, then retired his men, who withdrew in good
order. B squadron having lost Yockney, its brave leader, heard no
order, so they held their ground until few of them had escaped the
driving sleet of lead. Many of the men were struck three and four
times. There was no surrender, and the extermination of B company
added another laurel, even at a moment of defeat, to the regiment
whose reputation was so grimly upheld. The Boer victors walked in
among the litter of stricken men and horses. 'Practically all of
them were dressed in khaki and had the water-bottles and haversacks
of our soldiers. One of them snatched a bayonet from a dead man,
and was about to despatch one of our wounded when he was stopped in
the nick of time by a man in a black suit, who, I afterwards heard,
was De la Rey himself. . .The feature of the action was the
incomparable heroism of our dear old Colonel Wools-Sampson.' So
wrote a survivor of B company, himself shot through the body. It
was four hours before a fresh British advance reoccupied the ridge,
and by that time the Boers had disappeared. Some seventy killed and
wounded, many of them terribly mutilated, were found on the scene
of the disaster. It is certainly a singular coincidence that at
distant points of the seat of war two of the crack irregular corps
should have suffered so severely within three days of each other.
In each case, however, their prestige was enhanced rather than
lowered by the result. These incidents tend, however, to shake the
belief that scouting is better performed in the Colonial than in
the regular forces.
Of the Boer attacks upon British posts to which allusion has been
made, that upon Belfast, in the early morning of January 7th,
appears to have been very gallantly and even desperately pushed. On
the same date a number of smaller attacks, which may have been
meant simply as diversions, were made upon Wonderfontein,
Nooitgedacht, Wildfontein, Pan, Dalmanutha, and Machadodorp. These
seven separate attacks, occurring simultaneously over sixty miles,
show that the Boer forces were still organised and under one
effective control. The general object of the operations was
undoubtedly to cut Lord Roberts's communications upon that side and
to destroy a considerable section of the railway.
The town of Belfast was strongly held by Smith-Dorrien, with 1750
men, of which 1300 were infantry belonging to the Royal Irish, the
Shropshires, and the Gordons. The perimeter of defence, however,
was fifteen miles, and each little fort too far from its neighbour
for mutual support, though connected with headquarters by
telephone. It is probable that the leaders and burghers engaged in
this very gallant attack were in part the same as those concerned
in the successful attempt at Helvetia upon December 29th, for the
assault was delivered in the same way, at the same hour, and
apparently with the same primary object. This was to gain
possession of the big 5-inch gun, which is as helpless by night as
it is formidable by day. At Helvetia they attained their object and
even succeeded not merely in destroying, but in removing their
gigantic trophy. At Belfast they would have performed the same feat
had it not been for the foresight of General Smith-Dorrien, who had
the heavy gun trundled back into the town every night.
The attack broke first upon Monument Hill, a post held by Captain
Fosbery with eighty-three Royal Irish. Chance or treason guided the
Boers to the weak point of the wire entanglement and they surged
into the fort, where the garrison fought desperately to hold its
own. There was thick mist and driving rain; and the rush of vague
and shadowy figures amid the gloom was the first warning of the
onslaught. The Irishmen were overborne by a swarm of assailants,
but they nobly upheld their traditional reputation. Fosbery met his
death like a gallant gentleman, but not more heroically than Barry,
the humble private, who, surrounded by Boers, thought neither of
himself nor of them, but smashed at the maxim gun with a pickaxe
until he fell riddled with bullets. Half the garrison were on the
ground before the post was carried.
A second post upon the other side of the town was defended by
Lieutenant Marshall with twenty men, mostly Shropshires. For an
hour they held out until Marshall and nine out of his twelve
Shropshires had been hit. Then this post also was carried.
The Gordon Highlanders held two posts to the southeast and to the
south-west of the town, and these also were vigorously attacked.
Here, however, the advance spent itself without result. In vain the
Ermelo and Carolina commandos stormed up to the Gordon pickets.
They were blown back by the steady fire of the infantry. One small
post manned by twelve Highlanders was taken, but the rest defied
all attack. Seeing therefore that his attempt at a coup-de-main was
a failure, Viljoen withdrew his men before daybreak. The Boer
casualties have not been ascertained, but twenty-four of their dead
were actually picked up within the British lines. The British lost
sixty killed and wounded, while about as many were taken prisoners.
Altogether the action was a brisk and a gallant one, of which
neither side has cause to be ashamed. The simultaneous attacks upon
six other stations were none of them pressed home, and were
demonstrations rather than assaults.
The attempts upon Kaalfontein and on Zuurfontein were both made in
the early morning of January 12th. These two places are small
stations upon the line between Johannesburg and Pretoria. It is
clear that the Boers were very certain of their own superior
mobility before they ventured to intrude into the very heart of the
British position, and the result showed that they were right in
supposing that even if their attempt were repulsed, they would
still be able to make good their escape. Better horsed, better
riders, with better intelligence and a better knowledge of the
country, their ventures were always attended by a limited
liability.
The attacks seem to have been delivered by a strong commando, said
to have been under the command of Beyers, upon its way to join the
Boer concentration in the Eastern Transvaal. They had not the
satisfaction, however, of carrying the garrison of a British post
with them, for at each point they were met by a stout resistance
and beaten off. Kaalfontein was garrisoned by 120 men of Cheshire
under Williams-Freeman, Zuurfontein by as many Norfolks and a small
body of Lincolns under Cordeaux and Atkinson. For six hours the
pressure was considerable, the assailants of Kaalfontein keeping up
a brisk shell and rifle fire, while those of Zuurfontein were
without artillery. At the end of that time two armoured trains came
up with reinforcements and the enemy continued his trek to the
eastward. Knox 's 2nd cavalry brigade followed them up, but without
any very marked result.
Zeerust and Lichtenburg had each been garrisoned and provisioned by
Lord Methuen before he carried his column away to the south-west,
where much rough and useful work awaited him. The two towns were at
once invested by the enemy, who made an attack upon each of them.
That upon Zeerust, on January 7th, was a small matter and easily
repulsed. A more formidable one was made on Lichtenburg, on March
3rd. The attack was delivered by De la Rey, Smuts, and Celliers,
with 1500 men, who galloped up to the pickets in the early morning.
The defenders were 600 in number, consisting of Paget's Horse and
three companies of the 1st battalion of the Northumberland
Fusiliers, a veteran regiment with a long record of foreign
service, not to be confused with that 2nd battalion which was so
severely handled upon several occasions. It was well that it was
so, for less sturdy material might have been overborne by the
vigour of the attack. As it was, the garrison were driven to their
last trench, but held out under a very heavy fire all day, and next
morning the Boers abandoned the attack. Their losses appear to have
been over fifty in number, and included Commandant Celliers, who
was badly wounded and afterwards taken prisoner at Warm Baths. The
brave garrison lost fourteen killed, including two officers of the
Northumberlands, and twenty wounded.
In each of these instances the attacks by the Boers upon British
posts had ended in a repulse to themselves. They were more
fortunate, however, in their attempt upon Modderfontein on the
Gatsrand at the end of January. The post was held by 200 of the
South Wales Borderers, reinforced by the 59th Imperial Yeomanry,
who had come in as escort to a convoy from Krugersdorp. The attack,
which lasted all day, was carried out by a commando of 2000 Boers
under Smuts, who rushed the position upon the following morning. As
usual, the Boers, who were unable to retain their prisoners, had
little to show for their success. The British casualties, however,
were between thirty and forty, mostly wounded.
On January 22nd General Cunninghame left Oliphant's Nek with a
small force consisting of the Border and Worcester Regiments, the
6th Mounted Infantry, Kitchener's Horse, 7th Imperial Yeomanry, 8th
R.F.A., and P battery R.H.A. It had instructions to move south upon
the enemy known to be gathering there. By midday this force was
warmly engaged, and found itself surrounded by considerable bodies
of De la Rey's burghers. That night they camped at Middelfontein,
and were strongly attacked in the early morning. So menacing was
the Boer attitude, and so formidable the position, that the force
was in some danger. Fortunately they were in heliographic
communication with Oliphant's Nek, and learned upon the 23rd that
Babington had been ordered to their relief. All day Cunninghame's
men were under a long-range fire, but on the 24th Babington
appeared, and the British force was successfully extricated, having
seventy-five casualties. This action of Middelfontein is
interesting as having been begun in Queen Victoria's reign, and
ended in that of Edward VII.
Cunninghame's force moved on to Krugersdorp, and there, having
heard of the fall of the Modderfontein post as already described, a
part of his command moved out to the Gatsrand in pursuit of Smuts.
It was found, however, that the Boers had taken up a strong
defensive position, and the British were not numerous enough to
push the attack. On February 3rd Cunninghame endeavoured to
outflank the enemy with his small cavalry force while pushing his
infantry up in front, but in neither attempt did he succeed, the
cavalry failing to find the flank, while the infantry were met with
a fire which made further advance impossible. One company of the
Border Regiment found itself in such a position that the greater
part of it was killed, wounded, or taken. This check constituted
the action of Modderfontein. On the 4th, however, Cunningham,
assisted by some of the South African Constabulary, made his way
round the flank, and dislodged the enemy, who retreated to the
south. A few days later some of Smuts's men made an attempt upon
the railway near Bank, but were driven off with twenty-six
casualties. It was after this that Smuts moved west and joined De
la Rey's commando to make the attack already described upon
Lichtenburg. These six attempts represent the chief aggressive
movements which the Boers made against British posts in the
Transvaal during these months. Attacks upon trains were still
common, and every variety of sniping appears to have been rife,
from the legitimate ambuscade to something little removed from
murder.
It has been described in a previous chapter how Lord Kitchener made
an offer to the burghers which amounted to an amnesty, and how a
number of those Boers who had come under the influence of the
British formed themselves into peace committees, and endeavoured to
convey to the fighting commandos some information as to the
hopelessness of the struggle, and the lenient mood of the British.
Unfortunately these well-meant offers appear to have been mistaken
for signs of weakness by the Boer leaders, and encouraged them to
harden their hearts. Of the delegates who conveyed the terms to
their fellow countrymen two at least were shot, several were
condemned to death, and few returned without ill-usage. In no case
did they bear back a favourable answer. The only result of the
proclamation was to burden the British resources by an enormous
crowd of women and children who were kept and fed in refugee camps,
while their fathers and husbands continued in most cases to fight.
This allusion to the peace movement among the burghers may serve as
an introduction to the attempt made by Lord Kitchener, at the end
of February 1901, to bring the war to a close by negotiation.
Throughout its course the fortitude of Great Britain and of the
Empire had never for an instant weakened, but her conscience had
always been sensitive at the sight of the ruin which had befallen
so large a portion of South Africa, and any settlement would have
been eagerly hailed which would insure that the work done had not
been wasted, and would not need to be done again. A peace on any
other terms would simply shift upon the shoulders of our
descendants those burdens which we were not manly enough to bear
ourselves. There had arisen, as has been said, a considerable peace
movement among the burghers of the refugee camps and also among the
prisoners of war. It was hoped that some reflection of this might
be found among the leaders of the people. To find out if this were
so Lord Kitchener, at the end of February, sent a verbal message to
Louis Botha, and on the 27th of that month the Boer general rode
with an escort of Hussars into Middelburg. 'Sunburned, with a
pleasant, fattish face of a German type, and wearing an imperial,'
says one who rode beside him. Judging from the sounds of mirth
heard by those without, the two leaders seem to have soon got upon
amiable terms, and there was hope that a definite settlement might
spring from their interview. From the beginning Lord Kitchener
explained that the continued independence of the two republics was
an impossibility. But on every other point the British Government
was prepared to go great lengths in order to satisfy and conciliate
the burghers.
On March 7th Lord Kitchener wrote to Botha from Pretoria,
recapitulating the points which he had advanced. The terms offered
were certainly as far as, and indeed rather further than, the
general sentiment of the Empire would have gone. If the Boers laid
down their arms there was to be a complete amnesty, which was
apparently to extend to rebels also so long as they did not return
to Cape Colony or Natal. Self-government was promised after a
necessary interval, during which the two States should be
administered as Crown colonies. Law courts should be independent of
the Executive from the beginning, and both languages be official. A
million pounds of compensation would be paid to the burghers--a
most remarkable example of a war indemnity being paid by the
victors. Loans were promised to the farmers to restart them in
business, and a pledge was made that farms should not be taxed. The
Kaffirs were not to have the franchise, but were to have the
protection of law. Such were the generous terms offered by the
British Government. Public opinion at home, strongly supported by
that of the colonies, and especially of the army, felt that the
extreme step had been taken in the direction of conciliation, and
that to do more would seem not to offer peace, but to implore it.
Unfortunately, however, the one thing which the British could not
offer was the one thing which the Boers would insist upon having,
and the leniency of the proposals in all other directions may have
suggested weakness to their minds. On March 15th an answer was
returned by General Botha to the effect that nothing short of total
independence would satisfy them, and the negotiations were
accordingly broken off.
There was a disposition, however, upon the Boer side to renew them,
and upon May 10th General Botha applied to Lord Kitchener for
permission to cable to President Kruger, and to take his advice as
to the making of peace. The stern old man at The Hague was still,
however, in an unbending mood. His reply was to the effect that
there were great hopes of a successful issue of the war, and that
he had taken steps to make proper provision for the Boer prisoners
and for the refugee women. These steps, and very efficient ones
too, were to leave them entirely to the generosity of that
Government which he was so fond of reviling.
On the same day upon which Botha applied for leave to use the
British cable, a letter was written by Reitz, State Secretary of
the Transvaal, to Steyn, in which the desperate condition of the
Boers was clearly set forth. This document explained that the
burghers were continually surrendering, that the ammunition was
nearly exhausted, the food running low, and the nation in danger of
extinction. 'The time has come to take the final step,' said the
Secretary of State. Steyn wrote back a reply in which, like his
brother president, he showed a dour resolution to continue the
struggle, prompted by a fatalist conviction that some outside
interference would reverse the result of his appeal to arms. His
attitude and that of Kruger determined the Boer leaders to hold out
for a few more months, a resolution which may have been
injudicious, but was certainly heroic. 'It's a fight to a finish
this time,' said the two combatants in the 'Punch' cartoon which
marked the beginning of the war. It was indeed so, as far as the
Boers were concerned. As the victors we can afford to acknowledge
that no nation in history has ever made a more desperate and
prolonged resistance against a vastly superior antagonist. A Briton
may well pray that his own people may be as staunch when their hour
of adversity comes round.
The British position at this stage of the war was strengthened by a
greater centralisation. Garrisons of outlying towns were withdrawn
so that fewer convoys became necessary. The population was removed
also and placed near the railway lines, where they could be more
easily fed. In this way the scene of action was cleared and the
Boer and British forces left face to face. Convinced of the failure
of the peace policy, and morally strengthened by having tried it,
Lord Kitchener set himself to finish the war by a series of
vigorous operations which should sweep the country from end to end.
For this purpose mounted troops were essential, and an appeal from
him for reinforcements was most nobly answered. Five thousand
horsemen were despatched from the colonies, and twenty thousand
cavalry, mounted infantry, and Yeomanry were sent from home. Ten
thousand mounted men had already been raised in Great Britain,
South Africa, and Canada for the Constabulary force which was being
organised by Baden-Powell. Altogether the reinforcements of
horsemen amounted to more than thirty-five thousand men, all of
whom had arrived in South Africa before the end of April. With the
remains of his old regiments Lord Kitchener had under him at this
final period of the war between fifty and sixty thousand
cavalry--such a force as no British General in his happiest dream
had ever thought of commanding, and no British war minister in his
darkest nightmare had ever imagined himself called upon to supply.
Long before his reinforcements had come to hand, while his Yeomanry
was still gathering in long queues upon the London pavement to wait
their turn at the recruiting office, Lord Kitchener had dealt the
enemy several shrewd blows which materially weakened their
resources in men and material. The chief of these was the great
drive down the Eastern Transvaal undertaken by seven columns under
the command of French. Before considering this, however, a few
words must be devoted to the doings of Methuen in the south-west.
This hard-working General, having garrisoned Zeerust and
Lichtenburg, had left his old district and journeyed with a force
which consisted largely of Bushmen and Yeomanry to the disturbed
parts of Bechuanaland which had been invaded by De Villiers. Here
he cleared the country as far as Vryburg, which he had reached in
the middle of January, working round to Kuruman and thence to
Taungs. From Taungs his force crossed the Transvaal border and made
for Klerksdorp, working through an area which had never been
traversed and which contained the difficult Masakani hills. He left
Taungs upon February 2nd, fighting skirmishes at Uitval's Kop,
Paardefontein and Lilliefontein, in each of which the enemy was
brushed aside. Passing through Wolmaranstad, Methuen turned to the
north, where at Haartebeestefontein, on February 19th, he fought a
brisk engagement with a considerable force of Boers under De
Villiers and Liebenberg. On the day before the fight he
successfully outwitted the Boers, for, learning that they had left
their laager in order to take up a position for battle, he pounced
upon the laager and captured 10,000 head of cattle, forty-three
wagons, and forty prisoners. Stimulated by this success, he
attacked the Boers next day, and after five hours of hard fighting
forced the pass which they were holding against him. As Methuen had
but 1500 men, and was attacking a force which was as large as his
own in a formidable position, the success was a very creditable
one. The Yeomanry all did well, especially the 5th and 10th
battalions. So also did the Australians and the Loyal North
Lancashires. The British casualties amounted to sixteen killed and
thirty-four wounded, while the Boers left eighteen of their dead
upon the position which they had abandoned. Lord Methuen's little
force returned to Klerksdorp, having deserved right well of their
country. From Klerksdorp Methuen struck back westwards to the south
of his former route, and on March 14th he was reported at
Warrenton. Here also in April came Erroll's small column, bringing
with it the garrison and inhabitants of Hoopstad, a post which it
had been determined, in accordance with Lord Kitchener's policy of
centralisation, to abandon.
In the month of January, 1901, there had been a considerable
concentration of the Transvaal Boers into that large triangle which
is bounded by the Delagoa railway line upon the north, the Natal
railway line upon the south, and the Swazi and Zulu frontiers upon
the east. The bushveld is at this season of the year unhealthy both
for man and beast, so that for the sake of their herds, their
families, and themselves the burghers were constrained to descend
into the open veld. There seemed the less objection to their doing
so since this tract of country, though traversed once both by
Buller and by French, had still remained a stronghold of the Boers
and a storehouse of supplies. Within its borders are to be found
Carolina, Ermelo, Vryheid, and other storm centres. Its possession
offers peculiar strategical advantages, as a force lying there can
always attack either railway, and might even make, as was indeed
intended, a descent into Natal. For these mingled reasons of health
and of strategy a considerable number of burghers united in this
district under the command of the Bothas and of Smuts.
Their concentration had not escaped the notice of the British
military authorities, who welcomed any movement which might bring
to a focus that resistance which had been so nebulous and elusive.
Lord Kitchener having once seen the enemy fairly gathered into this
huge cover, undertook the difficult task of driving it from end to
end. For this enterprise General French was given the chief
command, and had under his orders no fewer than seven columns,
which started from different points of the Delagoa and of the Natal
railway lines, keeping in touch with each other and all trending
south and east. A glance at the map would show, however, that it
was a very large field for seven guns, and that it would need all
their alertness to prevent the driven game from breaking back.
Three columns started from the Delagoa line, namely,
Smith-Dorrien's from Wonderfontein (the most easterly), Campbell's
from Middelburg, and Alderson's from Eerstefabrieken, close to
Pretoria. Four columns came from the western railway line: General
Knox's from Kaalfontein, Major Allenby's from Zuurfontein (both
stations between Pretoria and Johannesburg), General Dartnell's
from Springs, close to Johannesburg, and finally General Colville
(not to be confused with Colvile) from Greylingstad in the south.
The whole movement resembled a huge drag net, of which
Wonderfontein and Greylingstad formed the ends, exactly one hundred
miles apart. On January 27th the net began to be drawn. Some
thousands of Boers with a considerable number of guns were known to
be within the enclosure, and it was hoped that even if their own
extreme mobility enabled them to escape it would be impossible for
them to save their transport and their cannon.
Each of the British columns was about 2000 strong, making a total
of 14,000 men with about fifty guns engaged in the operations. A
front of not less than ten miles was to be maintained by each
force. The first decided move was on the part of the extreme left
wing, Smith-Dorrien's column, which moved south on Carolina, and
thence on Bothwell near Lake Chrissie. The arduous duty of passing
supplies down from the line fell mainly upon him, and his force was
in consequence larger than the others, consisting of 8500 men with
thirteen guns. On the arrival of Smith-Dorrien at Carolina the
other columns started, their centre of advance being Ermelo. Over
seventy miles of veld the gleam of the helio by day and the flash
of the signal lamps at night marked the steady flow of the British
tide. Here and there the columns came in touch with the enemy and
swept him before them. French had a skirmish at Wilge River at the
end of January, and Campbell another south of Middelburg, in which
he had twenty casualties. On February 4th Smith-Dorrien was at Lake
Chrissie; French had passed through Bethel and the enemy was
retiring on Amsterdam. The hundred-mile ends of the drag net were
already contracted to a third of that distance, and the game was
still known to be within it. On the 5th Ermelo was occupied, and
the fresh deep ruts upon the veld told the British horsemen of the
huge Boer convoy that was ahead of them. For days enormous herds,
endless flocks, and lines of wagons which stretched from horizon to
horizon had been trekking eastward. Cavalry and mounted infantry
were all hot upon the scent.
Botha, however, was a leader of spirit, not to be hustled with
impunity. Having several thousand burghers with him, it was evident
that if he threw himself suddenly upon any part of the British line
he might hope for a time to make an equal fight, and possibly to
overwhelm it. Were Smith-Dorrien out of the way there would be a
clear road of escape for his whole convoy to the north, while a
defeat of any of the other columns would not help him much. It was
on Smith-Dorrien, therefore, that he threw himself with great
impetuosity. That General's force was, however, formidable,
consisting of the Suffolks, West Yorks and Camerons, 5th Lancers,
2nd Imperial Light Horse, and 3rd Mounted Infantry, with eight
field guns and three heavy pieces. Such a force could hardly be
defeated in the open, but no one can foresee the effect of a night
surprise well pushed home, and such was the attack delivered by
Botha at 3 A.M. upon February 6th, when his opponent was encamped
at Bothwell Farm.
The night was favourable to the attempt, as it was dark and misty.
Fortunately, however, the British commander had fortified himself
and was ready for an assault. The Boer forlorn hope came on with a
gallant dash, driving a troop of loose horses in upon the outposts,
and charging forward into the camp. The West Yorkshires, however,
who bore the brunt of the attack, were veterans of the Tugela, who
were no more to be flurried at three in the morning than at three
in the afternoon. The attack was blown backwards, and twenty dead
Boers, with their brave leader Spruyt, were left within the British
lines. The main body of the Boers contented themselves with a heavy
fusillade out of the darkness, which was answered and crushed by
the return fire of the infantry. In the morning no trace, save
their dead, was to be seen of the enemy, but twenty killed and
fifty wounded in Smith-Dorrien's column showed how heavy had been
the fire which had swept through the sleeping camp. The Carolina
attack, which was to have co-operated with that of the
Heidelbergers, was never delivered, through difficulties of the
ground, and considerable recriminations ensued among the Boers in
consequence.
Beyond a series of skirmishes and rearguard actions this attack of
Botha's was the one effort made to stay the course of French's
columns. It did not succeed, however, in arresting them for an
hour. From that day began a record of captures of men, herds, guns,
and wagons, as the fugitives were rounded up from the north, the
west, and the south. The operation was a very thorough one, for the
towns and districts occupied were denuded of their inhabitants, who
were sent into the refugee camps while the country was laid waste
to prevent its furnishing the commandos with supplies in the
future. Still moving south-east, General French's columns made
their way to Piet Retief upon the Swazi frontier, pushing a
disorganised array which he computed at 5000 in front of them. A
party of the enemy, including the Carolina commando, had broken
back in the middle of February and Louis Botha had got away at the
same time, but so successful were his main operations that French
was able to report his total results at the end of the month as
being 292 Boers killed or wounded, 500 surrendered, 3 guns and one
maxim taken, with 600 rifles, 4000 horses, 4500 trek oxen, 1300
wagons and carts, 24,000 cattle, and 165,000 sheep. The whole vast
expanse of the eastern veld was dotted with the broken and charred
wagons of the enemy.
Tremendous rains were falling and the country was one huge
quagmire, which crippled although it did not entirely prevent the
further operations. All the columns continued to report captures.
On March 3rd Dartnell got a maxim and 50 prisoners, while French
reported 50 more, and Smith-Dorrien 80. On March 6th French
captured two more guns, and on the 14th he reported 46 more Boer
casualties and 146 surrenders, with 500 more wagons, and another
great haul of sheep and oxen. By the end of March French had moved
as far south as Vryheid, his troops having endured the greatest
hardships from the continual heavy rains, and the difficulty of
bringing up any supplies. On the 27th he reported seventeen more
Boer casualties and 140 surrenders, while on the last day of the
month he took another gun and two pom-poms. The enemy at that date
were still retiring eastward, with Alderson and Dartnell pressing
upon their rear. On April 4th French announced the capture of the
last piece of artillery which the enemy possessed in that region.
The rest of the Boer forces doubled back at night between the
columns and escaped over the Zululand border, where 200 of them
surrendered. The total trophies of French's drive down the Eastern
Transvaal amounted to eleven hundred of the enemy killed, wounded,
or taken, the largest number in any operation since the surrender
of Prinsloo. There is no doubt that the movement would have been
even more successful had the weather been less boisterous, but this
considerable loss of men, together with the capture of all the guns
in that region, and of such enormous quantities of wagons,
munitions, and stock, inflicted a blow upon the Boers from which
they never wholly recovered. On April 20th French was back in
Johannesburg once more.
While French had run to earth the last Boer gun in the
south-eastern corner of the Transvaal, De la Rey, upon the western
side, had still managed to preserve a considerable artillery with
which he flitted about the passes of the Magaliesberg or took
refuge in the safe districts to the south-west of it. This part of
the country had been several times traversed, but had never been
subdued by British columns. The Boers, like their own veld grass,
need but a few sparks to be left behind to ensure a conflagration
breaking out again. It was into this inflammable country that
Babington moved in March with Klerksdorp for his base. On March
21st he had reached Haartebeestefontein, the scene not long before
of a successful action by Methuen. Here he was joined by
Shekleton's Mounted Infantry, and his whole force consisted of
these, with the 1st Imperial Light Horse, the 6th Imperial Bushmen,
the New Zealanders, a squadron of the 14th Hussars, a wing each of
the Somerset Light Infantry and of the Welsh Fusiliers, with
Carter's guns and four pom-poms. With this mobile and formidable
little force Babington pushed on in search of Smuts and De la Rey,
who were known to be in the immediate neighbourhood.
As a matter of fact the Boers were not only there, but were nearer
and in greater force than had been anticipated. On the 22nd three
squadrons of the Imperial Light Horse under Major Briggs rode into
1500 of them, and it was only by virtue of their steadiness and
gallantry that they succeeded in withdrawing themselves and their
pom-pom without a disaster. With Boers in their front and Boers on
either flank they fought an admirable rearguard action. So hot was
the fire that A squadron alone had twenty-two casualties. They
faced it out, however, until their gun had reached a place of
safety, when they made an orderly retirement towards Babington's
camp, having inflicted as heavy a loss as they had sustained. With
Elandslaagte, Waggon Hill, the relief of Mafeking, Naauwpoort, and
Haartebeestefontein upon their standards, the Imperial Light Horse,
should they take a permanent place in the Army List, will start
with a record of which many older regiments might be proud.
If the Light Horse had a few bad hours on March 22nd at the hands
of the Boers, they and their colonial comrades were soon able to
return the same with interest. On March 23rd Babington moved
forward through Kafir Kraal, the enemy falling back before him.
Next morning the British again advanced, and as the New Zealanders
and Bushmen, who formed the vanguard under Colonel Gray, emerged
from a pass they saw upon the plain in front of them the Boer force
with all its guns moving towards them. Whether this was done of set
purpose or whether the Boers imagined that the British had turned
and were intending to pursue them cannot now be determined, but
whatever the cause it is certain that for almost the first time in
the campaign a considerable force of each side found themselves in
the open and face to face.
It was a glorious moment. Setting spurs to their horses, officers
and men with a yell dashed forward at the enemy. One of the Boer
guns unlimbered and attempted to open fire, but was overwhelmed by
the wave of horsemen. The Boer riders broke and fled, leaving their
artillery to escape as best it might. The guns dashed over the veld
in a mad gallop, but wilder still was the rush of the fiery cavalry
behind them. For once the brave and cool-headed Dutchmen were
fairly panic-stricken. Hardly a shot was fired at the pursuers, and
the riflemen seem to have been only too happy to save their own
skins. Two field guns, one pom-pom, six maxims, fifty-six wagons
and 140 prisoners were the fruits of that one magnificent charge,
while fifty-four stricken Boers were picked up after the action.
The pursuit was reluctantly abandoned when the spent horses could
go no farther.
While the vanguard had thus scattered the main body of the enemy a
detachment of riflemen had ridden round to attack the British rear
and convoy. A few volleys from the escort drove them off, however,
with some loss. Altogether, what with the loss of nine guns and of
at least 200 men, the rout of Haartebeestefontein was a severe blow
to the Boer cause. A week or two later Sir H. Rawlinson's column,
acting with Babington, rushed Smuts's laager at daylight and
effected a further capture of two guns and thirty prisoners. Taken
in conjunction with French's successes in the east and Plumer's in
the north, these successive blows might have seemed fatal to the
Boer cause, but the weary struggle was still destined to go on
until it seemed that it must be annihilation rather than
incorporation which would at last bring a tragic peace to those
unhappy lands.
All over the country small British columns had been operating
during these months--operations which were destined to increase in
scope and energy as the cold weather drew in. The weekly tale of
prisoners and captures, though small for any one column, gave the
aggregate result of a considerable victory. In these scattered and
obscure actions there was much good work which can have no reward
save the knowledge of duty done. Among many successful raids and
skirmishes may be mentioned two by Colonel Park from Lydenburg,
which resulted between them in the capture of nearly 100 of the
enemy, including Abel Erasmus of sinister reputation. Nor would any
summary of these events be complete without a reference to the very
gallant defence of Mahlabatini in Zululand, which was successfully
held by a handful of police and civilians against an irruption of
the Boers. With the advent of winter and of reinforcements the
British operations became very energetic in every part of the
country, and some account of them will now be added.
