CHAPTER 34.
THE WINTER CAMPAIGN (APRIL TO SEPTEMBER, 1901).
The African winter extends roughly from April to September, and as
the grass during that period would be withered on the veld, the
mobility of the Boer commandos must be very much impaired. It was
recognised therefore that if the British would avoid another year
of war it could only be done by making good use of the months which
lay before them. For this reason Lord Kitchener had called for the
considerable reinforcements which have been already mentioned, but
on the other hand he was forced to lose many thousands of his
veteran Yeomanry, Australians, and Canadians, whose term of service
was at an end. The volunteer companies of the infantry returned
also to England, and so did nine militia battalions, whose place
was taken however by an equal number of new-comers.
The British position was very much strengthened during the winter
by the adoption of the block-house system. These were small square
or hexagonal buildings, made of stone up to nine feet with
corrugated iron above it. They were loopholed for musketry fire and
held from six to thirty men. These little forts were dotted along
the railways at points not more than 2000 yards apart, and when
supplemented by a system of armoured trains they made it no easy
matter for the Boers to tamper with or to cross the lines. So
effective did these prove that their use was extended to the more
dangerous portions of the country, and lines were pushed through
the Magaliesberg district to form a chain of posts between
Krugersdorp and Rustenburg. In the Orange River Colony and on the
northern lines of the Cape Colony the same system was extensively
applied. I will now attempt to describe the more important
operations of the winter, beginning with the incursion of Plumer
into the untrodden ground to the north.
At this period of the war the British forces had overrun, if they
had not subdued, the whole of the Orange River Colony and every
part of the Transvaal which is south of the
Mafeking-Pretoria-Komati line. Through this great tract of country
there was not a village and hardly a farmhouse which had not seen
the invaders. But in the north there remained a vast district, two
hundred miles long and three hundred broad, which had hardly been
touched by the war. It is a wild country, scrub-covered,
antelope-haunted plains rising into desolate hills, but there are
many kloofs and valleys with rich water meadows and lush grazings,
which formed natural granaries and depots for the enemy. Here the
Boer government continued to exist, and here, screened by their
mountains, they were able to organise the continuation of the
struggle. It was evident that there could be no end to the war
until these last centres of resistance had been broken up.
The British forces had advanced as far north as Rustenburg in the
west, Pienaar in the centre, and Lydenburg in the east, but here
they had halted, unwilling to go farther until their conquests had
been made good behind them. A General might well pause before
plunging his troops into that vast and rugged district, when an
active foe and an exposed line of communication lay for many
hundreds of miles to the south of them. But Lord Kitchener with
characteristic patience waited for the right hour to come, and then
with equally characteristic audacity played swiftly and boldly for
his stake. De Wet, impotent for the moment, had been hunted back
over the Orange River. French had harried the burghers in the
South-east Transvaal, and the main force of the enemy was known to
be on that side of the seat of war. The north was exposed, and with
one long, straight lunge to the heart, Pietersburg might be
transfixed.
There could only be one direction for the advance, and that must be
along the Pretoria to Pietersburg railroad. This is the only line
of rails which leads to the north, and as it was known to be in
working order (the Boers were running a bi-weekly service from
Pietersburg to Warm Baths), it was hoped that a swift advance might
seize it before any extensive damage could be done. With this
object a small but very mobile force rapidly assembled at the end
of March at Pienaar River, which was the British rail-head forty
miles north of Pretoria and a hundred and thirty from Pietersburg.
This column consisted of the Bushveld Carbineers, the 4th Imperial
Bushmen's Corps, and the 6th New Zealand contingent. With them were
the 18th battery R.F.A., and three pom-poms. A detachment of the
invaluable mounted Sappers rode with the force, and two infantry
regiments, the 2nd Gordons and the Northamptons, were detached to
garrison the more vulnerable places upon the line of advance.
Upon March 29th the untiring Plumer, called off from the chase of
De Wet, was loosed upon this fresh line, and broke swiftly away to
the north. The complete success of his undertaking has obscured our
estimate of its danger, but it was no light task to advance so
great a distance into a bitterly hostile country with a fighting
force of 2000 rifles. As an enterprise it was in many ways not
unlike Mahon's dash on Mafeking, but without any friendly force
with which to join hands at the end. However from the beginning all
went well. On the 30th the force had reached Warm Baths, where a
great isolated hotel already marks the site of what will be a rich
and fashionable spa. On April 1st the Australian scouts rode into
Nylstroom, fifty more miles upon their way. There had been
sufficient sniping to enliven the journey, but nothing which could
be called an action. Gleaning up prisoners and refugees as they
went, with the railway engineers working like bees behind them, the
force still swept unchecked upon its way. On April 5th Piet
Potgietersrust was entered, another fifty-mile stage, and on the
morning of the 8th the British vanguard rode into Pietersburg.
Kitchener's judgment and Plumer's energy had met with their reward.
The Boer commando had evacuated the town and no serious opposition
was made to the British entry. The most effective resistance came
from a single schoolmaster, who, in a moment of irrational frenzy
or of patriotic exaltation, shot down three of the invaders before
he met his own death. Some rolling stock, one small gun, and
something under a hundred prisoners were the trophies of the
capture, but the Boer arsenal and the printing press were
destroyed, and the Government sped off in a couple of Cape carts in
search of some new capital. Pietersburg was principally valuable as
a base from which a sweeping movement might be made from the north
at the same moment as one from the south-east. A glance at the map
will show that a force moving from this point in conjunction with
another from Lydenburg might form the two crooked claws of a crab
to enclose a great space of country, in which smaller columns might
collect whatever was to be found. Without an instant of unnecessary
delay the dispositions were made, and no fewer than eight columns
slipped upon the chase. It will be best to continue to follow the
movements of Plumer's force, and then to give some account of the
little armies which were operating from the south, with the results
of their enterprise.
It was known that Viljoen and a number of Boers were within the
district which lies north of the line in the Middelburg district.
An impenetrable bush-veld had offered them a shelter from which
they made their constant sallies to wreck a train or to attack a
post. This area was now to be systematically cleared up. The first
thing was to stop the northern line of retreat. The Oliphant River
forms a loop in that direction, and as it is a considerable stream,
it would, if securely held, prevent any escape upon that side. With
this object Plumer, on April 14th, the sixth day after his
occupation of Pietersburg, struck east from that town and trekked
over the veld, through the formidable Chunies Pass, and so to the
north bank of the Oliphant, picking up thirty or forty Boer
prisoners upon the way. His route lay through a fertile country
dotted with native kraals. Having reached the river which marked
the line which he was to hold, Plumer, upon April 17th, spread his
force over many miles, so as to block the principal drifts. The
flashes of his helio were answered by flash after flash from many
points upon the southern horizon. What these other forces were, and
whence they came, must now be made clear to the reader.
General Bindon Blood, a successful soldier, had confirmed in the
Transvaal a reputation which he had won on the northern frontier of
India. He and General Elliot were two of the late comers who had
been spared from the great Eastern dependency to take the places of
some of those Generals who had returned to England for a
well-earned rest. He had distinguished himself by his systematic
and effective guardianship of the Delagoa railway line, and he was
now selected for the supreme control of the columns which were to
advance from the south and sweep the Roos-Senekal district. There
were seven of them, which were arranged as follows:
Two columns started from Middelburg under Beatson and Benson, which
might be called the left wings of the movement. The object of
Beatson's column was to hold the drifts of the Crocodile River,
while Benson's was to seize the neighbouring hills called the
Bothasberg. This it was hoped would pin the Boers from the west,
while Kitchener from Lydenburg advanced from the east in three
separate columns. Pulteney and Douglas would move up from Belfast
in the centre, with Dulstoom for their objective. It was the
familiar drag net of French, but facing north instead of south.
On April 13th the southern columns were started, but already the
British preparations had alarmed the Boers, and Botha, with his
main commandos, had slipped south across the line into that very
district from which he had been so recently driven. Viljoen's
commando still remained to the north, and the British troops,
pouring in from every side, converged rapidly upon it. The success
of the operations was considerable, though not complete. The
Tantesberg, which had been the rallying-point of the Boers, was
occupied, and Roos-Senekal, their latest capital, was taken, with
their State papers and treasure. Viljoen, with a number of
followers, slipped through between the columns, but the greater
part of the burghers, dashing furiously about like a shoal of fish
when they become conscious of the net, were taken by one or other
of the columns. A hundred of the Boksburg commando surrendered en
masse, fifty more were taken at Roos-Senekal; forty-one of the
formidable Zarps with Schroeder, their leader, were captured in the
north by the gallantry and wit of a young Australian officer named
Reid; sixty more were hunted down by the indefatigable Vialls,
leader of the Bushmen. From all parts of the district came the same
story of captures and surrenders.
Knowing, however, that Botha and Viljoen had slipped through to the
south of the railway line, Lord Kitchener determined to rapidly
transfer the scene of the operations to that side. At the end of
April, after a fortnight's work, during which this large district
was cropped, but by no means shaved, the troops turned south again.
The results of the operation had been eleven hundred prisoners,
almost the same number as French had taken in the south-east,
together with a broken Krupp, a pom-pom, and the remains of the big
naval gun taken from us at Helvetia.
It was determined that Plumer's advance upon Pietersburg should not
be a mere raid, but that steps should be taken to secure all that
he had gained, and to hold the lines of communication. With this
object the 2nd Gordon Highlanders and the 2nd Wiltshires were
pushed up along the railroad, followed by Kitchener's Fighting
Scouts. These troops garrisoned Pietersburg and took possession of
Chunies Poort, and other strategic positions. They also furnished
escorts for the convoys which supplied Plumer on the Oliphant
River, and they carried out some spirited operations themselves in
the neighbourhood of Pietersburg. Grenfell, who commanded the
force, broke up several laagers, and captured a number of
prisoners, operations in which he was much assisted by Colenbrander
and his men. Finally the last of the great Creusot guns, the
formidable Long Toms, was found mounted near Haenertsburg. It was
the same piece which had in succession scourged Mafeking and
Kimberley. The huge gun, driven to bay, showed its powers by
opening an effective fire at ten thousand yards. The British
galloped in upon it, the Boer riflemen were driven off, and the gun
was blown up by its faithful gunners. So by suicide died the last
of that iron brood, the four sinister brothers who had wrought much
mischief in South Africa. They and their lesson will live in the
history of modern artillery.
The sweeping of the Roos-Senekal district being over, Plumer left
his post upon the River of the Elephants, a name which, like
Rhenoster, Zeekoe, Kameelfontein, Leeuw Kop, Tigerfontein, Elands
River, and so many more, serves as a memorial to the great mammals
which once covered the land. On April 28th the force turned south,
and on May 4th they had reached the railroad at Eerstefabrieken
close to Pretoria. They had come in touch with a small Boer force
upon the way, and the indefatigable Vialls hounded them for eighty
miles, and tore away the tail of their convoy with thirty
prisoners. The main force had left Pretoria on horseback on March
28th, and found themselves back once again upon foot on May 5th.
They had something to show, however, for the loss of their horses,
since they had covered a circular march of 400 miles, had captured
some hundreds of the enemy, and had broken up their last organised
capital. From first to last it was a most useful and well-managed
expedition.
It is the more to be regretted that General Blood was recalled from
his northern trek before it had attained its full results, because
those operations to which he turned did not offer him any great
opportunities for success. Withdrawing from the north of the
railway with his columns, he at once started upon a sweep of that
portion of the country which forms an angle between the Delagoa
line and the Swazi frontier--the Barberton district. But again the
two big fish, Viljoen and Botha, had slipped away, and the usual
collection of sprats was left in the net. The sprats count also,
however, and every week now telegrams were reaching England from
Lord Kitchener which showed that from three to five hundred more
burghers had fallen into our hands. Although the public might begin
to look upon the war as interminable, it had become evident to the
thoughtful observer that it was now a mathematical question, and
that a date could already be predicted by which the whole Boer
population would have passed into the power of the British.
Among the numerous small British columns which were at work in
different parts of the country, in the latter half of May, there
was one under General Dixon which was operating in the
neighbourhood of the Magaliesberg Range. This locality has never
been a fortunate one for the British arms. The country is
peculiarly mountainous and broken, and it was held by the veteran
De la Rey and a numerous body of irreconcilable Boers. Here in July
we had encountered a check at Uitval's Nek, in December Clements
had met a more severe one at Nooitgedacht, while shortly afterwards
Cunningham had been repulsed at Middelfontein, and the Light Horse
cut up at Naauwpoort. After such experiences one would have thought
that no column which was not of overmastering strength would have
been sent into this dangerous region, but General Dixon had as a
matter of fact by no means a strong force with him. With 1600 men
and a battery he was despatched upon a quest after some hidden guns
which were said to have been buried in those parts.
On May 26th Dixon's force, consisting of Derbyshires, King's Own
Scottish Borderers, Imperial Yeomanry, Scottish Horse, and six guns
(four of 8th R.F.A. and two of 28th R.F.A.), broke camp at
Naauwpoort and moved to the west. On the 28th they found themselves
at a place called Vlakfontein, immediately south of Oliphant's Nek.
On that day there were indications that there were a good many
Boers in the neighbourhood. Dixon left a guard over his camp and
then sallied out in search of the buried guns. His force was
divided into three parts, the left column under Major Chance
consisting of two guns of the 28th R.F.A., 230 of the Yeomanry, and
one company of the Derbys. The centre comprised two guns (8th R.F.
A.), one howitzer, two companies of the Scottish Borderers and one
of the Derbys; while the right was made up of two guns (8th R.F.A.
), 200 Scottish Horse, and two companies of Borderers. Having
ascertained that the guns were not there, the force about midday
was returning to the camp, when the storm broke suddenly and
fiercely upon the rearguard.
There had been some sniping during the whole morning, but no
indications of the determined attack which was about to be
delivered. The force in retiring upon the camp had become divided,
and the rearguard consisted of the small column under Major Chance
which had originally formed the left wing. A veld fire was raging
on one flank of this rearguard, and through the veil of smoke a
body of five hundred Boers charged suddenly home with magnificent
gallantry upon the guns. We have few records of a more dashing or
of a more successful action in the whole course of the war. So
rapid was it that hardly any time elapsed between the glimpse of
the first dark figures galloping through the haze and the thunder
of their hoofs as they dashed in among the gunners. The Yeomanry
were driven back and many of them shot down. The charge of the
mounted Boers was supported by a very heavy fire from a covering
party, and the gun-detachments were killed or wounded almost to a
man. The lieutenant in charge and the sergeant were both upon the
ground. So far as it is possible to reconstruct the action from the
confused accounts of excited eye-witnesses and from the exceedingly
obscure official report of General Dixon, there was no longer any
resistance round the guns, which were at once turned by their
captors upon the nearest British detachment.
The company of infantry which had helped to escort the guns proved
however to be worthy representatives of that historic branch of the
British service. They were northerners, men of Derbyshire and
Nottingham, the same counties which had furnished the brave militia
who had taken their punishment so gamely at Roodeval. Though
hustled and broken they re-formed and clung doggedly to their task,
firing at the groups of Boers who surrounded the guns. At the same
time word had been sent of their pressing need to the Scotch
Borderers and the Scottish Horse, who came swarming across the
valley to the succour of their comrades. Dixon had brought two guns
and a howitzer into action, which subdued the fire of the two
captured pieces, and the infantry, Derbys and Borderers, swept over
the position, retaking the two guns and shooting down those of the
enemy who tried to stand. The greater number vanished into the
smoke, which veiled their retreat as it had their advance.
Forty-one of them were left dead upon the ground. Six officers and
fifty men killed with about a hundred and twenty wounded made up
the British losses, to which two guns would certainly have been
added but for the gallant counter-attack of the infantry. With
Dargai and Vlakfontein to their credit the Derbys have green
laurels upon their war-worn colours. They share them on this
occasion with the Scottish Borderers, whose volunteer company
carried itself as stoutly as the regulars.
How is such an action to be summed up? To Kemp, the young Boer
leader, and his men belongs the credit of the capture of the guns;
to the British that of their recapture and of the final possession
of the field. The British loss was probably somewhat higher than
that of the Boers, but upon the other hand there could be no
question as to which side could afford loss the better. The Briton
could be replaced, but there were no reserves behind the fighting
line of the Boers.
There is one subject which cannot be ignored in discussing this
battle, however repugnant it may be. That is the shooting of some
of the British wounded who lay round the guns. There is no question
at all about the fact, which is attested by many independent
witnesses. There is reason to hope that some of the murderers paid
for their crimes with their lives before the battle was over. It is
pleasant to add that there is at least one witness to the fact that
Boer officers interfered with threats to prevent some of these
outrages. It is unfair to tarnish the whole Boer nation and cause
on account of a few irresponsible villains, who would be disowned
by their own decent comrades. Very many--too many--British soldiers
have known by experience what it is to fall into the hands of the
enemy, and it must be confessed that on the whole they have been
dealt with in no ungenerous spirit, while the British treatment of
the Boers has been unexampled in all military history for its
generosity and humanity. That so fair a tale should be darkened by
such ruffianly outrages is indeed deplorable, but the incident is
too well authenticated to be left unrecorded in any detailed
account of the campaign. General Dixon, finding the Boers very
numerous all round him, and being hampered by his wounded, fell
back upon Naauwpoort, which he reached on June 1st.
In May, Sir Bindon Blood, having returned to the line to refit,
made yet another cast through that thrice-harried belt of country
which contains Ermelo, Bethel, and Carolina, in which Botha,
Viljoen, and the fighting Boers had now concentrated. Working over
the blackened veld he swung round in the Barberton direction, and
afterwards made a westerly drive in conjunction with small columns
commanded by Walter Kitchener, Douglas, and Campbell of the Rifles,
while Colville, Garnett, and Bullock co-operated from the Natal
line. Again the results were disappointing when compared with the
power of the instrument employed. On July 5th he reached Springs,
near Johannesburg, with a considerable amount of stock, but with no
great number of prisoners. The elusive Botha had slipped away to
the south and was reported upon the Zululand border, while Viljoen
had succeeded in crossing the Delagoa line and winning back to his
old lair in the district north of Middelburg, from which he had
been evicted in April. The commandos were like those pertinacious
flies which buzz upwards when a hand approaches them, but only to
settle again in the same place. One could but try to make the place
less attractive than before.
Before Viljoen's force made its way over the line it had its
revenge for the long harrying it had undergone by a well-managed
night attack, in which it surprised and defeated a portion of
Colonel Beatson's column at a place called Wilmansrust, due south
of Middelburg, and between that town and Bethel. Beatson had
divided his force, and this section consisted of 850 of the 5th
Victorian Mounted Rifles, with thirty gunners and two pom-poms, the
whole under the command of Major Morris. Viljoen's force trekking
north towards the line came upon this detachment upon June 12th.
The British were aware of the presence of the enemy, but do not
appear to have posted any extra outposts or taken any special
precautions. Long months of commando chasing had imbued them too
much with the idea that these were fugitive sheep, and not fierce
and wily wolves, whom they were endeavouring to catch. It is said
that 700 yards separated the four pickets. With that fine eye for
detail which the Boer leaders possess, they had started a veld fire
upon the west of the camp and then attacked from the east, so that
they were themselves invisible while their enemies were silhouetted
against the light. Creeping up between the pickets, the Boers were
not seen until they opened fire at point-blank range upon the
sleeping men. The rifles were stacked--another noxious military
tradition--and many of the troopers were shot down while they
rushed for their weapons. Surprised out of their sleep and unable
to distinguish their antagonists, the brave Australians did as well
as any troops could have done who were placed in so impossible a
position. Captain Watson, the officer in charge of the pom-poms,
was shot down, and it proved to be impossible to bring the guns
into action. Within five minutes the Victorians had lost twenty
killed and forty wounded, when the survivors surrendered. It is
pleasant to add that they were very well treated by the victors,
but the high-spirited colonials felt their reverse most bitterly.
'It is the worst thing that ever happened to Australia!' says one
in the letter in which he describes it. The actual number of Boers
who rushed the camp was only 180, but 400 more had formed a cordon
round it. To Viljoen and his lieutenant Muller great credit must be
given for this well-managed affair, which gave them a fresh supply
of stores and clothing at a time when they were hard pressed for
both. These same Boer officers had led the attack upon Helvetia
where the 4.7 gun was taken. The victors succeeded in getting away
with all their trophies, and having temporarily taken one of the
blockhouses on the railway near Brugspruit, they crossed the line
in safety and returned, as already said, to their old quarters in
the north, which had been harried but not denuded by the operations
of General Blood.
It would take a volume to catalogue, and a library to entirely
describe the movements and doings of the very large number of
British columns which operated over the Transvaal and the Orange
River Colony during this cold-weather campaign. If the same columns
and the same leaders were consistently working in the same
districts, some system of narrative might enable the reader to
follow their fortunes, but they were, as a matter of fact, rapidly
transferred from one side of the field of action to another in
accordance with the concentrations of the enemy. The total number
of columns amounted to at least sixty, which varied in number from
two hundred to two thousand, and seldom hunted alone. Could their
movements be marked in red upon a chart, the whole of that huge
district would be criss-crossed, from Taungs to Komati and from
Touws River to Pietersburg, with the track of our weary but
indomitable soldiers.
Without attempting to enter into details which would be unbecoming
to the modesty of a single volume, one may indicate what the other
more important groupings were during the course of these months,
and which were the columns that took part in them. Of French's
drive in the south-east, and of Blood's incursion into the
Roos-Senekal district some account has been given, and of his
subsequent sweeping of the south. At the same period Babington,
Dixon, and Rawlinson were co-operating in the Klerksdorp district,
though the former officer transferred his services suddenly to
Blood's combination, and afterwards to Elliot's column in the north
of Orange River Colony. Williams and Fetherstonhaugh came later to
strengthen this Klerksdorp district, in which, after the clearing
of the Magaliesberg, De la Rey had united his forces to those of
Smuts. This very important work of getting a firm hold upon the
Magaliesberg was accomplished in July by Barton, Allenby, Kekewich,
and Lord Basing, who penetrated into the wild country and
established blockhouses and small forts in very much the same way
as Cumberland and Wade in 1746 held down the Highlands. The British
position was much strengthened by the firm grip obtained of this
formidable stronghold of the enemy, which was dangerous not only on
account of its extreme strength, but also of its proximity to the
centres of population and of wealth.
De la Rey, as already stated, had gone down to the Klerksdorp
district, whence, for a time at least, he seems to have passed over
into the north of the Orange River Colony. The British pressure at
Klerksdorp had become severe, and thither in May came the
indefatigable Methuen, whom we last traced to Warrenton. From this
point on May 1st he railed his troops to Mafeking, whence he
trekked to Lichtenburg, and south as far as his old fighting ground
of Haartebeestefontein, having one skirmish upon the way and
capturing a Boer gun. Thence he returned to Mafeking, where he had
to bid adieu to those veteran Yeomanry who had been his comrades on
so many a weary march. It was not their fortune to be present at
any of the larger battles of the war, but few bodies of troops have
returned to England with a finer record of hard and useful service.
No sooner, however, had Methuen laid down one weapon than he
snatched up another. Having refitted his men and collected some of
the more efficient of the new Yeomanry, he was off once more for a
three weeks' circular tour in the direction of Zeerust. It is
difficult to believe that the oldest inhabitant could have known
more of the western side of the Transvaal, for there was hardly a
track which he had not traversed or a kopje from which he had not
been sniped. Early in August he had made a fresh start from
Mafeking, dividing his force into two columns, the command of the
second being given to Von Donop. Having joined hands with
Fetherstonhaugh, he moved through the south-west and finally halted
at Klerksdorp. The harried Boers moved a hundred miles north to
Rustenburg, followed by Methuen, Fetherstonhaugh, Hamilton,
Kekewich, and Allenby, who found the commandos of De la Rey and
Kemp to be scattering in front of them and hiding in the kloofs and
dongas, whence in the early days of September no less than two
hundred were extracted. On September 6th and 8th Methuen engaged
the main body of De la Rey in the valley of the Great Marico River
which lies to the north-west of Rustenburg. In these two actions he
pushed the Boers in front of him with a loss of eighteen killed and
forty-one prisoners, but the fighting was severe, and fifteen of
his men were killed and thirty wounded before the position had been
carried. The losses were almost entirely among the newly raised
Yeomanry, who had already shown on several occasions that, having
shed their weaker members and had some experience of the field,
they were now worthy to take their place beside their veteran
comrades.
The only other important operation undertaken by the British
columns in the Transvaal during this period was in the north, where
Beyers and his men were still harried by Grenfell, Colenbrander,
and Wilson. A considerable proportion of the prisoners which
figured in the weekly lists came from this quarter. On May 30th
there was a notable action, the truth of which was much debated but
finally established, in which Kitchener's Scouts under Wilson
surprised and defeated a Boer force under Pretorius, killing and
wounding several, and taking forty prisoners. On July 1st Grenfell
took nearly a hundred of Beyers' men with a considerable convoy.
North, south, east, and west the tale was ever the same, but so
long as Botha, De la Rey, Steyn, and De Wet remained uncaptured,
the embers might still at any instant leap into a flame.
It only remains to complete this synopsis of the movements of
columns within the Transvaal that I should add that after the
conclusion of Blood's movement in July, several of his columns
continued to clear the country and to harass Viljoen in the
Lydenburg and Dulstroom districts. Park, Kitchener, Spens, Beatson,
and Benson were all busy at this work, never succeeding in forcing
more than a skirmish, but continually whittling away wagons,
horses, and men from that nucleus of resistance which the Boer
leaders still held together.
Though much hampered by the want of forage for their horses, the
Boers were ever watchful for an opportunity to strike back, and the
long list of minor successes gained by the British was occasionally
interrupted by a petty reverse. Such a one befell the small body of
South African Constabulary stationed near Vereeniging, who
encountered upon July 13th a strong force of Boers supposed to be
the main commando of De Wet. The Constabulary behaved with great
gallantry but were hopelessly outnumbered, and lost their
seven-pounder gun, four killed, six wounded, and twenty-four
prisoners. Another small reverse occurred at a far distant point of
the seat of war, for the irregular corps known as Steinacker's
Horse was driven from its position at Bremersdorp in Swaziland upon
July 24th, and had to fall back sixteen miles, with a loss of ten
casualties and thirty prisoners. Thus in the heart of a native
state the two great white races of South Africa were to be seen
locked in a desperate conflict. However unavoidable, the sight was
certainly one to be deplored.
To the Boer credit, or discredit, are also to be placed those
repeated train wreckings, which cost the British during this
campaign the lives and limbs of many brave soldiers who were worthy
of some less ignoble fate. It is true that the laws of war sanction
such enterprises, but there is something indiscriminate in the
results which is repellent to humanity, and which appears to
justify the most energetic measures to prevent them. Women,
children, and sick must all travel by these trains and are exposed
to a common danger, while the assailants enjoy a safety which
renders their exploit a peculiarly inglorious one. Two Boers,
Trichardt and Hindon, the one a youth of twenty-two, the other a
man of British birth, distinguished, or disgraced, themselves by
this unsavoury work upon the Delagoa line, but with the extension
of the blockhouse system the attempts became less successful. There
was one, however, upon the northern line near Naboomspruit which
cost the lives of Lieutenant Best and eight Gordon Highlanders,
while ten were wounded. The party of Gordons continued to resist
after the smash, and were killed or wounded to a man. The painful
incident is brightened by such an example of military virtue, and
by the naive reply of the last survivor, who on being questioned
why he continued to fight until he was shot down, answered with
fine simplicity, 'Because I am a Gordon Highlander.'
Another train disaster of an even more tragic character occurred
near Waterval, fifteen miles north of Pretoria, upon the last day
of August. The explosion of a mine wrecked the train, and a hundred
Boers who lined the banks of the cutting opened fire upon the
derailed carriages. Colonel Vandeleur, an officer of great promise,
was killed and twenty men, chiefly of the West Riding regiment,
were shot. Nurse Page was also among the wounded. It was after this
fatal affair that the regulation of carrying Boer hostages upon the
trains was at last carried out.
It has been already stated that part of Lord Kitchener's policy of
concentration lay in his scheme for gathering the civil population
into camps along the lines of communication. The reasons for this,
both military and humanitarian, were overwhelming. Experience had
proved that the men if left at liberty were liable to be persuaded
or coerced by the fighting Boers into breaking their parole and
rejoining the commandos. As to the women and children, they could
not be left upon the farms in a denuded country. That the Boers in
the field had no doubts as to the good treatment of these people
was shown by the fact that they repeatedly left their families in
the way of the columns so that they might be conveyed to the camps.
Some consternation was caused in England by a report of Miss
Hobhouse, which called public attention to the very high rate of
mortality in some of these camps, but examination showed that this
was not due to anything insanitary in their situation or
arrangement, but to a severe epidemic of measles which had swept
away a large number of the children. A fund was started in London
to give additional comforts to these people, though there is reason
to believe that their general condition was superior to that of the
Uitlander refugees, who still waited permission to return to their
homes. By the end of July there were no fewer than sixty thousand
inmates of the camps in the Transvaal alone, and half as many in
the Orange River Colony. So great was the difficulty in providing
the supplies for so large a number that it became more and more
evident that some at least of the camps must be moved down to the
sea coast.
Passing to the Orange River Colony we find that during this winter
period the same British tactics had been met by the same constant
evasions on the part of the dwindling commandos. The Colony had
been divided into four military districts: that of Bloemfontein,
which was given to Charles Knox, that of Lyttelton at
Springfontein, that of Rundle at Harrismith, and that of Elliot in
the north. The latter was infinitely the most important, and
Elliot, the warden of the northern marches, had under him during
the greater part of the winter a mobile force of about 6000 men,
commanded by such experienced officers as Broadwood, De Lisle, and
Bethune. Later in the year Spens, Bullock, Plumer, and Rimington
were all sent into the Orange River Colony to help to stamp out the
resistance. Numerous skirmishes and snipings were reported from all
parts of the country, but a constant stream of prisoners and of
surrenders assured the soldiers that, in spite of the difficulty of
the country and the obstinacy of the enemy, the term of their
labours was rapidly approaching.
In all the petty and yet necessary operations of these columns, two
incidents demand more than a mere mention. The first was a
hard-fought skirmish in which some of Elliot's horsemen were
engaged upon June 6th. His column had trekked during the month of
May from Kroonstad to Harrismith, and then turning north found
itself upon that date near the hamlet of Reitz. Major Sladen with
200 Mounted Infantry, when detached from the main body, came upon
the track of a Boer convoy and ran it down. Over a hundred vehicles
with forty-five prisoners were the fruits of their enterprise. Well
satisfied with his morning's work, the British leader despatched a
party of his men to convey the news to De Lisle, who was behind,
while he established himself with his loot and his prisoners in a
convenient kraal. Thence they had an excellent view of a large body
of horsemen approaching them with scouts, flankers, and all
military precautions. One warm-hearted officer seems actually to
have sallied out to meet his comrades, and it was not till his
greeting of them took the extreme form of handing over his rifle
that the suspicion of danger entered the heads of his companions.
But if there was some lack of wit there was none of heart in Sladen
and his men. With forty-five Boers to hold down, and 500 under
Fourie, De Wet, and De la Rey around them, the little band made
rapid preparation for a desperate resistance: the prisoners were
laid upon their faces, the men knocked loopholes in the mud walls
of the kraal, and a blunt soldierly answer was returned to the
demand for surrender.
But it was a desperate business. The attackers were five to one,
and the five were soldiers of De Wet, the hard-bitten veterans of a
hundred encounters. The captured wagons in a long double row
stretched out over the plain, and under this cover the Dutchmen
swarmed up to the kraal. But the men who faced them were veterans
also, and the defence made up for the disparity of numbers. With
fine courage the Boers made their way up to the village, and
established themselves in the outlying huts, but the Mounted
Infantry clung desperately to their position. Out of the few
officers present Findlay was shot through the head, Moir and
Cameron through the heart, and Strong through the stomach. It was a
Waggon Hill upon a small scale, two dour lines of skirmishers
emptying their rifles into each other at point-blank range. Once
more, as at Bothaville, the British Mounted Infantry proved that
when it came to a dogged pelting match they could stand punishment
longer than their enemy. They suffered terribly. Fifty-one out of
the little force were on the ground, and the survivors were not
much more numerous than their prisoners. To the 1st Gordons, the
2nd Bedfords, the South Australians, and the New South Welsh men
belongs the honour of this magnificent defence. For four hours the
fierce battle raged, until at last the parched and powder-stained
survivors breathed a prayer of thanks as they saw on the southern
horizon the vanguard of De Lisle riding furiously to the rescue.
For the last hour, since they had despaired of carrying the kraal,
the Boers had busied themselves in removing their convoy; but now,
for the second time in one day, the drivers found British rifles
pointed at their heads, and the oxen were turned once more and
brought back to those who had fought so hard to hold them.
Twenty-eight killed and twenty-six wounded were the losses in this
desperate affair. Of the Boers seventeen were left dead in front of
the kraal, and the forty-five had not escaped from the bulldog grip
which held them. There seems for some reason to have been no
effective pursuit of the Boers, and the British column held on its
way to Kroonstad.
The second incident which stands out amid the dreary chronicle of
hustlings and snipings is the surprise visit paid by Broadwood with
a small British column to the town of Reitz upon July 11th, which
resulted in the capture of nearly every member of the late
government of the Free State, save only the one man whom they
particularly wanted. The column consisted of 200 yeomen, 200 of the
7th Dragoon Guards, and two guns. Starting at 11 P.M., the raiders
rode hard all night and broke with the dawn upon the sleeping
village. Racing into the main street, they secured the startled
Boers as they rushed from the houses. It is easy to criticise such
an operation from a distance, and to overlook the practical
difficulties in the way, but on the face of it it seems a pity that
the holes had not been stopped before the ferret was sent in. A
picket at the farther end of the street would have barred Steyn's
escape. As it was, he flung himself upon his horse and galloped
half-clad out of the town. Sergeant Cobb of the Dragoons snapped a
rifle at close quarters upon him, but the cold of the night had
frozen the oil on the striker and the cartridge hung fire. On such
trifles do the large events of history turn! Two Boer generals, two
commandants, Steyn's brother, his secretary, and several other
officials were among the nine-and-twenty prisoners. The treasury
was also captured, but it is feared that the Yeomen and Dragoons
will not be much the richer from their share of the contents.
Save these two incidents, the fight at Reitz and the capture of a
portion of Steyn's government at the same place, the winter's
campaign furnished little which was of importance, though a great
deal of very hard and very useful work was done by the various
columns under the direction of the governors of the four military
districts. In the south General Bruce Hamilton made two sweeps, one
from the railway line to the western frontier, and the second from
the south and east in the direction of Petrusburg. The result of
the two operations was about 300 prisoners. At the same time Monro
and Hickman re-cleared the already twice-cleared districts of
Rouxville and Smithfield. The country in the east of the Colony was
verging now upon the state which Grant described in the Shenandoah
Valley: 'A crow,' said he, 'must carry his own rations when he
flies across it.'
In the middle district General Charles Knox, with the columns of
Pine-Coffin, Thorneycroft, Pilcher, and Henry, were engaged in the
same sort of work with the same sort of results.
The most vigorous operations fell to the lot of General Elliot, who
worked over the northern and north-eastern district, which still
contained a large number of fighting burghers. In May and June
Elliot moved across to Vrede and afterwards down the eastern
frontier of the Colony, joining hands at last with Rundle at
Harrismith. He then worked his way back to Kroonstad through Reitz
and Lindley. It was on this journey that Sladen's Mounted Infantry
had the sharp experience which has been already narrated. Western's
column, working independently, co-operated with Elliot in this
clearing of the north-east. In August there were very large
captures by Broadwood's force, which had attained considerable
mobility, ninety miles being covered by it on one occasion in two
days.
Of General Rundle there is little to be said, as he was kept busy
in exploring the rough country in his own district--the same
district which had been the scene of the operations against
Prinsloo and the Fouriesburg surrender. Into this district
Kritzinger and his men trekked after they were driven from the
Colony in July, and many small skirmishes and snipings among the
mountains showed that the Boer resistance was still alive.
July and August were occupied in the Orange River Colony by
energetic operations of Spens' and Rimington's columns in the
midland districts, and by a considerable drive to the north-eastern
corner, which was shared by three columns under Elliot and two
under Plumer, with one under Henry and several smaller bodies. A
considerable number of prisoners and a large amount of stock were
the result of the movement, but it was very evident that there was
a waste of energy in the employment of such forces for such an end.
The time appeared to be approaching when a strong force of military
police stationed permanently in each district might prove a more
efficient instrument. One interesting development of this phase of
the war was the enrolment of a burgher police among the Boers who
had surrendered. These men--well paid, well mounted, and well
armed--were an efficient addition to the British forces. The
movement spread until before the end of the war there were several
thousand burghers under such well-known officers as Celliers,
Villonel, and young Cronje, fighting against their own guerilla
countrymen. Who, in 1899, could have prophesied such a phenomenon
as that!
Lord Kitchener's proclamation issued upon August 9th marked one
more turn in the screw upon the part of the British authorities. By
it the burghers were warned that those who had not laid down their
arms by September 15th would in the case of the leaders be
banished, and in the case of the burghers be compelled to support
their families in the refugee camps. As many of the fighting
burghers were men of no substance, the latter threat did not affect
them much, but the other, though it had little result at the time,
may be useful for the exclusion of firebrands during the period of
reconstruction. Some increase was noticeable in the number of
surrenders after the proclamation, but on the whole it had not the
result which was expected, and its expediency is very open to
question. This date may be said to mark the conclusion of the
winter campaign and the opening of a new phase in the struggle.
