CHAPTER 35.
THE GUERILLA OPERATIONS IN CAPE COLONY.
In the account which has been given in a preceding chapter of the
invasion of Cape Colony by the Boer forces, it was shown that the
Western bands were almost entirely expelled, or at least that they
withdrew, at the time when De Wet was driven across the Orange
River. This was at the beginning of March 1901. It was also
mentioned that though the Boers evacuated the barren and
unprofitable desert of the Karoo, the Eastern bands which had come
with Kritzinger did not follow the same course, but continued to
infest the mountainous districts of the Central Colony, whence they
struck again and again at the railway lines, the small towns,
British patrols, or any other quarry which was within their reach
and strength. From the surrounding country they gathered a fair
number of recruits, and they were able through the sympathy and
help of the Dutch farmers to keep themselves well mounted and
supplied. In small wandering bands they spread themselves over a
vast extent of country, and there were few isolated farmhouses from
the Orange River to the Oudtshoorn Mountains, and from the Cape
Town railroad in the west to the Fish River in the east, which were
not visited by their active and enterprising scouts. The object of
the whole movement was, no doubt, to stimulate a general revolt in
the Colony; and it must be acknowledged that if the powder did not
all explode it was not for want of the match being thoroughly
applied.
It might at first sight seem the simplest of military operations to
hunt down these scattered and insignificant bands; but as a matter
of fact nothing could be more difficult. Operating in a country
which was both vast and difficult, with excellent horses, the best
of information and supplies ready for them everywhere, it was
impossible for the slow-moving British columns with their guns and
their wagons to overtake them. Formidable even in flight, the Boers
were always ready to turn upon any force which exposed itself too
rashly to retaliation, and so amid the mountain passes the British
chiefs had to use an amount of caution which was incompatible with
extreme speed. Only when a commando was exactly localised so that
two or three converging British forces could be brought to bear
upon it, was there a reasonable chance of forcing a fight. Still,
with all these heavy odds against them, the various little columns
continued month after month to play hide-and-seek with the
commandos, and the game was by no means always on the one side. The
varied fortunes of this scrambling campaign can only be briefly
indicated in these pages.
It has already been shown that Kritzinger's original force broke
into many bands, which were recruited partly from the Cape rebels
and partly from fresh bodies which passed over from the Orange
River Colony. The more severe the pressure in the north, the
greater reason was there for a trek to this land of plenty. The
total number of Boers who were wandering over the eastern and
midland districts may have been about two thousand, who were
divided into bands which varied from fifty to three hundred. The
chief leaders of separate commandos were Kritzinger, Scheepers,
Malan, Myburgh, Fouche, Lotter, Smuts, Van Reenen, Lategan, Maritz,
and Conroy, the two latter operating on the western side of the
country. To hunt down these numerous and active bodies the British
were compelled to put many similar detachments into the field,
known as the columns of Gorringe, Crabbe, Henniker, Scobell, Doran,
Kavanagh, Alexander, and others. These two sets of miniature armies
performed an intricate devil's dance over the Colony, the main
lines of which are indicated by the red lines upon the map. The
Zuurberg mountains to the north of Steynsburg, the Sneeuwberg range
to the south of Middelburg, the Oudtshoorn Mountains in the south,
the Cradock district, the Murraysburg district, and the
Graaf-Reinet district--these were the chief centres of Boer
activity.
In April Kritzinger made his way north to the Orange River Colony,
for the purpose of consulting with De Wet, but he returned with a
following of 200 men about the end of May. Continual brushes
occurred during this month between the various columns, and much
hard marching was done upon either side, but there was nothing
which could be claimed as a positive success.
Early in May two passengers sailed for Europe, the journey of each
being in its way historical. The first was the weary and overworked
Pro-Consul who had the foresight to distinguish the danger and the
courage to meet it. Milner's worn face and prematurely grizzled
hair told of the crushing weight which had rested upon him during
three eventful years. A gentle scholar, he might have seemed more
fitted for a life of academic calm than for the stormy part which
the discernment of Mr. Chamberlain had assigned to him. The fine
flower of an English university, low-voiced and urbane, it was
difficult to imagine what impression he would produce upon those
rugged types of which South Africa is so peculiarly prolific. But
behind the reserve of a gentleman there lay within him a lofty
sense of duty, a singular clearness of vision, and a moral courage
which would brace him to follow whither his reason pointed. His
visit to England for three months' rest was the occasion for a
striking manifestation of loyalty and regard from his
fellow-countrymen. He returned in August as Lord Milner to the
scene of his labours, with the construction of a united and loyal
commonwealth of South Africa as the task of his life.
The second traveller who sailed within a few days of the Governor
was Mrs. Botha, the wife of the Boer General, who visited Europe
for private as well as political reasons. She bore to Kruger an
exact account of the state of the country and of the desperate
condition of the burghers. Her mission had no immediate or visible
effect, and the weary war, exhausting for the British but fatal for
the Boers, went steadily on.
To continue the survey of the operations in the Cape, the first
point scored was by the invaders, for Malan's commando succeeded
upon May 13th in overwhelming a strong patrol of the Midland
Mounted Rifles, the local colonial corps, to the south of
Maraisburg. Six killed, eleven wounded, and forty-one prisoners
were the fruits of his little victory, which furnished him also
with a fresh supply of rifles and ammunition. On May 21st Crabbe's
column was in touch with Lotter and with Lategan, but no very
positive result came from the skirmish.
The end of May showed considerable Boer activity in the Cape
Colony, that date corresponding with the return of Kritzinger from
the north. Haig had for the moment driven Scheepers back from the
extreme southerly point which he had reached, and he was now in the
Graaf-Reinet district; but on the other side of the colony Conroy
had appeared near Kenhart, and upon May 23rd he fought a sharp
skirmish with a party of Border Scouts. The main Boer force under
Kritzinger was in the midlands, however, and had concentrated to
such an extent in the Cradock district that it was clear that some
larger enterprise was on foot. This soon took shape, for on June
2nd, after a long and rapid march, the Boer leader threw himself
upon Jamestown, overwhelmed the sixty townsmen who formed the
guard, and looted the town, from which he drew some welcome
supplies and 100 horses. British columns were full cry upon his
heels, however, and the Boers after a few hours left the gutted
town and vanished into the hills once more. On June 6th the British
had a little luck at last, for on that date Scobell and Lukin in
the Barkly East district surprised a laager and took twenty
prisoners, 166 horses, and much of the Jamestown loot. On the same
day Windham treated Van Reenen in a similar rough fashion near
Steynsburg, and took twenty-two prisoners.
On June 8th the supreme command of the operations in Cape Colony
was undertaken by General French, who from this time forward
manoeuvred his numerous columns upon a connected plan with the main
idea of pushing the enemy northwards. It was some time, however,
before his disposition bore fruit, for the commandos were still
better mounted and lighter than their pursuers. On June 13th the
youthful and dashing Scheepers, who commanded his own little force
at an age when he would have been a junior lieutenant of the
British army, raided Murraysburg and captured a patrol. On June
17th Monro with Lovat's Scouts and Bethune's Mounted Infantry had
some slight success near Tarkastad, but three days later the
ill-fated Midland Mounted Rifles were surprised in the early
morning by Kritzinger at Waterkloof, which is thirty miles west of
Cradock, and were badly mauled by him. They lost ten killed, eleven
wounded, and sixty-six prisoners in this unfortunate affair. Again
the myth that colonial alertness is greater than that of regular
troops seems to have been exposed.
At the end of June, Fouche, one of the most enterprising of the
guerilla chiefs, made a dash from Barkly East into the native
reserves of the Transkei in order to obtain horses and supplies. It
was a desperate measure, as it was vain to suppose that the warlike
Kaffirs would permit their property to be looted without
resistance, and if once the assegais were reddened no man could say
how far the mischief might go. With great loyalty the British
Government, even in the darkest days, had held back those martial
races--Zulus, Swazis, and Basutos--who all had old grudges against
the Amaboon. Fouche's raid was stopped, however, before it led to
serious trouble. A handful of Griqualand Mounted Rifles held it in
front, while Dalgety and his colonial veterans moving very swiftly
drove him back northwards.
Though baulked, Fouche was still formidable, and on July 14th he
made a strong attack in the neighbourhood of Jamestown upon a
column of Connaught Rangers who were escorting a convoy. Major
Moore offered a determined resistance, and eventually after some
hours of fighting drove the enemy away and captured their laager.
Seven killed and seventeen wounded were the British losses in this
spirited engagement.
On July 10th General French, surveying from a lofty mountain peak
the vast expanse of the field of operations, with his heliograph
calling up responsive twinkles over one hundred miles of country,
gave the order for the convergence of four columns upon the valley
in which he knew Scheepers to be lurking. We have it from one of
his own letters that his commando at the time consisted of 240 men,
of whom forty were Free Staters and the rest colonial rebels.
Crewe, Windham, Doran, and Scobell each answered to the call, but
the young leader was a man of resource, and a long kloof up the
precipitous side of the hill gave him a road to safety. Yet the
operations showed a new mobility in the British columns, which shed
their guns and their baggage in order to travel faster. The main
commando escaped, but twenty-five laggards were taken. The action
took place among the hills thirty miles to the west of
Graaf-Reinet.
On July 21st Crabbe and Kritzinger had a skirmish in the mountains
near Cradock, in which the Boers were strong enough to hold their
own; but on the same date near Murraysburg, Lukin, the gallant
colonial gunner, with ninety men rode into 150 of Lategan's band
and captured ten of them, with a hundred horses. On July 27th a
small party of twenty-one Imperial Yeomanry was captured, after a
gallant resistance, by a large force of Boers at the Doorn River on
the other side of the Colony. The Kaffir scouts of the British were
shot dead in cold blood by their captors after the action. There
seems to be no possible excuse for the repeated murders of coloured
men by the Boers, as they had themselves from the beginning of the
war used their Kaffirs for every purpose short of actually
fighting. The war had lost much of the good humour which marked its
outset. A fiercer feeling had been engendered on both sides by the
long strain, but the execution of rebels by the British, though
much to be deplored, is still recognised as one of the rights of a
belligerent. When one remembers the condonation upon the part of
the British of the use of their own uniforms by the Boers, of the
wholesale breaking of paroles, of the continual use of expansive
bullets, of the abuse of the pass system and of the red cross, it
is impossible to blame them for showing some severity in the
stamping out of armed rebellion within their own Colony. If stern
measures were eventually adopted it was only after extreme leniency
had been tried and failed. The loss of five years' franchise as a
penalty for firing upon their own flag is surely the most gentle
correction which an Empire ever laid upon a rebellious people.
At the beginning of August the connected systematic work of
French's columns began to tell. In a huge semicircle the British
were pushing north, driving the guerillas in front of them.
Scheepers in his usual wayward fashion had broken away to the
south, but the others had been unable to penetrate the cordon and
were herded over the Stormberg to Naauwport line. The main body of
the Boers was hustled swiftly along from August 7th to August 10th,
from Graaf-Reinet to Thebus, and thrust over the railway line at
that point with some loss of men and a great shedding of horses. It
was hoped that the blockhouses on the railroad would have held the
enemy, but they slipped across by night and got into the Steynsburg
district, where Gorringe's colonials took up the running. On August
18th he followed the commandos from Steynsburg to Venterstad,
killing twenty of them and taking several prisoners. On the 15th,
Kritzinger with the main body of the invaders passed the Orange
River near Bethulie, and made his way to the Wepener district of
the Orange River Colony. Scheepers, Lotter, Lategan, and a few
small wandering bands were the only Boers left in the Colony, and
to these the British columns now turned their attention, with the
result that Lategan, towards the end of the month, was also driven
over the river. For the time, at least, the situation seemed to
have very much improved, but there was a drift of Boers over the
north-western frontier, and the long-continued warfare at their own
doors was undoubtedly having a dangerous effect upon the Dutch
farmers. Small successes from time to time, such as the taking of
sixty of French's Scouts by Theron's commando on August 10th,
served to keep them from despair. Of the guerilla bands which
remained, the most important was that of Scheepers, which now
numbered 300 men, well mounted and supplied. He had broken back
through the cordon, and made for his old haunts in the south-west.
Theron, with a smaller band, was also in the Uniondale and
Willowmore district, approaching close to the sea in the Mossel Bay
direction, but being headed off by Kavanagh. Scheepers turned in
the direction of Cape Town, but swerved aside at Montagu, and moved
northwards towards Touws River.
So far the British had succeeded in driving and injuring, but never
in destroying, the Boer bands. It was a new departure therefore
when, upon September 4th, the commando of Lotter was entirely
destroyed by the column of Scobell. This column consisted of some
of the Cape Mounted Rifles and of the indefatigable 9th Lancers. It
marked the enemy down in a valley to the west of Cradock and
attacked them in the morning, after having secured all the
approaches. The result was a complete success. The Boers threw
themselves into a building and held out valiantly, but their
position was impossible, and after enduring considerable punishment
they were forced to hoist the white flag. Eleven had been killed,
forty-six wounded, and fifty-six surrendered--figures which are in
themselves a proof of the tenacity of their defence. Lotter was
among the prisoners, 260 horses were taken, and a good supply of
ammunition, with some dynamite. A few days later, on September
10th, a similar blow, less final in its character, was dealt by
Colonel Crabbe to the commando of Van der Merve, which was an
offshoot of that of Scheepers. The action was fought near
Laingsburg, which is on the main line, just north of Matjesfontein,
and it ended in the scattering of the Boer band, the death of their
boy leader (he was only eighteen years of age), and the capture of
thirty-seven prisoners. Seventy of the Beers escaped by a hidden
road. To Colonials and Yeomanry belongs the honour of the action,
which cost the British force seven casualties. Colonel Crabbe
pushed on after the success, and on September 14th he was in touch
with Scheepers's commando near Ladismith (not to be confused with
the historical town of Natal), and endured and inflicted some
losses. On the 17th a patrol of Grenadier Guards was captured in
the north of the Colony, Rebow, the young lieutenant in charge of
them, meeting with a soldier's death.
On the same day a more serious engagement occurred near Tarkastad,
a place which lies to the east of Cradock, a notorious centre of
disaffection in the midland district. Smuts's commando, some
hundreds strong, was marked down in this part, and several forces
converged upon it. One of the outlets, Elands River Poort, was
guarded by a single squadron of the 17th Lancers. Upon this the
Boers made a sudden and very fierce attack, their approach being
facilitated partly by the mist and partly by the use of khaki, a
trick which seems never to have grown too stale for successful use.
The result was that they were able to ride up to the British camp
before any preparations had been made for resistance, and to shoot
down a number of the Lancers before they could reach their horses.
So terrible was the fire that the single squadron lost thirty-four
killed and thirty-six wounded. But the regiment may console itself
for the disaster by the fact that the sorely stricken detachment
remained true to the spirited motto of the corps, and that no
prisoners appear to have been lost.
After this one sharp engagement there ensued several weeks during
which the absence of historical events, or the presence of the
military censor, caused a singular lull in the account of the
operations. With so many small commandos and so many pursuing
columns it is extraordinary that there should not have been a
constant succession of actions. That there was not must indicate a
sluggishness upon the part of the pursuers, and this sluggishness
can only be explained by the condition of their horses. Every train
of thought brings the critic back always to the great horse
question, and encourages the conclusion that there, at all seasons
of the war and in all scenes of it, is to be found the most damning
indictment against British foresight, common-sense, and power of
organisation. That the third year of the war should dawn without
the British forces having yet got the legs of the Boers, after
having penetrated every portion of their country and having the
horses of the world on which to draw, is the most amazingly
inexplicable point in the whole of this strange campaign. From the
telegram 'Infantry preferred' addressed to a nation of
rough-riders, down to the failure to secure the excellent horses on
the spot, while importing them unfit for use from the ends of the
earth, there has been nothing but one long series of blunders in
this, the most vital question of all. Even up to the end, in the
Colony the obvious lesson had not yet been learnt that it is better
to give 1000 men two horses each, and to let them reach the enemy,
than give 2000 men one horse each, with which they can never attain
their object. The chase during two years of the man with two horses
by the man with one horse, has been a sight painful to ourselves
and ludicrous to others.
In connection with this account of operations within the Colony,
there is one episode which occurred in the extreme north-west which
will not fit in with this connected narrative, but which will
justify the distraction of the reader's intelligence, for few finer
deeds of arms are recorded in the war. This was the heroic defence
of a convoy by the 14th Company of Irish Imperial Yeomanry. The
convoy was taking food to Griquatown, on the Kimberley side of the
seat of war. The town had been long invested by Conroy, and the
inhabitants were in such straits that it was highly necessary to
relieve them. To this end a convoy, two miles long, was despatched
under Major Humby of the Irish Yeomanry. The escort consisted of
seventy-five Northumberland Fusiliers, twenty-four local troops,
and 100 of the 74th Irish Yeomanry. Fifteen miles from Griquatown,
at a place called Rooikopjes, the convoy was attacked by the enemy
several hundred in number. Two companies of the Irishmen seized the
ridge, however, which commanded the wagons, and held it until they
were almost exterminated. The position was covered with bush, and
the two parties came to the closest of quarters, the Yeomen
refusing to take a backward step, though it was clear that they
were vastly outnumbered. Encouraged by the example of Madan and
Ford, their gallant young leaders, they deliberately sacrificed
their lives in order to give time for the guns to come up and for
the convoy to pass. Oliffe, Bonynge, and Maclean, who had been
children together, were shot side by side on the ridge, and
afterwards buried in one grave. Of forty-three men in action,
fourteen were killed and twenty severely wounded. Their sacrifice
was not in vain, however. The Boers were beaten back, and the
convoy, as well as Griquatown, was saved. Some thirty or forty
Boers were killed or wounded in the skirmish, and Conroy, their
leader, declared that it was the stiffest fight of his life.
In the autumn and winter of 1901 General French had steadily
pursued the system of clearing certain districts, one at a time,
and endeavouring by his blockhouses and by the arrangement of his
forces to hold in strict quarantine those sections of the country
which were still infested by the commandos. In this manner he
succeeded by the November of this year in confining the active
forces of the enemy to the extreme north-east and to the south-west
of the peninsula. It is doubtful if the whole Boer force,
three-quarters of whom were colonial rebels, amounted to more than
fifteen hundred men. When we learn that at this period of the war
they were indifferently armed, and that many of them were mounted
upon donkeys, it is impossible, after making every allowance for
the passive assistance of the farmers, and the difficulties of the
country, to believe that the pursuit was always pushed with the
spirit and vigour which was needful.
In the north-east, Myburgh, Wessels, and the truculent Fouche were
allowed almost a free hand for some months, while the roving bands
were rounded up in the midlands and driven along until they were
west of the main railroad. Here, in the Calvinia district, several
commandos united in October 1901 under Maritz, Louw, Smit, and
Theron. Their united bands rode down into the rich grain-growing
country round Piquetberg and Malmesbury, pushing south until it
seemed as if their academic supporters at Paarl were actually to
have a sight of the rebellion which they had fanned to a flame. At
one period their patrols were within forty miles of Cape Town. The
movement was checked, however, by a small force of Lancers and
district troops, and towards the end of October, Maritz, who was
chief in this quarter, turned northwards, and on the 29th captured
a small British convoy which crossed his line of march. Early in
November he doubled back and attacked Piquetberg, but was beaten
off with some loss. From that time a steady pressure from the south
and east drove these bands farther and farther into the great
barren lands of the west, until, in the following April, they had
got as far as Namaqualand, many hundred miles away.
Upon October 9th, the second anniversary of the Ultimatum, the
hands of the military were strengthened by the proclamation of Cape
Town and all the seaport towns as being in a state of martial law.
By this means a possible source of supplies and recruits for the
enemy was effectually blocked. That it had not been done two years
before is a proof of how far local political considerations can be
allowed to over-ride the essentials of Imperial policy. Meanwhile
treason courts were sitting, and sentences, increasing rapidly from
the most trivial to the most tragic, were teaching the rebel that
his danger did not end upon the field of battle. The execution of
Lotter and his lieutenants was a sign that the patience of a
long-suffering Empire had at last reached an end.
The young Boer leader, Scheepers, had long been a thorn in the side
of the British. He had infested the southern districts for some
months, and he had distinguished himself both by the activity of
his movements and by the ruthless vigour of some of his actions.
Early in October a serious illness and consequent confinement to
his bed brought him at last within the range of British mobility.
On his recovery he was tried for repeated breaches of the laws of
war, including the murder of several natives. He was condemned to
death, and was executed in December. Much sympathy was excited by
his gallantry and his youth--he was only twenty-three. On the other
hand, our word was pledged to protect the natives, and if he whose
hand had been so heavy upon them escaped, all confidence would have
been lost in our promises and our justice. That British vengeance
was not indiscriminate was shown soon afterwards in the case of a
more important commander, Kritzinger, who was the chief leader of
the Boers within Cape Colony. Kritzinger was wounded and captured
while endeavouring to cross the line near Hanover Road upon
December 15th. He was put upon his trial, and his fate turned upon
how far he was responsible for the misdeeds of some of his
subordinates. It was clearly shown that he had endeavoured to hold
them within the bounds of civilised warfare, and with
congratulations and handshakings he was acquitted by the military
court.
In the last two months of the year 1901, a new system was
introduced into the Cape Colony campaign by placing the Colonial
and district troops immediately under the command of Colonial
officers and of the Colonial Government. It had long been felt that
some devolution was necessary, and the change was justified by the
result. Without any dramatic incident, an inexorable process of
attrition, caused by continual pursuit and hardship, wore out the
commandos. Large bands had become small ones, and small ones had
vanished. Only by the union of several bodies could any enterprise
higher than the looting of a farmhouse be successfully attempted.
Such a union occurred, however, in the early days of February 1902,
when Smuts, Malan, and several other Boer leaders showed great
activity in the country round Calvinia. Their commandos seem to
have included a proportion of veteran Republicans from the north,
who were more formidable fighting material than the raw Colonial
rebels. It happened that several dangerously weak British columns
were operating within reach at that time, and it was only owing to
the really admirable conduct of the troops that a serious disaster
was averted. Two separate actions, each of them severe, were fought
on the same date, and in each case the Boers were able to bring
very superior numbers into the field.
The first of these was the fight in which Colonel Doran's column
extricated itself with severe loss from a most perilous plight. The
whole force under Doran consisted of 350 men with two guns, and
this handful was divided by an expedition which he, with 150 men,
undertook in order to search a distant farm. The remaining two
hundred men, under Captain Saunders, were left upon February 5th
with the guns and the convoy at a place called Middlepost, which
lies about fifty miles south-west of Calvinia. These men were of
the 11th, 23rd, and 24th Imperial Yeomanry, with a troop of Cape
Police. The Boer Intelligence was excellent, as might be expected
in a country which is dotted with farms. The weakened force at
Middlepost was instantly attacked by Smuts's commando. Saunders
evacuated the camp and abandoned the convoy, which was the only
thing he could do, but he concentrated all his efforts upon
preserving his guns. The night was illuminated by the blazing
wagons, and made hideous by the whoops of the drunken rebels who
caroused among the captured stores. With the first light of dawn
the small British force was fiercely assailed on all sides, but
held its own in a manner which would have done credit to any
troops. The much criticised Yeomen fought like veterans. A
considerable position had to be covered, and only a handful of men
were available at the most important points. One ridge, from which
the guns would be enfiladed, was committed to the charge of
Lieutenants Tabor and Chichester with eleven men of the 11th
Imperial Yeomanry, their instructions being 'to hold it to the
death.' The order was obeyed with the utmost heroism. After a
desperate defence the ridge was only taken by the Boers when both
officers had been killed and nine out of eleven men were on the
ground. In spite of the loss of this position the fight was still
sustained until shortly after midday, when Doran with the patrol
returned. The position was still most dangerous, the losses had
been severe, and the Boers were increasing in strength. An
immediate retreat was ordered, and the small column, after ten days
of hardship and anxiety, reached the railway line in safety. The
wounded were left to the care of Smuts, who behaved with chivalry
and humanity.
At about the same date a convoy proceeding from Beaufort West to
Fraserburg was attacked by Malan's commando. The escort, which
consisted of sixty Colonial Mounted Rifles and 100 of the West
Yorkshire militia, was overwhelmed after a good defence, in which
Major Crofton, their commander, was killed. The wagons were
destroyed, but the Boers were driven off by the arrival of Crabbe's
column, followed by those of Capper and Lund. The total losses of
the British in these two actions amounted to twenty-three killed
and sixty-five wounded.
The re-establishment of settled law and order was becoming more
marked every week in those south-western districts, which had long
been most disturbed. Colonel Crewe in this region, and Colonel
Lukin upon the other side of the line, acting entirely with
Colonial troops, were pushing back the rebels, and holding, by a
well-devised system of district defence, all that they had gained.
By the end of February there were none of the enemy south of the
Beaufort West and Clanwilliam line. These results were not obtained
without much hard marching and a little hard fighting. Small
columns under Crabbe, Capper, Wyndham, Nickall, and Lund, were
continually on the move, with little to show for it save an
ever-widening area of settled country in their rear. In a skirmish
on February 20th Judge Hugo, a well-known Boer leader, was killed,
and Vanheerden, a notorious rebel, was captured. At the end of this
month Fouche's tranquil occupation of the north-east was at last
disturbed, and he was driven out of it into the midlands, where he
took refuge with the remains of his commando in the Camdeboo
Mountains. Malan's men had already sought shelter in the same
natural fortress. Malan was wounded and taken in a skirmish near
Somerset East a few days before the general Boer surrender. Fouche
gave himself up at Cradock on June 2nd.
The last incident of this scattered, scrambling, unsatisfactory
campaign in the Cape peninsula was the raid made by Smuts, the
Transvaal leader, into the Port Nolloth district of Namaqualand,
best known for its copper mines. A small railroad has been
constructed from the coast at this point, the terminus being the
township of Ookiep. The length of the line is about seventy miles.
It is difficult to imagine what the Boers expected to gain in this
remote corner of the seat of war, unless they had conceived the
idea that they might actually obtain possession of Port Nolloth
itself, and so restore the communications with their sympathisers
and allies. At the end of March the Boer horsemen appeared suddenly
out of the desert, drove in the British outposts, and summoned
Ookiep to surrender. Colonel Shelton, who commanded the small
garrison, sent an uncompromising reply, but he was unable to
protect the railway in his rear, which was wrecked, together with
some of the blockhouses which had been erected to guard it. The
loyal population of the surrounding country had flocked into
Ookiep, and the Commandant found himself burdened with the care of
six thousand people. The enemy had succeeded in taking the small
post of Springbok, and Concordia, the mining centre, was
surrendered into their hands without resistance, giving them
welcome supplies of arms, ammunition, and dynamite. The latter was
used by the Boers in the shape of hand-bombs, and proved to be a
very efficient weapon when employed against blockhouses. Several of
the British defences were wrecked by them, with considerable loss
to the garrison; but in the course of a month's siege, in spite of
several attacks, the Boers were never able to carry the frail works
which guarded the town. Once more, at the end of the war as at the
beginning of it, there was shown the impotence of the Dutch
riflemen against a British defence. A relief column, under Colonel
Cooper, was quickly organised at Port Nolloth, and advanced along
the railway line, forcing Smuts to raise the siege in the first
week of May. Immediately afterwards came the news of the
negotiations for peace, and the Boer general presented himself at
Port Nolloth, whence he was conveyed by ship to Cape Town, and so
north again to take part in the deliberations of his
fellow-countrymen. Throughout the war he had played a manly and
honourable part. It may be hoped that with youth and remarkable
experience, both of diplomacy and of war, he may now find a long
and brilliant career awaiting him in a wider arena than that for
which he strove.
