CHAPTER 37.
THE CAMPAIGN OF JANUARY TO APRIL, 1902.
At the opening of the year 1902 it was evident to every observer
that the Boer resistance, spirited as it was, must be nearing its
close. By a long succession of captures their forces were much
reduced in numbers. They were isolated from the world, and had no
means save precarious smuggling of renewing their supplies of
ammunition. It was known also that their mobility, which had been
their great strength, was decreasing, and that in spite of their
admirable horsemastership their supply of remounts was becoming
exhausted. An increasing number of the burghers were volunteering
for service against their own people, and it was found that all
fears as to this delicate experiment were misplaced, and that in
the whole army there were no keener and more loyal soldiers.
The chief factor, however, in bringing the Boers to their knees was
the elaborate and wonderful blockhouse system, which had been
strung across the whole of the enemy's country. The original
blockhouses had been far apart, and were a hindrance and an
annoyance rather than an absolute barrier to the burghers. The new
models, however, were only six hundred yards apart, and were
connected by such impenetrable strands of wire that a Boer pithily
described it by saying that if one's hat blew over the line
anywhere between Ermelo and Standerton one had to walk round Ermelo
to fetch it. Use was made of such barriers by the Spaniards in
Cuba, but an application of them on such a scale over such an
enormous tract of country is one of the curiosities of warfare, and
will remain one of several novelties which will make the South
African campaign for ever interesting to students of military
history.
The spines of this great system were always the railway lines,
which were guarded on either side, and down which, as down a road,
went flocks, herds, pedestrians, and everything which wished to
travel in safety. From these long central cords the lines branched
out to right and left, cutting up the great country into manageable
districts. A category of them would but weary the reader, but
suffice it that by the beginning of the year the south-east of the
Transvaal and the north-east of the Orange River Colony, the haunts
of Botha and De Wet, had been so intersected that it was obvious
that the situation must soon be impossible for both of them. Only
on the west of the Transvaal was there a clear run for De la Rey
and Kemp. Hence it was expected, as actually occurred, that in this
quarter the most stirring events of the close of the campaign would
happen.
General Bruce Hamilton in the Eastern Transvaal had continued the
energetic tactics which had given such good results in the past.
With the new year his number of prisoners fell, but he had taken so
many, and had hustled the remainder to such an extent, that the
fight seemed to have gone out of the Boers in this district. On
January 1st be presented the first-fruits of the year in the shape
of twenty-two of Grobler's burghers. On the 3rd he captured
forty-nine, while Wing, co-operating with him, took twenty more.
Among these was General Erasmus, who had helped, or failed to help,
General Lucas Meyer at Talana Hill. On the 10th Colonel Wing's
column, which was part of Hamilton's force, struck out again and
took forty-two prisoners, including the two Wolmarans. Only two
days later Hamilton returned to the same spot, and was rewarded
with thirty-two more captures. On the 18th he took twenty-seven, on
the 24th twelve, and on the 26th no fewer than ninety. So severe
were these blows, and so difficult was it for the Boers to know how
to get away from an antagonist who was ready to ride thirty miles
in a night in order to fall upon their laager, that the enemy
became much scattered and too demoralised for offensive operations.
Finding that they had grown too shy in this much shot over
district, Hamilton moved farther south, and early in March took a
cast round the Vryheid district, where he made some captures,
notably General Cherry Emmett, a descendant of the famous Irish
rebel, and brother-in-law of Louis Botha. For all these repeated
successes it was to the Intelligence Department, so admirably
controlled by Colonel Wools-Sampson, that thanks are mainly due.
Whilst Bruce Hamilton was operating so successfully in the Ermelo
district, several British columns under Plumer, Spens, and Colville
were stationed some fifty miles south to prevent the fugitives from
getting away into the mountainous country which lies to the north
of Wakkerstroom. On January 3rd a small force of Plumer's New
Zealanders had a brisk skirmish with a party of Boers, whose cattle
they captured, though at some loss to themselves. These Boers were
strongly reinforced, however, and when on the following day Major
Vallentin pursued them with fifty men he found himself at
Onverwacht in the presence of several hundred of the enemy, led by
Oppermann and Christian Botha. Vallentin was killed and almost all
of his small force were hit before British reinforcements, under
Colonel Pulteney, drove the Boers off. Nineteen killed and
twenty-three wounded were our losses in this most sanguinary little
skirmish. Nine dead Boers, with Oppermann himself, were left upon
the field of battle. His loss was a serious one to the enemy, as he
was one of their most experienced Generals.
From that time until the end these columns, together with
Mackenzie's column to the north of Ermelo, continued to break up
all combinations, and to send in their share of prisoners to swell
Lord Kitchener's weekly list. A final drive, organised on April
11th against the Standerton line, resulted in 134 prisoners.
In spite of the very large army in South Africa, so many men were
absorbed by the huge lines of communications and the blockhouse
system that the number available for active operations was never
more than forty or fifty thousand men. With another fifty thousand
there is no doubt that at least six months would have been taken
from the duration of the war. On account of this shorthandedness
Lord Kitchener had to leave certain districts alone, while he
directed his attention to those which were more essential. Thus to
the north of the Delagoa Railway line there was only one town,
Lydenburg, which was occupied by the British. They had, however, an
energetic commander in Park of the Devons. This leader, striking
out from his stronghold among the mountains, and aided by Urmston
from Belfast, kept the commando of Ben Viljoen and the peripatetic
Government of Schalk Burger continually upon the move. As already
narrated, Park fought a sharp night action upon December 19th,
after which, in combination with Urmston, he occupied Dulstroom,
only missing the government by a few hours. In January Park and
Urmston were again upon the war-path, though the incessant winds,
fogs, and rains of that most inclement portion of the Transvaal
seriously hampered their operations. Several skirmishes with the
commandos of Muller and Trichardt gave no very decisive result, but
a piece of luck befell the British on January 25th in the capture
of General Viljoen by an ambuscade cleverly arranged by Major Orr
in the neighbourhood of Lydenburg. Though a great firebrand before
the war, Viljoen had fought bravely and honourably throughout the
contest, and he had won the respect and esteem of his enemy.
Colonel Park had had no great success in his last two expeditions,
but on February 20th he made an admirable march, and fell upon a
Boer laager which lay in placid security in the heart of the hills.
One hundred and sixty-four prisoners, including many Boer officers,
were the fruits of this success, in which the National Scouts, or
'tame Boers,' as they were familiarly called, played a prominent
part. This commando was that of Middelburg, which was acting as
escort to the government, who again escaped dissolution. Early in
March Park was again out on trek, upon one occasion covering
seventy miles in a single day. Nothing further of importance came
from this portion of the seat of war until March 23rd, when the
news reached England that Schalk Burger, Reitz, Lucas Meyer, and
others of the Transvaal Government had come into Middelburg, and
that they were anxious to proceed to Pretoria to treat. On the
Eastern horizon had appeared the first golden gleam of the dawning
peace.
Having indicated the course of events in the Eastern Transvaal,
north and south of the railway line, I will now treat one or two
incidents which occurred in the more central and northern portions
of the country. I will then give some account of De Wet's doings in
the Orange River Colony, and finally describe that brilliant effort
of De la Rey's in the west which shed a last glory upon the Boer
arms.
In the latter days of December, Colenbrander and Dawkins operating
together had put in a great deal of useful work in the northern
district, and from Nylstrom to Pietersburg the burghers were
continually harried by the activity of these leaders. Late in the
month Dawkins was sent down into the Orange River Colony in order
to reinforce the troops who were opposed to De Wet. Colenbrander
alone, with his hardy colonial forces, swept through the
Magaliesburg, and had the double satisfaction of capturing a number
of the enemy and of heading off and sending back a war party of
Linchwe's Kaffirs who, incensed by a cattle raid of Kemp's, were
moving down in a direction which would have brought them
dangerously near to the Dutch women and children. This instance and
several similar ones in the campaign show how vile are the lies
which have been told of the use, save under certain well-defined
conditions, of armed natives by the British during the war. It
would have been a perfectly easy thing at any time for the
Government to have raised all the fighting native races of South
Africa, but it is not probable that we, who held back our admirable
and highly disciplined Sikhs and Ghoorkas, would break our
self-imposed restrictions in order to enrol the inferior but more
savage races of Africa. Yet no charge has been more often repeated
and has caused more piteous protests among the soft-hearted and
soft-headed editors of Continental journals.
The absence of Colenbrander in the Rustenburg country gave Beyers a
chance of which he was not slow to avail himself. On January 24th,
in the early morning, he delivered an attack upon Pietersburg
itself, but he was easily driven off by the small garrison. It is
probable, however, that the attack was a mere feint in order to
enable a number of the inmates of the refugee camp to escape. About
a hundred and fifty made off, and rejoined the commandos. There
were three thousand Boers in all in this camp, which was shortly
afterwards moved down to Natal in order to avoid the recurrence of
such an incident.
Colenbrander, having returned to Pietersburg once more, determined
to return Beyers's visit, and upon April 8th he moved out with a
small force to surprise the Boer laager. The Inniskilling Fusiliers
seized the ground which commanded the enemy's position. The latter
retreated, but were followed up, and altogether about one hundred
and fifty were killed, wounded, and taken. On May 3rd a fresh
operation against Beyers was undertaken, and resulted in about the
same loss to the Boers. On the other hand, the Boers had a small
success against Kitchener's Scouts, killing eighteen and taking
thirty prisoners.
There is one incident, however, in connection with the war in this
region which one would desire to pass over in silence if such a
course were permissible. Some eighty miles to the east of
Pietersburg is a wild part of the country called the Spelonken. In
this region an irregular corps, named the Bushveld Carbineers, had
been operating. It was raised in South Africa, but contained both
Colonials and British in its ranks. Its wild duties, its mixed
composition, and its isolated situation must have all militated
against discipline and restraint, and it appears to have
degenerated into a band not unlike those Southern 'bush-whackers'
in the American war to whom the Federals showed little mercy. They
had given short shrift to the Boer prisoners who had fallen into
their hands, the excuse offered for their barbarous conduct being
that an officer who had served in the corps had himself been
murdered by the Boers. Such a reason, even if it were true, could
of course offer no justification for indiscriminate revenge. The
crimes were committed in July and August 1901, but it was not until
January 1902 that five of the officers were put upon their trial
and were found to be guilty as principals or accessories of twelve
murders. The corps was disbanded, and three of the accused
officers, Handcock, Wilton, and Morant, were sentenced to death,
while another, Picton, was cashiered. Handcock and Morant were
actually executed. This stern measure shows more clearly than
volumes of argument could do how high was the standard of
discipline in the British Army, and how heavy was the punishment,
and how vain all excuses, where it had been infringed. In the face
of this actual outrage and its prompt punishment how absurd becomes
that crusade against imaginary outrages preached by an ignorant
press abroad, and by renegade Englishmen at home.
To the south of Johannesburg, half-way between that town and the
frontier, there is a range of hills called the Zuikerboschrand,
which extends across from one railway system to the other. A number
of Boers were known to have sought refuge in this country, so upon
February 12th a small British force left Klip River Post in order
to clear them out. There were 320 men in all, composing the 28th
Mounted Infantry, drawn from the Lancashire Fusiliers, Warwicks,
and Derbys, most of whom had just arrived from Malta, which one
would certainly imagine to be the last place where mounted infantry
could be effectively trained. Major Dowell was in command. An
advance was made into the hilly country, but it was found that the
enemy was in much greater force than had been imagined. The
familiar Boer tactics were used with the customary success. The
British line was held by a sharp fire in front, while strong
flanking parties galloped round each of the wings. It was with
great difficulty that any of the British extricated themselves from
their perilous position, and the safety of a portion of the force
was only secured by the devotion of a handful of officers and men,
who gave their lives in order to gain time for their comrades to
get away. Twelve killed and fifty wounded were our losses in this
unfortunate skirmish, and about one hundred prisoners supplied the
victors with a useful addition to their rifles and ammunition. A
stronger British force came up next day, and the enemy were driven
out of the hills.
A week later, upon February 18th, there occurred another skirmish
at Klippan, near Springs, between a squadron of the Scots Greys and
a party of Boers who had broken into this central reserve which
Lord Kitchener had long kept clear of the enemy. In this action the
cavalry were treated as roughly as the mounted infantry had been
the week before, losing three officers killed, eight men killed or
wounded, and forty-six taken. They had formed a flanking party to
General Gilbert Hamilton's column, but were attacked and
overwhelmed so rapidly that the blow had fallen before their
comrades could come to their assistance.
One of the consequences of the successful drives about to be
described in the Orange River Colony was that a number of the Free
Staters came north of the Vaal in order to get away from the
extreme pressure upon the south. At the end of March a considerable
number had reinforced the local commandos in that district to the
east of Springs, no very great distance from Johannesburg, which
had always been a storm centre. A cavalry force was stationed at
this spot which consisted at that time of the 2nd Queen's Bays, the
7th Hussars, and some National Scouts, all under Colonel Lawley of
the Hussars. After a series of minor engagements east of Springs,
Lawley had possessed himself of Boschman's Kop, eighteen miles from
that town, close to the district which was the chief scene of Boer
activity. From this base he despatched upon the morning of April
1st three squadrons of the Bays under Colonel Fanshawe, for the
purpose of surprising a small force of the enemy which was reported
at one of the farms. Fanshawe's strength was about three hundred
men.
The British cavalry found themselves, however, in the position of
the hunter who, when he is out for a snipe, puts up a tiger. All
went well with the expedition as far as Holspruit, the farm which
they had started to search. Commandant Pretorius, to whom it
belonged, was taken by the energy of Major Vaughan, who pursued and
overtook his Cape cart. It was found, however, that Alberts's
commando was camped at the farm, and that the Bays were in the
presence of a very superior force of the enemy. The night was dark,
and when firing began it was almost muzzle to muzzle, with the
greatest possible difficulty in telling friend from foe. The three
squadrons fell back upon some rising ground, keeping admirable
order under most difficult circumstances. In spite of the darkness
the attack was pressed fiercely home, and with their favourite
tactics the burghers rapidly outflanked the position taken up by
the cavalry. The British moved by alternate squadrons on to a
higher rocky kopje on the east, which could be vaguely
distinguished looming in the darkness against the skyline. B
squadron, the last to retire, was actually charged and ridden
through by the brave assailants, firing from their saddles as they
broke through the ranks. The British had hardly time to reach the
kopje and to dismount and line its edge when the Boers, yelling
loudly, charged with their horses up the steep flanks. Twice they
were beaten back, but the third time they seized one corner of the
hill and opened a hot fire upon the rear of the line of men who
were defending the other side. Dawn was now breaking, and the
situation most serious, for the Boers were in very superior numbers
and were pushing their pursuit with the utmost vigour and
determination. A small party of officers and men whose horses had
been shot covered the retreat of their comrades, and continued to
fire until all of them, two officers and twenty-three men, were
killed or wounded, the whole of their desperate defence being
conducted within from thirty to fifty yards of the enemy. The
remainder of the regiment was now retired to successive ridges,
each of which was rapidly outflanked by the Boers, whose whole
method of conducting their attack was extraordinarily skilful.
Nothing but the excellent discipline of the overmatched troopers
prevented the retreat from becoming a rout. Fortunately, before the
pressure became intolerable the 7th Hussars with some artillery
came to the rescue, and turned the tide. The Hussars galloped in
with such dash that some of them actually got among the Boers with
their swords, but the enemy rapidly fell back and disappeared.
In this very sharp and sanguinary cavalry skirmish the Bays lost
eighty killed and wounded out of a total force of 270. To stand
such losses under such circumstances, and to preserve absolute
discipline and order, is a fine test of soldierly virtue. The
adjutant, the squadron leaders, and six out of ten officers were
killed or wounded. The Boers lost equally heavily. Two Prinsloos,
one of them a commandant, and three field-cornets were among the
slain, with seventy other casualties. The force under General
Alberts was a considerable one, not fewer than six hundred rifles,
so that the action at Holspruit is one which adds another name of
honour to the battle-roll of the Bays. It is pleasing to add that
in this and the other actions which were fought at the end of the
war our wounded met with kindness and consideration from the enemy.
We may now descend to the Orange River Colony and trace the course
of those operations which were destined to break the power of De
Wet's commando. On these we may concentrate our attention, for the
marchings and gleanings and snipings of the numerous small columns
in the other portions of the colony, although they involved much
arduous and useful work, do not claim a particular account.
After the heavy blow which he dealt Firmin's Yeomanry, De Wet
retired, as has been told, into the Langberg, whence he afterwards
retreated towards Reitz. There he was energetically pushed by
Elliot's columns, which had attained such mobility that 150 miles
were performed in three days within a single week. Our rough
schoolmasters had taught us our lesson, and the soldiering which
accomplished the marches of Bruce Hamilton, Elliot, Rimington, and
the other leaders of the end of the war was very far removed from
that which is associated with ox-wagons and harmoniums.
Moving rapidly, and covering himself by a succession of rearguard
skirmishes, De Wet danced like a will-o'the-wisp in front of and
round the British columns. De Lisle, Fanshawe, Byng, Rimington,
Dawkins, and Rawlinson were all snatching at him and finding him
just beyond their finger-tips. The master-mind at Pretoria had,
however, thought out a scheme which was worthy of De Wet himself in
its ingenuity. A glance at the map will show that the little branch
from Heilbron to Wolvehoek forms an acute angle with the main line.
Both these railways were strongly blockhoused and barbed-wired, so
that any force which was driven into the angle, and held in it by a
force behind it, would be in a perilous position. To attempt to
round De Wet's mobile burghers into this obvious pen would have
been to show one's hand too clearly. In vain is the net laid in
sight of the bird. The drive was therefore made away from this
point, with the confident expectation that the guerilla chief would
break back through the columns, and that they might then pivot
round upon him and hustle him so rapidly into the desired position
that he would not realise his danger until it was too late. Byng's
column was left behind the driving line to be ready for the
expected backward break. All came off exactly as expected. De Wet
doubled back through the columns, and one of his commandos stumbled
upon Byng's men, who were waiting on the Vlei River to the west of
Reitz. The Boers seem to have taken it for granted that, having
passed the British driving line, they were out of danger, and for
once it was they who were surprised. The South African Light Horse,
the New Zealanders, and the Queensland Bushmen all rode in upon
them. A fifteen-pounder, the one taken at Tweefontein, and two
pom-poms were captured, with thirty prisoners and a considerable
quantity of stores.
This successful skirmish was a small matter, however, compared to
the importance of being in close touch with De Wet and having a
definite objective for the drive. The columns behind expanded
suddenly into a spray of mounted men forming a continuous line for
over sixty miles. On February 5th the line was advancing, and on
the 6th it was known that De Wet was actually within the angle, the
mouth of which was spanned by the British line. Hope ran high in
Pretoria. The space into which the burgher chief had been driven
was bounded by sixty-six miles of blockhouse and wire on one side
and thirty on the other, while the third side of the triangle was
crossed by fifty-five miles of British horsemen, flanked by a
blockhouse line between Kroonstad and Lindley. The tension along
the lines of defence was extreme. Infantry guarded every yard of
them, and armoured trains patrolled them, while at night
searchlights at regular intervals shed their vivid rays over the
black expanse of the veld and illuminated the mounted figures who
flitted from time to time across their narrow belts of light.
On the 6th De Wet realised his position, and with characteristic
audacity and promptness he took means to clear the formidable toils
which had been woven round him. The greater part of his command
scattered, with orders to make their way as best they might out of
the danger. Working in their own country, where every crease and
fold of the ground was familiar to them, it is not surprising that
most of them managed to make their way through gaps in the
attenuated line of horsemen behind them. A few were killed, and a
considerable number taken, 270 being the respectable total of the
prisoners. Three or four slipped through, however, for every one
who stuck in the meshes. De Wet himself was reported to have made
his escape by driving cattle against the wire fences which enclosed
him. It seems, however, to have been nothing more romantic than a
wire-cutter which cleared his path, though cattle no doubt made
their way through the gap which he left. With a loss of only three
of his immediate followers be Wet won his way out of the most
dangerous position which even his adventurous career had ever
known. Lord Kitchener had descended to Wolvehoek to be present at
the climax of the operations, but it was not fated that he was to
receive the submission of the most energetic of his opponents, and
he returned to Pretoria to weave a fresh mesh around him.
This was not hard to do, as the Boer General had simply escaped
from one pen into another, though a larger one. After a short rest
to restore the columns, the whole pack were full cry upon his heels
once more. An acute angle is formed by the Wilge River on one side
and the line of blockhouses between Harrismith and Van Reenen upon
the other. This was strongly manned by troops and five columns;
those of Rawlinson, Nixon, Byng, Rimington, and Keir herded the
broken commandos into the trap. From February 20th the troops swept
in an enormous skirmish line across the country, ascending hills,
exploring kloofs, searching river banks, and always keeping the
enemy in front of them. At last, when the pressure was severely
felt, there came the usual breakback, which took the form of a most
determined night attack upon the British line. This was delivered
shortly after midnight on February 23rd. It struck the British
cordon at the point of juncture between Byng's column and that of
Rimington. So huge were the distances which had to be covered, and
so attenuated was the force which covered them, that the historical
thin red line was a massive formation compared to its khaki
equivalent. The chain was frail and the links were not all
carefully joined, but each particular link was good metal, and the
Boer impact came upon one of the best. This was the 7th New Zealand
Contingent, who proved themselves to be worthy comrades to their
six gallant predecessors. Their patrols were broken by the rush of
wild, yelling, firing horsemen, but the troopers made a most
gallant resistance. Having pierced the line the Boers, who were led
in their fiery rush by Manie Botha, turned to their flank, and,
charging down the line of weak patrols, overwhelmed one after
another and threatened to roll up the whole line. They had cleared
a gap of half a mile, and it seemed as if the whole Boer force
would certainly escape through so long a gap in the defences. The
desperate defence of the New Zealanders gave time, however, for the
further patrols, which consisted of Cox's New South Wales Mounted
Infantry, to fall back almost at right angles so as to present a
fresh face to the attack. The pivot of the resistance was a maxim
gun, most gallantly handled by Captain Begbie and his men. The
fight at this point was almost muzzle to muzzle, fifty or sixty New
Zealanders and Australians with the British gunners holding off a
force of several hundred of the best fighting men of the Boer
forces. In this desperate duel many dropped on both sides. Begbie
died beside his gun, which fired eighty rounds before it jammed. It
was run back by its crew in order to save it from capture. But
reinforcements were coming up, and the Boer attack was beaten back.
A number of them had escaped, however, through the opening which
they had cleared, and it was conjectured that the wonderful De Wet
was among them. How fierce was the storm which had broken on the
New Zealanders may be shown by their roll of twenty killed and
forty wounded, while thirty dead Boers were picked up in front of
their picket line. Of eight New Zealand officers seven are reported
to have been hit, an even higher proportion than that which the
same gallant race endured at the battle of Rhenoster Kop more than
a year before.
It was feared at first that the greater part of the Boers might
have escaped upon this night of the 23rd, when Manie Botha's
storming party burst through the ranks of the New Zealanders. It
was soon discovered that this was not so, and the columns as they
closed in had evidence from the numerous horsemen who scampered
aimlessly over the hills in front of them that the main body of the
enemy was still in the toils. The advance was in tempestuous
weather and over rugged country, but the men were filled with
eagerness, and no precaution was neglected to keep the line intact.
This time their efforts were crowned with considerable success. A
second attempt was made by the corraled burghers to break out on
the night of February 26th, but it was easily repulsed by Nixon.
The task of the troopers as the cordon drew south was more and more
difficult, and there were places traversed upon the Natal border
where an alpen stock would have been a more useful adjunct than a
horse. At six o'clock on the morning of the 27th came the end. Two
Boers appeared in front of the advancing line of the Imperial Light
Horse and held up a flag. They proved to be Truter and De Jager,
ready to make terms for their commando. The only terms offered were
absolute surrender within the hour. The Boers had been swept into a
very confined space, which was closely hemmed in by troops, so that
any resistance must have ended in a tragedy. Fortunately there was
no reason for desperate councils in their case, since they did not
fight as Lotter had done, with the shadow of judgment hanging over
him. The burghers piled arms, and all was over.
The total number captured in this important drive was 780 men,
including several leaders, one of whom was De Wet's own son. It was
found that De Wet himself had been among those who had got away
through the picket lines on the night of the 23rd. Most of the
commando were Transvaalers, and it was typical of the wide sweep of
the net that many of them were the men who had been engaged against
the 28th Mounted Infantry in the district south of Johannesburg
upon the 12th of the same month. The loss of 2000 horses and 50,000
cartridges meant as much as that of the men to the Boer army. It
was evident that a few more such blows would clear the Orange River
Colony altogether.
The wearied troopers were allowed little rest, for in a couple of
days after their rendezvous at Harrismith they were sweeping back
again to pick up all that they had missed. This drive, which was
over the same ground, but sweeping backwards towards the Heilbron
to Wolvehoek line, ended in the total capture of 147 of the enemy,
who were picked out of holes, retrieved from amid the reeds of the
river, called down out of trees, or otherwise collected. So
thorough were the operations that it is recorded that the angle
which formed the apex of the drive was one drove of game upon the
last day, all the many types of antelope, which form one of the
characteristics and charms of the country, having been herded into
it.
More important even than the results of the drive was the discovery
of one of De Wet's arsenals in a cave in the Vrede district.
Half-way down a precipitous krantz, with its mouth covered by
creepers, no writer of romance could have imagined a more fitting
headquarters for a guerilla chief. The find was made by Ross's
Canadian Scouts, who celebrated Dominion Day by this most useful
achievement. Forty wagon-loads of ammunition and supplies were
taken out of the cave. De Wet was known to have left the north-east
district, and to have got across the railway, travelling towards
the Vaal as if it were his intention to join De la Rey in the
Transvaal. The Boer resistance had suddenly become exceedingly
energetic in that part, and several important actions had been
fought, to which we will presently turn.
Before doing so it would be as well to bring the chronicle of
events in the Orange River Colony down to the conclusion of peace.
There were still a great number of wandering Boers in the northern
districts and in the frontier mountains, who were assiduously, but
not always successfully, hunted down by the British troops. Much
arduous and useful work was done by several small columns, the
Colonial Horse and the Artillery Mounted Rifles especially
distinguishing themselves. The latter corps, formed from the
gunners whose field-pieces were no longer needed, proved themselves
to be a most useful body of men; and the British gunner, when he
took to carrying his gun, vindicated the reputation which he had
won when his gun had carried him.
From the 1st to the 4th of May a successful drive was conducted by
many columns in the often harried but never deserted Lindley to
Kroonstad district. The result was propitious, as no fewer than 321
prisoners were brought in. Of these, 150 under Mentz were captured
in one body as they attempted to break through the encircling
cordon.
Amid many small drives and many skirmishes, one stands out for its
severity. It is remarkable as being the last action of any
importance in the campaign. This was the fight at Moolman's Spruit,
near Ficksburg, upon April 20th, 1902. A force of about one hundred
Yeomanry and forty Mounted Infantry (South Staffords) was
despatched by night to attack an isolated farm in which a small
body of Boers was supposed to be sleeping. Colonel Perceval was in
command. The farm was reached after a difficult march, but the
enemy were found to have been forewarned, and to be in much greater
strength than was anticipated. A furious fire was opened on the
advancing troops, who were clearly visible in the light of a full
moon. Sir Thomas Fowler was killed and several men of the Yeomanry
were hit. The British charged up to the very walls, but were unable
to effect an entrance, as the place was barricaded and loopholed.
Captain Blackwood, of the Staffords, was killed in the attack.
Finding that the place was impregnable, and that the enemy
outnumbered him, Colonel Perceval gave the order to retire, a
movement which was only successfully carried out because the
greater part of the Boer horses had been shot. By morning the small
British force had extricated itself, from its perilous position
with a total loss of six killed, nineteen wounded, and six missing.
The whole affair was undoubtedly a cleverly planned Boer ambush,
and the small force was most fortunate in escaping destruction.
One other isolated incident may be mentioned here, though it
occurred far away in the Vryheid district of the Transvaal. This
was the unfortunate encounter between Zulus and Boers by which the
latter lost over fifty of their numbers under deplorable
circumstances. This portion of the Transvaal has only recently been
annexed, and is inhabited by warlike Zulus, who are very different
from the debased Kaffirs of the rest of the country. These men had
a blood-feud against the Boers, which was embittered by the fact
that they had lost heavily through Boer depredations. Knowing that
a party of fifty-nine men were sleeping in a farmhouse, the Zulus
crept on to it and slaughtered every man of the inmates. Such an
incident is much to be regretted, and yet, looking back upon the
long course of the war, and remembering the turbulent tribes who
surrounded the combatants--Swazis, Basutos, and Zulus--we may well
congratulate ourselves that we have been able to restrain those
black warriors, and to escape the brutalities and the bitter
memories of a barbarian invasion.
