CHAPTER 38.
DE LA REY'S CAMPAIGN OF 1902.
IT will be remembered that at the close of 1901 Lord Methuen and
Colonel Kekewich had both come across to the eastern side of their
district and made their base at the railway line in the Klerksdorp
section. Their position was strengthened by the fact that a
blockhouse cordon now ran from Klerksdorp to Ventersdorp, and from
Ventersdorp to Potchefstroom, so that this triangle could be
effectively controlled. There remained, however, a huge tract of
difficult country which was practically in the occupation of the
enemy. Several thousand stalwarts were known to be riding with De
la Rey and his energetic lieutenant Kemp. The strenuous operations
of the British in the Eastern Transvaal and in the Orange River
Colony had caused this district to be comparatively neglected, and
so everything was in favour of an aggressive movement of the Boers.
There was a long lull after the unsuccessful attack upon Kekewich's
camp at Moedwill, but close observers of the war distrusted this
ominous calm and expected a storm to follow.
The new year found the British connecting Ventersdorp with Tafelkop
by a blockhouse line. The latter place had been a centre of Boer
activity. Colonel Hickie's column covered this operation. Meanwhile
Methuen had struck across through Wolmaranstad as far as Vryburg.
In these operations, which resulted in constant small captures, he
was assisted by a column under Major Paris working from Kimberley.
From Vryburg Lord Methuen made his way in the middle of January to
Lichtenburg, meeting with a small rebuff in the neighbourhood of
that town, for a detachment of Yeomanry was overwhelmed by General
Celliers, who killed eight, wounded fifteen, and captured forty.
From Lichtenburg Lord Methuen continued his enormous trek, and
arrived on February 1st at Klerksdorp once more. Little rest was
given to his hard-worked troops, and they were sent off again
within the week under the command of Von Donop, with the result
that on February 8th, near Wolmaranstad, they captured Potgieter's
laager with forty Boer prisoners. Von Donop remained at
Wolmaranstad until late in February; On the 23rd he despatched an
empty convoy back to Klerksdorp, the fate of which will be
afterwards narrated.
Kekewich and Hickie had combined their forces at the beginning of
February. On February 4th an attempt was made by them to surprise
General De la Rey. The mounted troops who were despatched under
Major Leader failed in this enterprise, but they found and
overwhelmed the laager of Sarel Alberts, capturing 132 prisoners.
By stampeding the horses the Boer retreat was cut off, and the
attack was so furiously driven home, especially by the admirable
Scottish Horse, that few of the enemy got away. Alberts himself
with all his officers were among the prisoners. From this time
until the end of February this column was not seriously engaged.
It has been stated above that on February 23rd Von Donop sent in an
empty convoy from Wolmaranstad to Klerksdorp, a distance of about
fifty miles. Nothing had been heard for some time of De la Rey, but
he had called together his men and was waiting to bring off some
coup. The convoy gave him the very opportunity for which he sought.
The escort of the convoy consisted of the 5th Imperial Yeomanry,
sixty of Paget's Horse, three companies of the ubiquitous
Northumberland Fusiliers, two guns of the 4th R.F.A., and a
pom-pom, amounting in all to 630 men. Colonel Anderson was in
command. On the morning of Tuesday, February 25th, the convoy was
within ten miles of its destination, and the sentries on the kopjes
round the town could see the gleam of the long line of white-tilted
wagons. Their hazardous voyage was nearly over, and yet they were
destined to most complete and fatal wreck within sight of port. So
confident were they that the detachment of Paget's Horse was
permitted to ride on the night before into the town. It was as
well, for such a handful would have shared and could not have
averted the disaster.
The night had been dark and wet, and the Boers under cover of it
had crept between the sleeping convoy and the town. Some bushes
which afford excellent cover lie within a few hundred yards of the
road, and here the main ambush was laid. In the first grey of the
morning the long line of the convoy, 130 wagons in all, came
trailing past--guns and Yeomanry in front, Fusiliers upon the
flanks and rear. Suddenly the black bank of scrub was outlined in
flame, and a furious rifle fire was opened upon the head of the
column. The troops behaved admirably under most difficult
circumstances. A counter-attack by the Fusiliers and some of the
Yeomanry, under cover of shrapnel from the guns, drove the enemy
out of the scrub and silenced his fire at this point. It was
evident, however, that he was present in force, for firing soon
broke out along the whole left flank, and the rearguard found
itself as warmly attacked as the van. Again, however, the
assailants were driven off. It was now broad daylight, and the
wagons, which had got into great confusion in the first turmoil of
battle, had been remarshalled and arranged. It was Colonel
Anderson's hope that he might be able to send them on into safety
while he with the escort covered their retreat. His plan was
certainly the best one, and if it did not succeed it was due to
nothing which he could avert, but to the nature of the ground and
the gallantry of the enemy.
The physical obstacle consisted in a very deep and difficult
spruit, the Jagd Spruit, which forms an ugly passage in times of
peace, but which when crowded and choked with stampeding mules and
splintering wagons, under their terrified conductors, soon became
impassable. Here the head of the column was clubbed and the whole
line came to a stand. Meanwhile the enemy, adopting their new
tactics, came galloping in on the left flank and on the rear. The
first attack was repelled by the steady fire of the Fusiliers, but
on the second occasion the horsemen got up to the wagons, and
galloping down them were able to overwhelm in detail the little
knots of soldiers who were scattered along the flank. The British,
who were outnumbered by at least three to one, made a stout
resistance, and it was not until seven o'clock that the last shot
was fired. The result was a complete success to the burghers, but
one which leaves no shadow of discredit on any officer or man among
those who were engaged. Eleven officers and 176 men fell out of
about 550 actually engaged. The two guns were taken. The convoy was
no use to the Boers, so the teams were shot and the wagons burned
before they withdrew. The prisoners too, they were unable to
retain, and their sole permanent trophies consisted of the two
guns, the rifles, and the ammunition. Their own losses amounted to
about fifty killed and wounded.
A small force sallied out from Klerksdorp in the hope of helping
Anderson, but on reaching the Jagd Drift it was found that the
fighting was over and that the field was in possession of the
Boers. De la Rey was seen in person among the burghers, and it is
pleasant to add that he made himself conspicuous by his humanity to
the wounded. His force drew off in the course of the morning, and
was soon out of reach of immediate pursuit, though this was
attempted by Kekewich, Von Donop, and Grenfell. It was important to
regain the guns if possible, as they were always a menace to the
blockhouse system, and for this purpose Grenfell with sixteen
hundred horsemen was despatched to a point south of Lichtenburg,
which was conjectured to be upon the Boer line of retreat. At the
same time Lord Methuen was ordered up from Vryburg in order to
cooperate in this movement, and to join his forces to those of
Grenfell. It was obvious that with an energetic and resolute
adversary like De la Rey there was great danger of these two forces
being taken in detail, but it was hoped that each was strong enough
to hold its own until the other could come to its aid. The result
was to show that the danger was real and the hope fallacious.
It was on March 2nd that Methuen left Vryburg. The column was not
his old one, consisting of veterans of the trek, but was the
Kimberley column under Major Paris, a body of men who had seen much
less service and were in every way less reliable. It included a
curious mixture of units, the most solid of which were four guns
(two of the 4th, and two of the 38th R.F.A.), 200 Northumberland
Fusiliers, and 100 Loyal North Lancashires. The mounted men
included 5th Imperial Yeomanry (184), Cape Police (233), Cullinan's
Horse (64), 86th Imperial Yeomanry (110), Diamond Fields Horse
(92), Dennison' s Scouts (58), Ashburner's Horse (126), and British
South African Police (24). Such a collection of samples would be
more in place, one would imagine, in a London procession than in an
operation which called for discipline and cohesion. In warfare the
half is often greater than the whole, and the presence of a
proportion of halfhearted and inexperienced men may be a positive
danger to their more capable companions.
Upon March 6th Methuen, marching east towards Lichtenburg, came in
touch near Leeuwspruit with Van Zyl's commando, and learned in the
small skirmish which ensued that some of his Yeomanry were
unreliable and ill-instructed. Having driven the enemy off by his
artillery fire, Methuen moved to Tweebosch, where he laagered until
next morning. At 3 A.M. of the 7th the ox-convoy was sent on, under
escort of half of his little force. The other half followed at 4.
20, so as to give the slow-moving oxen a chance of keeping ahead.
It was evident, however, immediately after the column had got
started that the enemy were all round in great numbers, and that an
attack in force was to be expected. Lord Methuen gave orders
therefore that the ox-wagons should be halted and that the
mule-transport should close upon them so as to form one solid
block, instead of a straggling line. At the same time he reinforced
his rearguard with mounted men and with two guns, for it was in
that quarter that the enemy appeared to be most numerous and
aggressive. An attack was also developing upon the right flank,
which was held off by the infantry and by the second section of the
guns.
It has been said that Methuen's horsemen were for the most part
inexperienced irregulars. Such men become in time excellent
soldiers, as all this campaign bears witness, but it is too much to
expose them to a severe ordeal in the open field when they are
still raw and untrained. As it happened, this particular ordeal was
exceedingly severe, but nothing can excuse the absolute failure of
the troops concerned to rise to the occasion. Had Methuen's
rearguard consisted of Imperial Light Horse, or Scottish Horse, it
is safe to say that the battle of Tweebosch would have had a very
different ending.
What happened was that a large body of Boers formed up in five
lines and charged straight home at the rear screen and rearguard,
firing from their saddles as they had done at Brakenlaagte. The
sight of those wide-flung lines of determined men galloping over
the plain seems to have been too much for the nerves of the
unseasoned troopers. A panic spread through their ranks, and in an
instant they had turned their horses' heads and were thundering to
their rear, leaving the two guns uncovered and streaming in wild
confusion past the left flank of the jeering infantry who were
lying round the wagons. The limit of their flight seems to have
been the wind of their horses, and most of them never drew rein
until they had placed many miles between themselves and the
comrades whom they had deserted. 'It was pitiable,' says an
eye-witness, 'to see the grand old General begging them to stop,
but they would not; a large body of them arrived in Kraaipan
without firing a shot,' It was a South African 'Battle of the
Spurs.'
By this defection of the greater portion of the force the handful
of brave men who remained were left in a hopeless position. The two
guns of the 38th battery were overwhelmed and ridden over by the
Boer horsemen, every man being killed or wounded, including
Lieutenant Nesham, who acted up to the highest traditions of his
corps.
The battle, however, was not yet over. The infantry were few in
number, but they were experienced troops, and they maintained the
struggle for some hours in the face of overwhelming numbers. Two
hundred of the Northumberland Fusiliers lay round the wagons and
held the Boers off from their prey. With them were the two
remaining guns, which were a mark for a thousand Boer riflemen. It
was while encouraging by his presence and example the much-tried
gunners of this section that the gallant Methuen was wounded by a
bullet which broke the bone of his thigh. Lieutenant Venning and
all the detachment fell with their General round the guns.
An attempt had been made to rally some of the flying troopers at a
neighbouring kraal, and a small body of Cape Police and Yeomanry
under the command of Major Paris held out there for some hours. A
hundred of the Lancashire Infantry aided them in their stout
defence. But the guns taken by the Boers from Von Donop's convoy
had free play now that the British guns were out of action, and
they were brought to bear with crushing effect upon both the kraal
and the wagons. Further resistance meant a useless slaughter, and
orders were given for a surrender. Convoy, ammunition, guns,
horses--nothing was saved except the honour of the infantry and the
gunners. The losses, 68 killed and 121 wounded, fell chiefly upon
these two branches of the service. There were 205 unwounded
prisoners.
This, the last Boer victory in the war, reflected equal credit upon
their valour and humanity, qualities which had not always gone hand
in hand in our experience of them. Courtesy and attention were
extended to the British wounded, and Lord Methuen was sent under
charge of his chief medical officer, Colonel Townsend (the doctor
as severely wounded as the patient), into Klerksdorp. In De la Rey
we have always found an opponent who was as chivalrous as he was
formidable. The remainder of the force reached the Kimberley to
Mafeking railway line in the direction of Kraaipan, the spot where
the first bloodshed of the war had occurred some twenty-nine months
before.
On Lord Methuen himself no blame can rest for this unsuccessful
action. If the workman's tool snaps in his hand he cannot be held
responsible for the failure of his task. The troops who misbehaved
were none of his training. 'If you hear anyone slang him,' says one
of his men, 'you are to tell them that he is the finest General and
the truest gentleman that ever fought in this war.' Such was the
tone of his own troopers, and such also that of the spokesmen of
the nation when they commented upon the disaster in the Houses of
Parliament. It was a fine example of British justice and sense of
fair play, even in that bitter moment, that to hear his eulogy one
would have thought that the occasion had been one when thanks were
being returned for a victory. It is a generous public with fine
instincts, and Paul Methuen, wounded and broken, still remained in
their eyes the heroic soldier and the chivalrous man of honour.
The De Wet country had been pretty well cleared by the series of
drives which have already been described, and Louis Botha's force
in the Eastern Transvaal had been much diminished by the tactics of
Bruce Hamilton and Wools-Sampson. Lord Kitchener was able,
therefore, to concentrate his troops and his attention upon that
wide-spread western area in which General De la Rey had dealt two
such shrewd blows within a few weeks of each other. Troops were
rapidly concentrated at Klerksdorp. Kekewich, Walter Kitchener,
Rawlinson, and Rochfort, with a number of small columns, were ready
in the third week of March to endeavour to avenge Lord Methuen.
The problem with which Lord Kitchener was confronted was a very
difficult one, and he has never shown more originality and audacity
than in the fashion in which he handled it. De la Rey's force was
scattered over a long tract of country, capable of rapidly
concentrating for a blow, but otherwise as intangible and elusive
as a phantom army. Were Lord Kitchener simply to launch ten
thousand horsemen at him, the result would be a weary ride over
illimitable plains without sight of a Boer, unless it were a
distant scout upon the extreme horizon. De la Rey and his men would
have slipped away to his northern hiding-places beyond the Marico
River. There was no solid obstacle here, as in the Orange River
Colony, against which the flying enemy could be rounded up. One
line of blockhouses there was, it is true--the one called the
Schoonspruit cordon, which flanked the De la Rey country. It
flanked it, however, upon the same side as that on which the troops
were assembled. If the troops were only on the other side, and De
la Rey was between them and the blockhouse line, then, indeed,
something might be done. But to place the troops there, and then
bring them instantly back again, was to put such a strain upon men
and horses as had never yet been done upon a large scale in the
course of the war. Yet Lord Kitchener knew the mettle of the men
whom he commanded, and he was aware that there were no exertions of
which the human frame is capable which he might not confidently
demand.
The precise location of the Boer laagers does not appear to have
been known, but it was certain that a considerable number of them
were scattered about thirty miles or so to the west of Klerksdorp
and the Schoonspruit line. The plan was to march a British force
right through them, then spread out into a wide line and come
straight back, driving the burghers on to the cordon of
blockhouses, which had been strengthened by the arrival of three
regiments of Highlanders. But to get to the other side of the Boers
it was necessary to march the columns through by night. It was a
hazardous operation, but the secret was well kept, and the movement
was so well carried out that the enemy had no time to check it. On
the night of Sunday, March 23rd, the British horsemen passed
stealthily in column through the De la Rey country, and then,
spreading out into a line, which from the left wing at Lichtenburg
to the right wing at Commando Drift measured a good eighty miles,
they proceeded to sweep back upon their traces. In order to reach
their positions the columns had, of course, started at different
points of the British blockhouse line, and some had a good deal
farther to go than others, while the southern extension of the line
was formed by Rochfort's troops, who had moved up from the Vaal.
Above him from south to north came Walter Kitchener, Rawlinson, and
Kekewich in the order named.
On the morning of Monday, March 24th, a line of eighty miles of
horsemen, without guns or transport, was sweeping back towards the
blockhouses, while the country between was filled with scattered
parties of Boers who were seeking for gaps by which to escape. It
was soon learned from the first prisoners that De la Rey was not
within the cordon. His laager had been some distance farther west.
But the sight of fugitive horsemen rising and dipping over the
rolling veld assured the British that they had something within
their net. The catch was, however, by no means as complete as might
have been desired. Three hundred men in khaki slipped through
between the two columns in the early morning. Another large party
escaped to the southwards. Some of the Boers adopted extraordinary
devices in order to escape from the ever-narrowing cordon. 'Three,
in charge of some cattle, buried themselves, and left a small hole
to breathe through with a tube. Some men began to probe with
bayonets in the new-turned earth and got immediate and vociferous
subterranean yells. Another man tried the same game and a horse
stepped on him. He writhed and reared the horse, and practically
the horse found the prisoner for us.' But the operations achieved
one result, which must have lifted a load of anxiety from Lord
Kitchener's mind. Three fifteen-pounders, two pom-poms, and a large
amount of ammunition were taken. To Kekewich and the Scottish Horse
fell the honour of the capture, Colonel Wools-Sampson and Captain
Rice heading the charge and pursuit. By this means the constant
menace to the blockhouses was lessened, if not entirely removed.
One hundred and seventy-five Boers were disposed of, nearly all as
prisoners, and a considerable quantity of transport was captured.
In this operation the troops had averaged from seventy to eighty
miles in twenty-six hours without change of horses. To such a point
had the slow-moving ponderous British Army attained after two
years' training of that stern drill-master, necessity.
The operations had attained some success, but nothing commensurate
with the daring of the plan or the exertions of the soldiers.
Without an instant's delay, however, Lord Kitchener struck a second
blow at his enemy. Before the end of March Kekewich, Rawlinson, and
Walter Kitchener were all upon the trek once more. Their operations
were pushed farther to the west than in the last drive, since it
was known that on that occasion De la Rey and his main commando had
been outside the cordon.
It was to one of Walter Kitchener's lieutenants that the honour
fell to come in direct contact with the main force of the burghers.
This General had moved out to a point about forty miles west of
Klerksdorp. Forming his laager there, he despatched Cookson on
March 30th with seventeen hundred men to work further westward in
the direction of the Harts River. Under Cookson's immediate command
were the 2nd Canadian Mounted Infantry, Damant's Horse, and four
guns of the 7th R.F.A. His lieutenant, Keir, commanded the 28th
Mounted Infantry, the Artillery Mounted Rifles, and 2nd Kitchener's
Fighting Scouts. The force was well mounted, and carried the
minimum of baggage.
It was not long before this mobile force found itself within touch
of the enemy. The broad weal made by the passing of a convoy set
them off at full cry, and they were soon encouraged by the distant
cloud of dust which shrouded the Boer wagons. The advance guard of
the column galloped at the top of their speed for eight miles, and
closed in upon the convoy, but found themselves faced by an escort
of five hundred Boers, who fought a clever rearguard action, and
covered their charge with great skill. At the same time Cookson
closed in upon his mounted infantry, while on the other side De la
Rey's main force fell back in order to reinforce the escort.
British and Boers were both riding furiously to help their own
comrades. The two forces were fairly face to face.
Perceiving that he was in front of the whole Boer army, and knowing
that he might expect reinforcements, Cookson decided to act upon
the defensive. A position was rapidly taken up along the
Brakspruit, and preparations made to resist the impending attack.
The line of defence was roughly the line of the spruit, but for
some reason, probably to establish a cross fire, one advanced
position was occupied upon either flank. On the left flank was a
farmhouse, which was held by two hundred men of the Artillery
Rifles. On the extreme right was another outpost of twenty-four
Canadians and forty-five Mounted Infantry. They occupied no
defensible position, and their situation was evidently a most
dangerous one, only to be justified by some strong military reason
which is not explained by any account of the action.
The Boer guns had opened fire, and considerable bodies of the enemy
appeared upon the flanks and in front. Their first efforts were
devoted towards getting possession of the farmhouse, which would
give them a point d'appui from which they could turn the whole
line. Some five hundred of them charged on horseback, but were met
by a very steady fire from the Artillery Rifles, while the guns
raked them with shrapnel. They reached a point within five hundred
yards of the building, but the fire was too hot, and they wheeled
round in rapid retreat. Dismounting in a mealie-patch they
skirmished up towards the farmhouse once more, but they were again
checked by the fire of the defenders and by a pompom which Colonel
Keir had brought up. No progress whatever was made by the attack in
this quarter.
In the meantime the fate which might have been foretold had
befallen the isolated detachment of Canadians and 28th Mounted
Infantry upon the extreme right. Bruce Carruthers, the Canadian
officer in command, behaved with the utmost gallantry, and was
splendidly seconded by his men. Overwhelmed by vastly superior
numbers, amid a perfect hail of bullets they fought like heroes to
the end. 'There have been few finer instances of heroism in the
course of the campaign,' says the reticent Kitchener in his
official despatch. Of the Canadians eighteen were hit out of
twenty-one, and the Mounted Infantry hard by lost thirty out of
forty-five before they surrendered.
This advantage gained upon the right flank was of no assistance to
the Boers in breaking the British line. The fact that it was so
makes it the more difficult to understand why this outpost was so
exposed. The burghers had practically surrounded Cookson's force,
and De la Rey and Kemp urged on the attack; but their artillery
fire was dominated by the British guns, and no weak point could be
found in the defence. At 1 o'clock the attack had been begun, and
at 5.30 it was finally abandoned, and De la Rey was in full
retreat. That he was in no sense routed is shown by the fact that
Cookson did not attempt to follow him up or to capture his guns;
but at least he had failed in his purpose, and had lost more
heavily than in any engagement which he had yet fought. The moral
effect of his previous victories had also been weakened, and his
burghers had learned, if they had illusions upon the subject, that
the men who fled at Tweebosch were not typical troopers of the
British Army. Altogether, it was a well-fought and useful action,
though it cost the British force some two hundred casualties, of
which thirty-five were fatal. Cookson's force stood to arms all
night until the arrival of Walter Kitchener's men in the morning.
General Ian Hamilton, who had acted for some time as Chief of the
Staff to Lord Kitchener, had arrived on April 8th at Klerksdorp to
take supreme command of the whole operations against De la Rey.
Early in April the three main British columns had made a rapid cast
round without success. To the very end the better intelligence and
the higher mobility seem to have remained upon the side of the
Boers, who could always force a fight when they wished and escape
when they wished. Occasionally, however, they forced one at the
wrong time, as in the instance which I am about to describe.
Hamilton had planned a drive to cover the southern portion of De la
Rey's country, and for this purpose, with Hartebeestefontein for
his centre, he was manoeuvring his columns so as to swing them into
line and then sweep back towards Klerksdorp. Kekewich, Rawlinson,
and Walter Kitchener were all manoeuvring for this purpose. The
Boers, however, game to the last, although they were aware that
their leaders had gone in to treat, and that peace was probably due
within a few days, determined to have one last gallant fall with a
British column. The forces of Kekewich were the farthest to the
westward, and also, as the burghers thought, the most isolated, and
it was upon them, accordingly, that the attack was made. In the
morning of April 11th, at a place called Rooiwal, the enemy, who
had moved up from Wolmaranstad, nineteen hundred strong, under Kemp
and Vermaas, fell with the utmost impetuosity upon the British
column. There was no preliminary skirmishing, and a single gallant
charge by 1500 Boers both opened and ended the engagement. 'I was
just saying to the staff officer that there were no Boers within
twenty miles,' says one who was present, 'when we heard a roar of
musketry and saw a lot of men galloping down on us.' The British
were surprised but not shaken by this unexpected apparition. 'I
never saw a more splendid attack. They kept a distinct line,' says
the eye-witness. Another spectator says, 'They came on in one long
line four deep and knee to knee.' It was an old-fashioned cavalry
charge, and the fact that it got as far as it did shows that we
have over rated the stopping power of modern rifles. They came for
a good five hundred yards under direct fire, and were only turned
within a hundred of the British line. The Yeomanry, the Scottish
Horse, and the Constabulary poured a steady fire upon the advancing
wave of horsemen, and the guns opened with case at two hundred
yards. The Boers were stopped, staggered, and turned. Their fire,
or rather the covering fire of those who had not joined in the
charge, had caused some fifty casualties, but their own losses were
very much more severe. The fierce Potgieter fell just in front of
the British guns. 'Thank goodness he is dead!' cried one of his
wounded burghers, 'for he sjamboked me into the firing line this
morning.' Fifty dead and a great number of wounded were left upon
the field of battle. Rawlinson's column came up on Kekewich's left,
and the Boer flight became a rout, for they were chased for twenty
miles, and their two guns were captured. It was a brisk and
decisive little engagement, and it closed the Western campaign,
leaving the last trick, as well as the game, to the credit of the
British. From this time until the end there was a gleaning of
prisoners but little fighting in De la Rey's country, the most
noteworthy event being a surprise visit to Schweizer-Renecke by
Rochfort, by which some sixty prisoners were taken, and afterwards
the drive of Ian Hamilton's forces against the Mafeking railway
line by which no fewer than 364 prisoners were secured. In this
difficult and well-managed operation the gaps between the British
columns were concealed by the lighting of long veld-fires and the
discharge of rifles by scattered scouts. The newly arrived
Australian Commonwealth Regiments gave a brilliant start to the
military history of their united country by the energy of their
marching and the thoroughness of their entrenching.
Upon May 29th, only two days before the final declaration of peace,
a raid was made by a few Boers upon the native cattle reserves near
Fredericstad. A handful of horsemen pursued them, and were ambushed
by a considerable body of the enemy in some hilly country ten miles
from the British lines. Most of the pursuers got away in safety,
but young Sutherland, second lieutenant of the Seaforths, and only
a few months from Eton, found himself separated from his horse and
in a hopeless position. Scorning to surrender, the lad actually
fought his way upon foot for over a mile before he was shot down by
the horsemen who circled round him. Well might the Boer commander
declare that in the whole course of the war he had seen no finer
example of British courage. It is indeed sad that at this last
instant a young life should be thrown away, but Sutherland died in
a noble fashion for a noble cause, and many inglorious years would
be a poor substitute for the example and tradition which such a
death will leave behind.
