CHAPTER 31.
THE GUERILLA WARFARE IN THE TRANSVAAL: NOOITGEDACHT.
Leaving De Wet in the Ficksburg mountains, where he lurked until
after the opening of the New Year, the story of the scattered
operations in the Transvaal may now be carried down to the same
point--a story comprising many skirmishes and one considerable
engagement, but so devoid of any central thread that it is
difficult to know how to approach it. From Lichtenburg to Komati, a
distance of four hundred miles, there was sporadic warfare
everywhere, attacks upon scattered posts, usually beaten off but
occasionally successful, attacks upon convoys, attacks upon railway
trains, attacks upon anything and everything which could harass the
invaders. Each General in his own district had his own work of
repression to perform, and so we had best trace the doings of each
up to the end of the year 1900.
Lord Methuen after his pursuit of De Wet in August had gone to
Mafeking to refit. From that point, with a force which contained a
large proportion of yeomanry and of Australian bushmen, he
conducted a long series of operations in the difficult and
important district which lies between Rustenburg, Lichtenburg, and
Zeerust. Several strong and mobile Boer commandos with guns moved
about in it, and an energetic though not very deadly warfare raged
between Lemmer, Snyman, and De la Rey on the one side, and the
troops of Methuen, Douglas, Broadwood, and Lord Errol upon the
other. Methuen moved about incessantly through the broken country,
winning small skirmishes and suffering the indignity of continual
sniping. From time to time he captured stores, wagons, and small
bodies of prisoners. Early in October he and Douglas had successes.
On the 15th Broadwood was engaged. On the 20th there was a convoy
action. On the 25th Methuen had a success and twenty-eight
prisoners. On November 9th he surprised Snyman and took thirty
prisoners. On the 10th he got a pom-pom. Early in this month
Douglas separated from Methuen, and marched south from Zeerust
through Ventersdorp to Klerksdorp, passing over a country which had
been hardly touched before, and arriving at his goal with much
cattle and some prisoners. Towards the end of the month a
considerable stock of provisions were conveyed to Zeerust, and a
garrison left to hold that town so as to release Methuen's column
for service elsewhere.
Hart's sphere of action was originally round Potchefstroom. On
September 9th he made a fine forced march to surprise this town,
which had been left some time before with an entirely inadequate
garrison to fall into the hands of the enemy. His infantry covered
thirty-six and his cavalry fifty-four miles in fifteen hours. The
operation was a complete success, the town with eighty Boers
falling into his hands with little opposition. On September 30th
Hart returned to Krugersdorp, where, save for one skirmish upon the
Gatsrand on November 22nd, he appears to have had no actual
fighting to do during the remainder of the year.
After the clearing of the eastern border of the Transvaal by the
movement of Pole-Carew along the railway line, and of Buller aided
by Ian Hamilton in the mountainous country to the north of it,
there were no operations of importance in this district. A guard
was kept upon the frontier to prevent the return of refugees and
the smuggling of ammunition, while General Kitchener, the brother
of the Sirdar, broke up a few small Boer laagers in the
neighbourhood of Lydenburg. Smith-Dorrien guarded the line at
Belfast, and on two occasions, November 1st and November 6th, he
made aggressive movements against the enemy. The first, which was a
surprise executed in concert with Colonel Spens of the Shropshires,
was frustrated by a severe blizzard, which prevented the troops
from pushing home their success. The second was a two days'
expedition, which met with a spirited opposition, and demands a
fuller notice.
This was made from Belfast, and the force, which consisted of about
fourteen hundred men, advanced south to the Komati River. The
infantry were Suffolks and Shropshires, the cavalry Canadians and
5th Lancers, with two Canadian guns and four of the 84th battery.
All day the Boer snipers clung to the column, as they had done to
French's cavalry in the same district. Mere route marches without a
very definite and adequate objective appear to be rather
exasperating than overawing, for so long as the column is moving
onwards the most timid farmer may be tempted into long-range fire
from the flanks or rear. The river was reached and the Boers driven
from a position which they had taken up, but their signal fires
brought mounted riflemen from every farm, and the retreat of the
troops was pressed as they returned to Belfast. There was all the
material for a South African Lexington. The most difficult of
military operations, the covering of a detachment from a numerous
and aggressive enemy, was admirably carried out by the Canadian
gunners and dragoons under the command of Colonel Lessard. So
severe was the pressure that sixteen of the latter were for a time
in the hands of the enemy, who attempted something in the nature of
a charge upon the steadfast rearguard. The movement was repulsed,
and the total Boer loss would appear to have been considerable,
since two of their leaders, Commandant Henry Prinsloo and General
Joachim Fourie, were killed, while General Johann Grobler was
wounded. If the rank and file suffered in proportion the losses
must have been severe. The British casualties in the two days
amounted to eight killed and thirty wounded, a small total when the
arduous nature of the service is considered. The Canadians and the
Shropshires seem to have borne off the honours of these trying
operations.
In the second week of October, General French, with three brigades
of cavalry (Dickson's, Gordon's, and Mahon's), started for a
cross-country ride from Machadodorp. Three brigades may seem an
imposing force, but the actual numbers did not exceed two strong
regiments, or about 1500 sabres in all. A wing of the Suffolk
Regiment went with them. On October 13th Mahon's brigade met with a
sharp resistance, and lost ten killed and twenty-nine wounded. On
the 14th the force entered Carolina. On the 16th they lost six
killed and twenty wounded, and from the day that they started until
they reached Heidelberg on the 27th there was never a day that they
could shake themselves clear of their attendant snipers. The total
losses of the force were about ninety killed and wounded, but they
brought in sixty prisoners and a large quantity of cattle and
stores. The march had at least the effect of making it clear that
the passage of a column of troops encumbered with baggage through a
hostile country is an inefficient means for quelling a popular
resistance. Light and mobile parties acting from a central depot
were in future to be employed, with greater hopes of success.
Some appreciable proportion of the British losses during this phase
of the war arose from railway accidents caused by the persistent
tampering with the lines. In the first ten days of October there
were four such mishaps, in which two Sappers, twenty-three of the
Guards (Coldstreams), and eighteen of the 66th battery were killed
or wounded. On the last occasion, which occurred on October 10th
near Vlakfontein, the reinforcements who came to aid the sufferers
were themselves waylaid, and lost twenty, mostly of the Rifle
Brigade, killed, wounded, or prisoners. Hardly a day elapsed that
the line was not cut at some point. The bringing of supplies was
complicated by the fact that the Boer women and children were
coming more and more into refugee camps, where they had to be fed
by the British, and the strange spectacle was frequently seen of
Boer snipers killing or wounding the drivers and stokers of the
very trains which were bringing up food upon which Boer families
were dependent for their lives. Considering that these tactics were
continued for over a year, and that they resulted in the death or
mutilation of many hundreds of British officers and men, it is
really inexplicable that the British authorities did not employ the
means used by all armies under such circumstances--which is to
place hostages upon the trains. A truckload of Boers behind every
engine would have stopped the practice for ever. Again and again in
this war the British have fought with the gloves when their
opponents used their knuckles.
We will pass now to a consideration of the doings of General Paget,
who was operating to the north and north-east of Pretoria with a
force which consisted of two regiments of infantry, about a
thousand horsemen, and twelve guns. His mounted men were under the
command of Plumer. In the early part of November this force had
been withdrawn from Warm Baths and had fallen back upon Pienaar's
River, where it had continual skirmishes with the enemy. Towards
the end of November, news having reached Pretoria that the enemy
under Erasmus and Viljoen were present in force at a place called
Rhenoster Kop, which is about twenty miles north of the Delagoa
Railway line and fifty miles north-east of the capital, it was
arranged that Paget should attack them from the south, while
Lyttelton from Middelburg should endeavour to get behind them. The
force with which Paget started upon this enterprise was not a very
formidable one. He had for mounted troops some Queensland, South
Australian, New Zealand, and Tasmanian Bushmen, together with the
York, Montgomery, and Warwick Yeomanry. His infantry were the 1st
West Riding regiment and four companies of the Munsters. His guns
were the 7th and 38th batteries, with two naval quick-firing
twelve-pounders and some smaller pieces. The total could not have
exceeded some two thousand men. Here, as at other times, it is
noticeable that in spite of the two hundred thousand soldiers whom
the British kept in the field, the lines of communication absorbed
so many that at the actual point of contact they were seldom
superior and often inferior in numbers to the enemy. The opening of
the Natal and Delagoa lines though valuable in many ways, had been
an additional drain. Where every culvert needs its picket and every
bridge its company, the guardianship of many hundreds of miles of
rail is no light matter.
In the early morning of November 29th Paget's men came in contact
with the enemy, who were in some force upon an admirable position.
A ridge for their centre, a flanking kopje for their cross fire,
and a grass glacis for the approach--it was an ideal Boer
battlefield. The colonials and the yeomanry under Plumer on the
left, and Hickman on the right, pushed in upon them, until it was
evident that they meant to hold their ground. Their advance being
checked by a very severe fire, the horsemen dismounted and took
such cover as they could. Paget's original idea had been a turning
movement, but the Boers were the more numerous body, and it was
impossible for the smaller British force to find their flanks, for
they extended over at least seven miles. The infantry were moved up
into the centre, therefore, between the wings of dismounted
horsemen, and the guns were brought up to cover the advance. The
country was ill-suited, however, to the use of artillery, and it
was only possible to use an indirect fire from under a curve of the
grass land. The guns made good practice, however, one section of
the 38th battery being in action all day within 800 yards of the
Boer line, and putting themselves out of action after 300 rounds by
the destruction of their own rifling. Once over the curve every
yard of the veld was commanded by the hidden riflemen. The infantry
advanced, but could make no headway against the deadly fire which
met them. By short rushes the attack managed to get within 300
yards of the enemy, and there it stuck. On the right the Munsters
carried a detached kopje which was in front of them, but could do
little to aid the main attack. Nothing could have exceeded the
tenacity of the Yorkshiremen and the New Zealanders, who were
immediately to their left. Though unable to advance they refused to
retire, and indeed they were in a position from which a retirement
would have been a serious operation. Colonel Lloyd of the West
Ridings was hit in three places and killed. Five out of six
officers of the New Zealand corps were struck down. There were no
reserves to give a fresh impetus to the attack, and the thin
scattered line, behind bullet-spotted stones or anthills, could but
hold its own while the sun sank slowly upon a day which will not be
forgotten by those who endured it. The Boers were reinforced in the
afternoon, and the pressure became so severe that the field guns
were retired with much difficulty. Many of the infantry had shot
away all their cartridges and were helpless. Just one year before
British soldiers had lain under similar circumstances on the plain
which leads to Modder River, and now on a smaller scale the very
same drama was being enacted. Gradually the violet haze of evening
deepened into darkness, and the incessant rattle of the rifle fire
died away on either side. Again, as at Modder River, the British
infantry still lay in their position, determined to take no
backward step, and again the Boers stole away in the night, leaving
the ridge which they had defended so well. A hundred killed and
wounded was the price paid by the British for that line of rock
studded hills--a heavier proportion of losses than had befallen
Lord Methuen in the corresponding action. Of the Boer losses there
was as usual no means of judging, but several grave-mounds, newly
dug, showed that they also had something to deplore. Their retreat,
however, was not due to exhaustion, but to the demonstration which
Lyttelton had been able to make in their rear. The gunners and the
infantry had all done well in a most trying action, but by common
consent it was with the men from New Zealand that the honours lay.
It was no empty compliment when Sir Alfred Milner telegraphed to
the Premier of New Zealand his congratulations upon the
distinguished behaviour of his fellow countrymen.
From this time onwards there was nothing of importance in this part
of the seat of war.
It is necessary now to turn from the north-east to the north-west
of Pretoria, where the presence of De la Rey and the cover afforded
by the Magaliesberg mountains had kept alive the Boer resistance.
Very rugged lines of hill, alternating with fertile valleys,
afforded a succession of forts and of granaries to the army which
held them. To General Clements' column had been committed the task
of clearing this difficult piece of country. His force fluctuated
in numbers, but does not appear at any time to have consisted of
more than three thousand men, which comprised the Border Regiment,
the Yorkshire Light Infantry, the second Northumberland Fusiliers,
mounted infantry, yeomanry, the 8th R.F.A., P battery R.H.A., and
one heavy gun. With this small army he moved about the district,
breaking up Boer bands, capturing supplies, and bringing in
refugees. On November 13th he was at Krugersdorp, the southern
extremity of his beat. On the 24th he was moving north again, and
found himself as he approached the hills in the presence of a force
of Boers with cannon. This was the redoubtable De la Rey, who
sometimes operated in Methuen's country to the north of the
Magaliesberg, and sometimes to the south. He had now apparently
fixed upon Clements as his definite opponent. De la Rey was
numerically inferior, and Clements had no difficulty in this first
encounter in forcing him back with some loss. On November 26th
Clements was back at Krugersdorp again with cattle and prisoners.
In the early days of December he was moving northwards once more,
where a serious disaster awaited him. Before narrating the
circumstances connected with the Battle of Nooitgedacht there is
one incident which occurred in this same region which should be
recounted.
This consists of the determined attack made by a party of De la
Rey's men, upon December 3rd, on a convoy which was proceeding from
Pretoria to Rustenburg, and had got as far as Buffel's Hoek. The
convoy was a very large one, consisting of 150 wagons, which
covered about three miles upon the march. It was guarded by two
companies of the West Yorkshires, two guns of the 75th battery, and
a handful of the Victoria Mounted Rifles. The escort appears
entirely inadequate when it is remembered that these stores, which
were of great value, were being taken through a country which was
known to be infested by the enemy. What might have been foreseen
occurred. Five hundred Boers suddenly rode down upon the helpless
line of wagons and took possession of them. The escort rallied,
however, upon a kopje, and, though attacked all day, succeeded in
holding their own until help arrived. They prevented the Boers from
destroying or carrying off as much of the convoy as was under their
guns, but the rest was looted and burned. The incident was a most
unfortunate one, as it supplied the enemy with a large quantity of
stores, of which they were badly in need. It was the more
irritating as it was freely rumoured that a Boer attack was
pending; and there is evidence that a remonstrance was addressed
from the convoy before it left Rietfontein to the General of the
district, pointing out the danger to which it was exposed. The
result was the loss of 120 wagons and of more than half the escort.
The severity of the little action and the hardihood of the defence
are indicated by the fact that the small body who held the kopje
lost fifteen killed and twenty-two wounded, the gunners losing nine
out of fifteen. A relieving force appeared at the close of the
action, but no vigorous pursuit was attempted, although the weather
was wet and the Boers had actually carried away sixty loaded
wagons, which could only go very slowly. It must be confessed that
from its feckless start to its spiritless finish the story of the
Buffel's Hoek convoy is not a pleasant one to tell.
Clements, having made his way once more to the Magaliesberg range,
had pitched his camp at a place called Nooitgedacht--not to be
confused with the post upon the Delagoa Railway at which the
British prisoners had been confined. Here, in the very shadow of
the mountain, he halted for five days, during which, with the usual
insouciance of British commanders, he does not seem to have
troubled himself with any entrenching. He knew, no doubt, that he
was too strong for his opponent De la Rey, but what he did not
know, but might have feared, was that a second Boer force might
appear suddenly upon the scene and join with De la Rey in order to
crush him. This second Boer force was that of Commandant Beyers
from Warm Baths. By a sudden and skilful movement the two united,
and fell like a thunderbolt upon the British column, which was
weakened by the absence of the Border Regiment. The result was such
a reverse as the British had not sustained since Sanna's Post--a
reverse which showed that, though no regular Boer army might exist,
still a sudden coalition of scattered bands could at any time
produce a force which would be dangerous to any British column
which might be taken at a disadvantage. We had thought that the
days of battles in this war were over, but an action which showed a
missing and casualty roll of 550 proved that in this, as in so many
other things, we were mistaken.
As already stated, the camp of Clements lay under a precipitous
cliff, upon the summit of which he had placed four companies of the
2nd Northumberland Fusiliers. This strong post was a thousand feet
higher than the camp. Below lay the main body of the force, two
more companies of fusiliers, four of Yorkshire Light Infantry, the
2nd Mounted Infantry, Kitchener's Horse, yeomanry, and the
artillery. The latter consisted of one heavy naval gun, four guns
of the 8th R.F.A., and P battery R.H.A. The whole force amounted to
about fifteen hundred men.
It was just at the first break of dawn--the hour of fate in South
African warfare--that the battle began. The mounted infantry post
between the camp and the mountains were aware of moving figures in
front of them. In the dim light they could discern that they were
clothed in grey, and that they wore the broad-brimmed hats and
feathers of some of our own irregular corps. They challenged, and
the answer was a shattering volley, instantly returned by the
survivors of the picket. So hot was the Boer attack that before
help could come every man save one of the picket was on the ground.
The sole survivor, Daley of the Dublins, took no backward step, but
continued to steadily load and fire until help came from the
awakened camp. There followed a savage conflict at point
blank-range. The mounted infantry men, rushing half clad to the
support of their comrades, were confronted by an ever-thickening
swarm of Boer riflemen, who had already, by working round on the
flank, established their favourite cross fire. Legge, the leader of
the mounted infantry, a hard little Egyptian veteran, was shot
through the head, and his men lay thick around him. For some
minutes it was as hot a corner as any in the war. But Clements
himself had appeared upon the scene, and his cool gallantry turned
the tide of fight. An extension of the line checked the cross fire,
and gave the British in turn a flanking position. Gradually the
Boer riflemen were pushed back, until at last they broke and fled
for their horses in the rear. A small body were cut off, many of
whom were killed and wounded, while a few were taken prisoners.
This stiff fight of an hour had ended in a complete repulse of the
attack, though at a considerable cost. Both Boers and British had
lost heavily. Nearly all the staff were killed or wounded, though
General Clements had come through untouched. Fifty or sixty of both
sides had fallen. But it was noted as an ominous fact that in spite
of shell fire the Boers still lingered upon the western flank. Were
they coming on again? They showed no signs of it. And yet they
waited in groups, and looked up towards the beetling crags above
them. What were they waiting for? The sudden crash of a murderous
Mauser fire upon the summit, with the rolling volleys of the
British infantry, supplied the answer.
Only now must it have been clear to Clements that he was not
dealing merely with some spasmodic attack from his old enemy De la
Rey, but that this was a largely conceived movement, in which a
force at least double the strength of his own had suddenly been
concentrated upon him. His camp was still menaced by the men whom
he had repulsed, and he could not weaken it by sending
reinforcements up the hill. But the roar of the musketry was rising
louder and louder. It was becoming clearer that there was the main
attack. It was a Majuba Hill action up yonder, a thick swarm of
skirmishers closing in from many sides upon a central band of
soldiers. But the fusiliers were hopelessly outnumbered, and this
rock fighting is that above all others in which the Boer has an
advantage over the regular. A helio on the hill cried for help. The
losses were heavy, it said, and the assailants numerous. The Boers
closed swiftly in upon the flanks, and the fusiliers were no match
for their assailants. Till the very climax the helio still cried
that they were being overpowered, and it is said that even while
working it the soldier in charge was hurled over the cliff by the
onrush of the victorious Boers.
The fight of the mounted infantry men had been at half-past four.
At six the attack upon the hill had developed, and Clements in
response to those frantic flashes of light had sent up a hundred
men of the yeomanry, from the Fife and Devon squadrons, as a
reinforcement. To climb a precipitous thousand feet with rifle,
bandolier, and spurs, is no easy feat, yet that roar of battle
above them heartened them upon their way. But in spite of all their
efforts they were only in time to share the general disaster. The
head of the line of hard-breathing yeomen reached the plateau just
as the Boers, sweeping over the remnants of the Northumberland
Fusiliers, reached the brink of the cliff. One by one the yeomen
darted over the edge, and endeavoured to find some cover in the
face of an infernal point-blank fire. Captain Mudie of the staff,
who went first, was shot down. So was Purvis of the Fifes, who
followed him. The others, springing over their bodies, rushed for a
small trench, and tried to restore the fight. Lieutenant Campbell,
a gallant young fellow, was shot dead as he rallied his men. Of
twenty-seven of the Fifeshires upon the hill six were killed and
eleven wounded. The statistics of the Devons are equally heroic.
Those yeomen who had not yet reached the crest were in a perfectly
impossible position, as the Boers were firing from complete cover
right down upon them. There was no alternative for them but
surrender. By seven o'clock every British soldier upon the hill,
yeoman or fusilier, had been killed, wounded, or taken. It is not
true that the supply of cartridges ran out, and the fusiliers, with
the ill-luck which has pursued the 2nd battalion, were outnumbered
and outfought by better skirmishers than themselves.
Seldom has a General found himself in a more trying position than
Clements, or extricated himself more honourably. Not only had he
lost nearly half his force, but his camp was no longer tenable, and
his whole army was commanded by the fringe of deadly rifles upon
the cliff. From the berg to the camp was from 800 to 1000 yards,
and a sleet of bullets whistled down upon it. How severe was the
fire may be gauged from the fact that the little pet monkey
belonging to the yeomanry--a small enough object--was hit three
times, though he lived to survive as a battle-scarred veteran.
Those wounded in the early action found themselves in a terrible
position, laid out in the open under a withering fire, 'like
helpless Aunt Sallies,' as one of them described it. 'We must get a
red flag up, or we shall be blown off the face of the earth,' says
the same correspondent, a corporal of the Ceylon Mounted Infantry.
'We had a pillow-case, but no red paint. Then we saw what would do
instead, so they made the upright with my blood, and the horizontal
with Paul's.' It is pleasant to add that this grim flag was
respected by the Boers. Bullocks and mules fell in heaps, and it
was evident that the question was not whether the battle could be
restored, but whether the guns could be saved. Leaving a fringe of
yeomen, mounted infantry, and Kitchener's Horse to stave off the
Boers, who were already descending by the same steep kloof up which
the yeomen had climbed, the General bent all his efforts to getting
the big naval gun out of danger. Only six oxen were left out of a
team of forty, and so desperate did the situation appear that twice
dynamite was placed beneath the gun to destroy it. Each time,
however, the General intervened, and at last, under a stimulating
rain of pom-pom shells, the great cannon lurched slowly forward,
quickening its pace as the men pulled on the drag-ropes, and the
six oxen broke into a wheezy canter. Its retreat was covered by the
smaller guns which rained shrapnel upon the crest of the hill, and
upon the Boers who were descending to the camp. Once the big gun
was out of danger, the others limbered up and followed, their rear
still covered by the staunch mounted infantry, with whom rest all
the honours of the battle. Cookson and Brooks with 250 men stood
for hours between Clements and absolute disaster. The camp was
abandoned as it stood, and all the stores, four hundred picketed
horses, and, most serious of all, two wagons of ammunition, fell
into the hands of the victors. To have saved all his guns, however,
after the destruction of half his force by an active enemy far
superior to him in numbers and in mobility, was a feat which goes
far to condone the disaster, and to increase rather than to impair
the confidence which his troops feel in General Clements. Having
retreated for a couple of miles he turned his big gun round upon
the hill, which is called Yeomanry Hill, and opened fire upon the
camp, which was being looted by swarms of Boers. So bold a face did
he present that he was able to remain with his crippled force upon
Yeomanry Hill from about nine until four in the afternoon, and no
attack was pressed home, though he lay under both shell and rifle
fire all day. At four in the afternoon he began his retreat, which
did not cease till he had reached Rietfontein, twenty miles off, at
six o'clock upon the following morning. His weary men had been
working for twenty-six hours, and actually fighting for fourteen,
but the bitterness of defeat was alleviated by the feeling that
every man, from the General downwards, had done all that was
possible, and that there was every prospect of their having a
chance before long of getting their own back.
The British losses at the battle of Nooitgedacht amounted to 60
killed, 180 wounded, and 315 prisoners, all of whom were delivered
up a few days later at Rustenburg. Of the Boer losses it is, as
usual, impossible to speak with confidence, but all the evidence
points to their actual casualties being as heavy as those of the
British. There was the long struggle at the camp in which they were
heavily punished, the fight on the mountain, where they exposed
themselves with unusual recklessness, and the final shelling from
shrapnel and from lyddite. All accounts agree that their attack was
more open than usual. 'They were mowed down in twenties that day,
but it had no effect. They stood like fanatics,' says one who
fought against them. From first to last their conduct was most
gallant, and great credit is due to their leaders for the skilful
sudden concentration by which they threw their whole strength upon
the exposed force. Some eighty miles separate Warm Baths from
Nooitgedacht, and it seems strange that our Intelligence Department
should have remained in ignorance of so large a movement.
General Broadwood's 2nd Cavalry Brigade had been stationed to the
north of Magaliesberg, some twelve miles westward of Clements, and
formed the next link in the long chain of British forces. Broadwood
does not appear, however, to have appreciated the importance of the
engagement, and made no energetic movement to take part in it. If
Colvile is open to the charge of having been slow to 'march upon
the cannon' at Sanna's Post, it might be urged that Broadwood in
turn showed some want of energy and judgment upon this occasion. On
the morning of the 13th his force could hear the heavy firing to
the eastward, and could even see the shells bursting on the top of
the Magaliesberg. It was but ten or twelve miles distant, and, as
his Elswick guns have a range of nearly five, a very small advance
would have enabled him to make a demonstration against the flank of
the Boers, and so to relieve the pressure upon Clements. It is true
that his force was not large, but it was exceptionally mobile.
Whatever the reasons, no effective advance was made by Broadwood.
On hearing the result he fell back upon Rustenburg, the nearest
British post, his small force being dangerously isolated.
Those who expected that General Clements would get his own back had
not long to wait. In a few days he was in the field again. The
remains of his former force had, however, been sent into Pretoria
to refit, and nothing remained of it save the 8th R.F.A. and the
indomitable cow-gun still pocked with the bullets of Nooitgedacht.
He had also F battery R.H.A., the Inniskillings, the Border
regiment, and a force of mounted infantry under Alderson. More
important than all, however, was the co-operation of General
French, who came out from Pretoria to assist in the operations. On
the 19th, only six days after his defeat, Clements found himself on
the very same spot fighting some at least of the very same men.
This time, however, there was no element of surprise, and the
British were able to approach the task with deliberation and
method. The result was that both upon the 19th and 20th the Boers
were shelled out of successive positions with considerable loss,
and driven altogether away from that part of the Magaliesberg.
Shortly afterwards General Clements was recalled to Pretoria, to
take over the command of the 7th Division, General Tucker having
been appointed to the military command of Bloemfontein in the place
of the gallant Hunter, who, to the regret of the whole army, was
invalided home. General Cunningham henceforward commanded the
column which Clements had led back to the Magaliesberg.
Upon November 13th the first of a series of attacks was made upon
the posts along the Delagoa Railway line. These were the work of
Viljoen's commando, who, moving swiftly from the north, threw
themselves upon the small garrisons of Balmoral and of Wilge River,
stations which are about six miles apart. At the former was a
detachment of the Buffs, and at the latter of the Royal Fusiliers.
The attack was well delivered, but in each instance was beaten back
with heavy loss to the assailants. A picket of the Buffs was
captured at the first rush, and the detachment lost six killed and
nine wounded. No impression was made upon the position, however,
and the double attack seems to have cost the Boers a large number
of casualties.
Another incident calling for some mention was the determined attack
made by the Boers upon the town of Vryheid, in the extreme
south-east of the Transvaal near the Natal border. Throughout
November this district had been much disturbed, and the small
British garrison had evacuated the town and taken up a position on
the adjacent hills. Upon December 11th the Boers attempted to carry
the trenches. The garrison of the town appears to have consisted of
the 2nd Royal Lancaster regiment, some five hundred strong, a party
of the Lancashire Fusiliers, 150 strong, and fifty men of the Royal
Garrison Artillery, with a small body of mounted infantry. They
held a hill about half a mile north of the town, and commanding it.
The attack, which was a surprise in the middle of the night, broke
upon the pickets of the British, who held their own in a way which
may have been injudicious but was certainly heroic. Instead of
falling back when seriously attacked, the young officers in charge
of these outposts refused to move, and were speedily under such a
fire that it was impossible to reinforce them. There were four
outposts, under Woodgate, Theobald, Lippert, and Mangles. The
attack at 2.15 on a cold dark morning began at the post held by
Woodgate, the Boers coming hand-to-hand before they were detected.
Woodgate, who was unarmed at the instant, seized a hammer, and
rushed at the nearest Boer, but was struck by two bullets and
killed. His post was dispersed or taken. Theobald and Lippert,
warned by the firing, held on behind their sangars, and were ready
for the storm which burst over them. Lippert was unhappily killed,
and his ten men all hit or taken, but young Theobald held his own
under a heavy fire for twelve hours. Mangles also, the gallant son
of a gallant father, held his post all day with the utmost
tenacity. The troops in the trenches behind were never seriously
pressed, thanks to the desperate resistance of the outposts, but
Colonel Gawne of the Lancasters was unfortunately killed. Towards
evening the Boers abandoned the attack, leaving fourteen of their
number dead upon the ground, from which it may be guessed that
their total casualties were not less than a hundred. The British
losses were three officers and five men killed, twenty-two men
wounded, and thirty men with one officer missing--the latter being
the survivors of those outposts which were overwhelmed by the Boer
advance.
A few incidents stand out among the daily bulletins of snipings,
skirmishes, and endless marchings which make the dull chronicle of
these, the last months of the year 1900. These must be enumerated
without any attempt at connecting them. The first is the
long-drawn-out siege or investment of Schweizer-Renecke. This small
village stands upon the Harts River, on the western border of the
Transvaal. It is not easy to understand why the one party should
desire to hold, or the other to attack, a position so
insignificant. From August 19th onwards it was defended by a
garrison of 250 men, under the very capable command of Colonel
Chamier, who handled a small business in a way which marks him as a
leader. The Boer force, which varied in numbers from five hundred
to a thousand, never ventured to push home an attack, for Chamier,
fresh from the experience of Kimberley, had taken such precautions
that his defences were formidable, if not impregnable. Late in
September a relieving force under Colonel Settle threw fresh
supplies into the town, but when he passed on upon his endless
march the enemy closed in once more, and the siege was renewed. It
lasted for several months, until a column withdrew the garrison and
abandoned the position.
Of all the British detachments, the two which worked hardest and
marched furthest during this period of the war was the 21st Brigade
(Derbysbires, Sussex, and Camerons) under General Bruce Hamilton,
and the column under Settle, which operated down the western border
of the Orange River Colony, and worked round and round with such
pertinacity that it was familiarly known as Settle's Imperial
Circus. Much hard and disagreeable work, far more repugnant to the
soldier than the actual dangers of war, fell to the lot of Bruce
Hamilton and his men. With Kroonstad as their centre they were
continually working through the dangerous Lindley and Heilbron
districts, returning to the railway line only to start again
immediately upon a fresh quest. It was work for mounted police, not
for infantry soldiers, but what they were given to do they did to
the best of their ability. Settle's men had a similar thankless
task. From the neighbourhood of Kimberley he marched in November
with his small column down the border of the Orange River Colony,
capturing supplies and bringing in refugees. He fought one brisk
action with Hertzog's commando at Kloof, and then, making his way
across the colony, struck the railway line again at Edenburg on
December 7th, with a train of prisoners and cattle.
Rundle also had put in much hard work in his efforts to control the
difficult district in the north-east of the Colony which had been
committed to his care. He traversed in November from north to south
the same country which he had already so painfully traversed from
south to north. With occasional small actions he moved about from
Vrede to Reitz, and so to Bethlehem and Harrismith. On him, as on
all other commanders, the vicious system of placing small garrisons
in the various towns imposed a constant responsibility lest they
should be starved or overwhelmed.
The year and the century ended by a small reverse to the British
arms in the Transvaal. This consisted in the capture of a post at
Helvetia defended by a detachment of the Liverpool Regiment and by
a 4.7 gun. Lydenburg, being seventy miles off the railway line, had
a chain of posts connecting it with the junction at Machadodorp.
These posts were seven in number, ten miles apart, each defended by
250 men. Of these Helvetia was the second. The key of the position
was a strongly fortified hill about three-quarters of a mile from
the headquarter camp, and commanding it. This post was held by
Captain Kirke with forty garrison artillery to work the big gun,
and seventy Liverpool infantry. In spite of the barbed-wire
entanglements, the Boers most gallantly rushed this position, and
their advance was so rapid, or the garrison so slow, that the place
was carried with hardly a shot fired. Major Cotton, who commanded
the main lines, found himself deprived in an instant of nearly half
his force and fiercely attacked by a victorious and exultant enemy.
His position was much too extended for the small force at his
disposal, and the line of trenches was pierced and enfiladed at
many points. It must be acknowledged that the defences were badly
devised--little barbed wire, frail walls, large loopholes, and the
outposts so near the trenches that the assailants could reach them
as quickly as the supports. With the dawn Cotton's position was
serious, if not desperate. He was not only surrounded, but was
commanded from Gun Hill. Perhaps it would have been wiser if, after
being wounded, he had handed over the command to Jones, his junior
officer. A stricken man's judgement can never be so sound as that
of the hale. However that may be, he came to the conclusion that
the position was untenable, and that it was best to prevent further
loss of life. Fifty of the Liverpools were killed and wounded, 200
taken. No ammunition of the gun was captured, but the Boers were
able to get safely away with this humiliating evidence of their
victory. One post, under Captain Wilkinson with forty men, held out
with success, and harassed the enemy in their retreat. As at
Dewetsdorp and at Nooitgedacht. the Boers were unable to retain
their prisoners, so that the substantial fruits of their enterprise
were small, but it forms none the less one more of those incidents
which may cause us to respect our enemy and to be critical towards
ourselves. [Footnote: Considering that Major Stapelton Cotton was
himself wounded in three places during the action (one of these
wounds being in the head), he has had hard measure in being
deprived of his commission by a court-martial which sat eight
months after the event. It is to be earnestly hoped that there may
be some revision of this severe sentence.]
In the last few months of the year some of those corps which had
served their time or which were needed elsewhere were allowed to
leave the seat of war. By the middle of November the three
different corps of the City Imperial Volunteers, the two Canadian
contingents, Lumsden's Horse, the Composite Regiment of Guards, six
hundred Australians, A battery R.H.A., and the volunteer companies
of the regular regiments, were all homeward bound. This loss of
several thousand veteran troops before the war was over was to be
deplored, and though unavoidable in the case of volunteer
contingents, it is difficult to explain where regular troops are
concerned. Early in the new year the Government was compelled to
send out strong reinforcements to take their place.
Early in December Lord Roberts also left the country, to take over
the duties of Commander-in-Chief. High as his reputation stood
when, in January, he landed at Cape Town, it is safe to say that it
had been immensely enhanced when, ten months later, he saw from the
quarter-deck of the 'Canada' the Table Mountain growing dimmer in
the distance. He found a series of disconnected operations, in
which we were uniformly worsted. He speedily converted them into a
series of connected operations in which we were almost uniformly
successful. Proceeding to the front at the beginning of February,
within a fortnight he had relieved Kimberley, within a month he had
destroyed Cronje's force, and within six weeks he was in
Bloemfontein. Then, after a six weeks' halt which could not
possibly have been shortened, he made another of his tiger leaps,
and within a month had occupied Johannesburg and Pretoria. From
that moment the issue of the campaign was finally settled, and
though a third leap was needed, which carried him to Komatipoort,
and though brave and obstinate men might still struggle against
their destiny, he had done what was essential, and the rest,
however difficult, was only the detail of the campaign. A kindly
gentleman, as well as a great soldier, his nature revolted from all
harshness, and a worse man might have been a better leader in the
last hopeless phases of the war. He remembered, no doubt, how Grant
had given Lee's army their horses, but Lee at the time had been
thoroughly beaten, and his men had laid down their arms. A similar
boon to the partially conquered Boers led to very different
results, and the prolongation of the war is largely due to this act
of clemency. At the same time political and military considerations
were opposed to each other upon the point, and his moral position
in the use of harsher measures is the stronger since a policy of
conciliation had been tried and failed. Lord Roberts returned to
London with the respect and love of his soldiers and of his
fellow-countrymen. A passage from his farewell address to his
troops may show the qualities which endeared him to them.
'The service which the South African Force has performed is, I
venture to think, unique in the annals of war, inasmuch as it has
been absolutely almost incessant for a whole year, in some cases
for more than a year. There has been no rest, no days off to
recruit, no going into winter quarters, as in other campaigns which
have extended over a long period. For months together, in fierce
heat, in biting cold, in pouring rain, you, my comrades, have
marched and fought without halt, and bivouacked without shelter
from the elements. You frequently have had to continue marching
with your clothes in rags and your boots without soles, time being
of such consequence that it was impossible for you to remain long
enough in one place to refit. When not engaged in actual battle you
have been continually shot at from behind kopjes by invisible
enemies to whom every inch of the country was familiar, and who,
from the peculiar nature of the country, were able to inflict
severe punishment while perfectly safe themselves. You have forced
your way through dense jungles, over precipitous mountains, through
and over which with infinite manual labour you have had to drag
heavy guns and ox-wagons. You have covered with almost incredible
speed enormous distances, and that often on very short supplies of
food. You have endured the sufferings inevitable in war to sick and
wounded men far from the base, without a murmur and even with
cheerfulness.'
The words reflect honour both upon the troops addressed and upon
the man who addressed them. From the middle of December 1900 Lord
Kitchener took over the control of the campaign.
